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Introduction 
  
"The dignity of the human person? The expression means nothing if it does not signify that by 
virtue of natural law, the human person has the right to be respected, it is the subject of rights, 
possesses rights." 
                    Jacques Maritain 
 
 
This dissertation defends a familiar thesis: the dignity of the human person relates in some 
fundamental ways to the possession of moral human rights. It does not appeal to a virtuous, 
dignified life, or to a moral code that each person must live by, for a person to be considered 
right-worthy or for that matter worthy of human dignity. The truth about having moral rights and 
being possessed of dignity is compellingly consistent and mutually reinforcing, in that both are 
accorded to persons simply in virtue of some fundamental quality constitutive to their being 
human. If references to human dignity are to mean something in moral philosophy, what we 
think about human dignity must measure up to the argument we find compelling about moral 
rights.  
I try to establish that human dignity plays  a dual role in the constitution of moral human rights. I 
argue that dignity is a moral status of the human person as being the holder of such rights and, at 
the same time, it is the content of certain rights: some rights can be regarded as immediate 
instances of this general status, for they directly protect the very moral status that persons have. I 
take it that rights-claims relating to the protection of persons from degrading and humiliating 
treatments are more pertinent to respect for the dignity of persons. In other words, the dignity of 
persons is constituted by these rights for which it serves as their content. There is an interesting 
quality of the dignitarian content that is aptly manifested in prohibitions against degrading and 
humiliating treatments; in addition to that, any given moral right can be overlaid by this 
dignitarian content and thereby conferred additional stringency to its claim. For instance, with 
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this additional content a right-claim over others' stepping unbidden on one's feet can be given a 
dignitarian gloss if further facts about the intention of the perpetrator obtain such that if by his 
act he intends to degrade or humiliate his victim.  
The thesis defended here is not very far removed from the mainstream doctrine about human 
dignity in the human rights discourse, in which appeals to human dignity are often made either to 
underlie or to repackage specific human rights claims. On the view that I defend in this 
dissertation, human dignity is tied to moral human rights in slightly distinct ways than what is 
articulated by the prevailing contemporary conception, according to which human dignity 
grounds those rights. But my overall thesis functions under a similar theoretical framework that 
warrants the mainstream view.  
This dissertation consists of five chapters, organized in ways that I believe will unveil the logical 
flow of my argument; to that end, I begin with alternative ways of conceiving human dignity 
arranged in an ascending order of how pervasive that each one's perceived challenge to my main 
thesis appears to be. After having traced the implication that the discussion in each chapter has 
on the rest, I then proceed to refute rival views while dialectically structuring the argument for 
my overall thesis as I go along with my critique of alternative ways of conceiving human dignity.  
Chapter one takes on critics of the mainstream doctrine according to which dignity is in some 
fundamental sense related to moral rights. In it, I identified three types of challenges to human 
dignity: the problem of content, the problem of concretization and the justification paradox. In 
this chapter, after doing justice to these three challenges I then laid down plausible ways of 
refuting them. Within the problem of content, there is an expansive discussion on what I consider 
to be the most threatening challenge to the mainstream view of human dignity: it is called the 
redundancy thesis, which basically claims that the content of human dignity is fully contained in 
other more familiar concepts such as autonomy or moral rights. Whereas, the problem of 
concretization states that the notion of dignity is inherently abstract that it is stubbornly 
unyielding to principled efforts at applying it to concrete moral contexts. That illustrates why 
appeals to dignity are often made by both sides in a debate about controversial issues in applied 
ethics. In response, I must say that the observation that dignity may be excessively abstract 
provides us a further reason to clarify the concept than a reason to give it up. Moving on to the 
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justification paradox, it must be noted that its challenge is specifically directed at the mainstream 
conception of dignity as a foundation of rights. Its main claim is that none of the most promising 
secular conceptions of dignity are suitable candidates for justifying human rights that are 
attributed to all human beings in virtue of their humanity; but if one wants to defend a dignitarian 
foundation of human rights, one has to abandon secular conceptions and instead adopt a religious 
conception of dignity have by all human beings for they are the Imagio Dei. Hence the paradox. 
Since my preferred conception of dignity is not strictly foundationalist, the justification paradox 
has no bearing on it. Furthermore, I argue that the justification paradox rests on a false 
dichotomy: clearly, there are secular conceptions that seek to confer dignity to all humans 
without making appeal to religious authority, or for that matter to any other metaphysical view of 
the nature of things.  
Chapter two discusses the orthodox view that human dignity grounds moral human rights. It 
explores the thesis that "rights are derived from the inherent dignity of the human person," first 
by drawing on Jeremy Waldron's analysis of four senses in which one concept can be considered 
as a foundation for another: foundation could mean historical origin or genealogy, a source of 
legitimacy, a genuine basis of validity or it could also mean shading indispensable light on 
another concept.1 Then, in the more substantive section of this chapter, I put to test each of the 
four senses against established intuitions about human dignity and thereby determine the most 
adequate sense in which human dignity may be declared a foundation for moral human rights.  
In the first place, when philosophers speak of normative foundations of a concept (such as the 
concept of rights) they seldom take seriously its genealogy or how it has evolved into the shape 
and content of its current use. Incidentally, it is not easy to establish whether or not the discourse 
on human dignity is the precursor to the contemporary discourse about moral human rights. By 
turning the tables, some have argued that human dignity has gained recent currency due to the 
coming to prominence of the idea of human rights in post WWII international legal and political 
discourses. Dignity as a foundation for human rights in the second sense means that it confers 
legitimacy to the claims human rights have on us. Legitimacy may, in turn, be understood in two 
                                                          
1
   Jeremy Waldron. "Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?" in Rowan Cruft, et.al (eds.) Philosophical   
Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) pp. 117-137 
9 
 
distinct senses: it may mean a source of legal validity in the same sense as Hans Kelsen speaks of 
grundnorm or it may mean moral appeal—precisely in the sense Jürgen Habermas conceives of 
human dignity.2 Thirdly, dignity can be conceived as a foundation in the sense that it justifies 
human rights claims. Later in this introduction I shall have a few things to say about this sense of 
foundation, deemed by many, including Waldron, as the most influential conception of human 
dignity in the human rights discourse. I argue that human dignity cannot be a foundation to moral 
rights in this most robust sense of a foundation, i.e. as a genuine source of their validity. And 
fourthly, human dignity maybe said to be foundational to human rights for it illuminates our 
understanding of the nature and moral significance of rights. While not as directly relevant to the 
normative underpinning of human rights claims, according to this fourth sense of foundation, 
dignity could still play a significant role in shedding light on the moral significance of being 
possessed of rights.  
Having established that it is not plausible to think of human dignity as a foundation in the strict 
sense, i.e., as a source of validity for human rights claims, then in chapter three I will explore a 
conceptual framework that tries to disentangle dignity from rights while maintaining an 
important place for both concepts at the normative core of inter-personal morality. It is in this 
chapter that I consider thought experiments by Joel Feinberg, Michael J Meyer including a 
reconfiguration of Avishai Margalit's conception of human dignity in the shape of a thought 
experiment. The upcoming section of this introduction will take up the mantle of reviewing my 
discussion of the noted thought experiments. 
Chapter four and five put forward the defense of my preferred conception of human dignity: 
human dignity is the moral status for having rights. The fourth chapter delineates the notion of 
moral status and discerns the adequate sense of moral status in terms of which human dignity can 
be defined, whereas chapter five considers two contrasting conceptions of human dignity as 
moral status: conceptions of dignity as inherently valuable status and as high-ranking status. The 
conception of dignity as inherent value shares uncanny similarities with dignity as rank, despite 
                                                          
2
   Hans Kelsen. Pure Theory of Law, translated by Max Knight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); 
Jürgen Habermas. "The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights" Metaphilosophy, 
41:4 (July 2010): 464-480 
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appearances to the contrary. Nevertheless, all things considered, I believe the latter is the most 
plausible conception. 
Having briefly sketched the chapters in their order of appearance in this dissertation, in this 
summary I should, however, like to concentrate on the more abstract philosophical discussion of 
this dissertation: it involves conducting a couple of thought experiments. I am hopeful that 
starting the summary there will capture the imagination of readers, stimulate their thought, and 
set the stage for the readers to explore the more trenchant discussion underlying the moral-
philosophical discourse on human dignity. I also hope that in so doing I will also encourage 
readers whose specific interest lies in essential questions of practical philosophy—questions 
stretching from the meaning of life to "what we owe to each other", including the metaphysical, 
epistemic and psychological presuppositions of moral thought and action—to studiously engage 
with the focal point of my exploration on the possible normative relation between the idea of 
human dignity and that of moral rights.  
Three Thought-Experiments 
Nowheresville. In a famous thought-experiment, Joel Feinberg (1970) considers a fictitious 
world the inhabitants of which display compassion, benevolence, sympathy and other moral 
virtues to a high degree and are often motivated by their duties regarding other persons. 
However, he imagines them to have no notion of moral rights. By examining Nowheresville – 
this 'virtuous world without rights' –, Feinberg tries to explain the nature and value of rights: 
What accounts for the distinct and essential role that rights are supposed to play in morality, and 
how is Nowheresville morally different to a 'world with rights'– Rightsville? In answering these 
questions, Feinberg strongly emphasizes that the inhabitants of his imagined world are unable to 
make claims. If they are treated badly, e.g., they might well request the author of the action to be 
benevolent or to carry out some duty regarding them; but it does not occur to them that they can 
claim their due from other persons, or for that matter think that duties are owed to them. 
According to Feinberg, this activity of claiming is the distinctive feature of having rights: it 
enables persons to "stand up for themselves, look others in the eye, and to feel in some 
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fundamental sense the equal of anyone."3 Crucially, he links this idea to the notion of human 
dignity: "Respect for persons (...) may simply be respect for their rights; and what is called 
'human dignity' may simply be the recognizable capacity to assert claims."4 Feinberg thus not 
only embraces his view about the nature and value of rights by reflecting on Nowheresville, but 
at the same time suggests that the concepts of moral rights and human dignity stand in a relation 
of mutual dependence. Although it is contested how to understand his position (especially in 
contrast with a view he seems to defend in his later work), one systematically interesting way to 
read him is the following: The concept of human dignity is conceptually tied to exercising and 
respecting moral rights, since it designates the status of beings who are capable of asserting 
claims. Conversely, the concept of moral rights is conceptually related to human dignity, because 
rights can only be meaningfully ascribed to beings who are possessed of human dignity, and 
respect for moral rights requires, first and foremost, that we respect the status of persons with the 
capacity to assert claims (i.e. their human dignity).    
Taking up and expanding upon his thought-experiment, one could say that, according to 
Feinberg, we can neither imagine a world whose inhabitants have an adequate understanding of 
human dignity but lack a concept of moral rights; nor can we envisage a world whose inhabitants 
have an adequate understanding of moral rights but lack the concept of human dignity. In a more 
general fashion, this view can be characterized by the following two claims about the 
relationship between human dignity and moral rights: (1) human dignity should be 
conceptualized within a rights approach; and (2)  the concept of human dignity is a distinct and 
indispensable element of a rights approach to morality.5 However, these two general claims 
extrapolated from Feinberg's thought experiment do not tell us how exactly the relationship 
between human dignity and moral rights should be understood.  
                                                          
3
   Joel Feinberg "The Nature and Value of Rights" reprinted in his Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays 
in Social  Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 151 
4
   Feinberg "The Nature and Value of Rights", 151 
5  Both claims, and especially the first one, have often been taken for granted in what might be called the 
'mainstream discourse' about human dignity, especially by those philosophers who work in the human rights 
tradition. However, it has seldom been explicitly justified why we should conceptualize human dignity within a 
rights approach.  
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Two contrasting substantive conceptions of human dignity consistently flow from the above 
stated general claims: one who conceptualizes dignity within this mainstream framework has to 
endorse either the conception that human dignity is a foundation of rights or, following Feinberg, 
declare that dignity is the normative status for having rights. As the discussion in chapter two 
shall reveal, various ways of conceiving human dignity as a foundation do not provide arguments 
we would find compelling about the nature of human dignity. When conceived as a foundation of 
rights, human dignity will lose its peculiar connection to specific ways of treating human beings; 
that is to mean, a defense of dignity as a foundation to rights does not seem to account for 
dignity's unique relevance to the vindication of certain rights than others. A dignitarian 
foundation of a right to autonomy, for example, pales in comparison to a dignitarian foundation 
of rights that protect human beings from cruel and inhumane treatments; and such a distinction 
evades the familiar way of conceiving dignity as a foundation. That leaves the status conception 
of dignity as the only viable, and I believe the most plausible, substantive theory within the rights 
approach. 
Nevertheless, it may still be thought that dignity's relationship with rights may be just one piece 
of the puzzle such that other morally significant elements to the notion of dignity may come from 
normative theories within which the notion of rights is not central. And that compels us to 
conduct the second thought experiment so as to explore whether its relation with rights is all that 
is normatively significant about human dignity.  
Nowheresville II (wayward Rightsville). Michael J. Meyer asks us to imagine an improved 
version of Nowheresville, wherein all the individual rights that were initially withheld from it are 
now fully restored. It has now become a flourishing society in which moral rights are firmly in 
place and its inhabitants routinely respect the rights of others and unequivocally demand their 
own. But there is one crucial twist to their reality, which is that its inhabitants have suddenly lost 
the capacity for self-control. Although this new status quo is invigorated by the presence of 
rights at their disposal, the sudden disappearance of self-control made it difficult for 
Nowheresvillians to exact a proper use of their new found rights.  
The lack of self-control translates into two contrasting reactions; some inhabitants act completely 
docile and unresponsive to assaults to their person while others are overly indulgent with their 
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rights impatiently demanding them even when evidently they are not under threat. The latter are 
restless and unruly, and irritatingly self-assertive, for they are perpetually anxious that someone 
is about to violate their rights: they are unable to restrain their fear that they might be 'thrown 
under the bus' at any given moment and that fear renders them weary and distrustful of others. 
They might also think that others constantly ignore or look through them as if they are invisible 
or transparent. So they feel compelled to declare their presence by demanding what is their due 
each time an opportunity presents itself. This fear may have grown out of a totally reasonable 
worry that one is vulnerable to treatment as if one counts for nothing, but the pathological lack of 
self-control heightens the experience of caution and transforms it into a hysterical but proactive 
barrage of claiming one's rights "in that unmistakably quavering voice that indicates...[one] is 
haunted by the fear of being left by the wayside."6 Consequently, the bumptious person is 
excessively vigilant, as he is beset by the fear that people are bound to overstep their boundaries 
the moment he lets his guard down. In contrast, the self-consciously docile person sees no point 
in defending himself; he is either extremely cynical or does not consider himself having the 
moral authority to exact his dues. For him, it seems inevitable that others will eventually thread 
on his rights and it would be futile to guard oneself from the inevitable. As a psychological 
defense mechanism, he may also adopt the sentiment that to attempt and fail would add insult to 
injury. Therefore, lacking the capacity to compose himself and rise above his servility, he 
disinclines to claim his legitimate rights. In his case or in the case of the bumptious person, either 
way, the lack of self-control leads Nowheresvillians to an undignified life. 
In light of this thought experiment, Meyer concludes: "in spite of the suggestion that by restoring 
rights to Nowheresville we would restore everything essential to human dignity, the man without 
the capacity for self-control is not in possession of his human dignity."7 The point is, the 
expression of one's dignity is as indispensable as the exercise of claiming one's rights; equally so, 
the capacity to self-control is a necessary condition if one is to be considered as having dignity in 
the same way the recognizable capacity to claim is necessary for possessing rights. Meyer states 
that, from his restatement of Nowheresville, the following is evident: "Having human dignity—
                                                          
6
   Michael J. Meyer, "Dignity, Rights and Self-Control" Ethics 99:3 (April 1989): 520-534, at. 526 
7
   Meyer "Dignity, Rights and Self-Control", 532 
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that special office or rank had by most all human beings—is necessarily related to the possession 
of not only the capacity to claim rights but at least the further capacity to exercise self-control."8 
The capacity for self-control may be necessary for a proper exercise of rights and for carrying 
oneself with dignity; nevertheless it is a character trait and perhaps a necessary one at that, but 
not a normative state. In other words, possessing the moral status to make claims is normatively 
necessary for one to be possessed of moral rights, but I believe the capacity for self-control is 
condition- necessary in the material sense.9 And, on the flip side, the loss of the capacity for self-
control is either a character defect or a deprivation of a psycho-physiological functioning of the 
person. But the absence of the capacity, i.e., the moral status, to claim creates a normative 
vacancy that no condition can estimate or replace. Therefore, to discuss the capacity for self-
control in the same breath as that of the capacity to claim rights would be to make a category 
mistake. This can be established without denying that the capacity for self-control has significant 
value in the world with or without rights, and also without denying that "depriving...the 
inhabitants of Nowheresville of their capacity for self-control would worsen their plight."10  
Meyer's thought experiment may help establish necessary conditions for persons to be 
considered 'being in possession of their human dignity'—the term 'possession' understood in the 
descriptive not in the normative sense. But being possessed of human dignity in the normative 
sense means something different from and utterly unrelated to effectively living up to one's 
dignity (which is what Meyer seems to presuppose). Moreover, the capacity to exercise self-
control or the lack of it does not help establish the normative point of being possessed of human 
dignity for having rights. Therefore, one must not conflate necessary conditions for conferring 
one's rights a genuinely moral function with what is (normatively) constitutive to those rights. 
This brings us to the third thought experiment. 
                                                          
8
   Meyer "Dignity, Rights and Self-Control", 533 
9
   Perhaps the following example illustrates the distinction that I am referring to; for instance, for a certain action X 
to be morally good it is condition-necessary that its performance has to objectively enhance the moral context, but it 
may be argued to be normatively necessary that the agent intends it so. 
10
   Meyer, "Dignity, Rights and Self-Control", 533 
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Decentville. Consider a modified version of Nowheresville II, the inhabitants of which no longer 
lack the capacity for self-control. It is a Rightsville proper, resembling the world in which we live 
in but even better in that it is fully governed by the most plausible conception of justice. Can one 
then say that in this just society its citizens would have no reason to consider their self-respect 
injured? According to Avishai Margalit, even in a just society people would have a sound reason 
for thinking their self-respect injured.11 Injury to self-respect or humiliation constitutes a 
violation of human dignity: "Humiliation is a concept based on contrast," declares Margalit, "and 
the opposite of humiliation is the concept of respect for humans. If there is no concept of human 
dignity, then there is no concept of humiliation either."12  
Of course violation of rights consist in injury to self-respect but, he contends, there is no 
mandatory connection between injury to self-respect and  violation of rights. The way to 
vindicate that claim is by exploring whether injury to self-respect can be adequately explained 
through a system of morality without a concept of rights, or rather positively by trying to 
conceive a moral theory that could confer the necessary normative components for self-respect 
without making any recourse to the concept of rights. In that regard, we can (re)consider the case 
of Uncle Tom (from Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel "Uncle Tom's Cabin"), portrayed in the novel 
as a classic incarnate of servility, by resetting his story within the context of a society that has no 
concept of rights and ask ourselves what would it take to prevent Tom from having a sound 
reason for considering his self-respect injured.   
According to Margalit, injury to self-respect manifests in three senses: "treating humans as non-
human, rejection [of a human being from the (moral) human commonwealth], and acts intended 
to lead to lack of control or to highlight one's [perceived] lack of control".13 Any sort of treatment 
that could confer people a sound reason for feeling humiliated can be illustrated in terms of one 
of these three senses of injury to self-respect. Now, the question is: does any of these three 
senses necessarily require a system of morality that includes rights? Humiliation in all its three 
                                                          
11
   Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press, 1996) 
12
  Margalit The Decent Society, 149 
13
  Margalit The Decent Society, 146 
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senses, says Margalit, involves "a type of cruelty [of symbolic nature] that can be directed only 
at human beings"14 and its prohibition does not necessarily call for establishing a just society. In 
order to defeat humiliation it is necessary to have a decent society; however, being in possession 
of a valid conception of the just society is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. This is 
particularly because a morality based on duties, or for that matter a morality of ends, can provide 
an adequate theoretical basis for the conception of a society that does not humiliate its members. 
Members of  Decentville need not be possessed of rights because a robust conception of moral 
obligations (as Kant would have it, for instance) that imposes categorical duties for respecting 
humans can protect people from the three senses of injury to self-respect. One can think, with 
John Rawls, of a ''decent hierarchical society'' that establishes a robust conception of duties 
including one that explicitly instructs its members 'to honor and respect the humanity in one's 
own person and in the person of another and never to disgrace/humiliate a fellow human being.' 
As long as its moral codes are framed as categorical commands not merely as appeals, this 
society would have the normative wherewithal to protect people like Tom from any form of 
humiliating treatment. Incidentally, a decent society is one that Tom would probably find 
appealing since his personal values gravitate towards notions of honor and dignified demeanor.  
I understand Margalit's reasons for not identifying respect for humans with respecting their 
rights, and I believe he is right in thinking that humiliation (violation of dignity) is partly due to 
humiliating gestures—"the symbolic element, which expresses the victim's subordination"—that 
may not be adequately captured by a distinctively pedantic notion of rights.  
However, in rejecting the notion that respecting human dignity is inextricably linked to 
respecting certain rights, Margalit undercuts dignity's special moral significance and the 
correlating idea that its abridgement constitutes exceptionally stringent moral offense. Being 
possessed of human dignity—that special moral status had by all humans—must warrant 
distinctively stringent requirements against certain ways of treating human beings. One of my 
concerns with respect to Margalit's conceptualization of the matter is that, not all forms of injury 
to self-respect necessarily constitute humiliation. Furthermore, what I found particularly 
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troubling with Margalit's Decentville is his belief that the talk of what constitutes human dignity 
supersedes the talk of rights. 
Towards the end of the fourth chapter and at the beginning of the fifth, I sought to establish the 
idea that having the moral status expressive of human dignity minimally requires being a sort of 
entity that can be owed duties, or, more precisely, being possessed of dignity signifies that "the 
human person has the right to be respected, it is the subject of rights, possesses rights." Dignity 
confers each human person the standing as someone to be reckoned with. I do not see how this 
sort of status conferred by human dignity can adequately be captured in a system of morality that 
makes no reference to the notion of rights.  
Offense to human dignity is a very serious moral breach, and that appeals to dignity are not to be 
made indiscriminately in every case of moral indiscretion. For we reserve references to human 
dignity to regulate some fundamental ways in which we ought to treat each other, which makes it 
painfully evident that not all violations of rights are perforce dignity violations. In my view, 
human dignity is more pertinent to certain rights than others; but, by that, I do not mean to 
suggest that a violation of human dignity never occasions in conjunction with violation of a right 
that does not ordinarily reflect our basic equal status, our dignity. I believe, specific rights that 
protect us from degrading, humiliating and other inhumane treatments are direct instances of the 
respect due to the dignity of persons. Nonetheless, other rights that are not in the first instance 
related to human dignity can be given a dignitarian gloss when they are deployed in order to 
protect the basic moral standing of persons as human beings. I take the civil rights movement of 
the 1960s, specifically the struggle to secure equal voting rights for black people in the American 
South, as a telling example of how a civil rights struggle transforms into struggle for the respect 
of human dignity. I also take humiliating and degrading treatments as paradigmatic violations of 
human dignity, for these kind of (mis)treatments manifest a fundamental and total breach of "the 
mandatory quality to the relation of attitude to dignity." Respect for human dignity is distinct, 
albeit subtly, from respect for rights because the sense of respect attributed to dignity is respect-
as-respectfulness. These are some of the reasons for thinking of human dignity as a moral status. 
As a basic moral standing had by all human beings, human dignity relates to rights in two 
distinct but closely related ways: dignity as a status for having rights and as a content of some 
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rights whose moral function is for the protection of that very moral standing. This, I believe, is 
the most plausible way of thinking about human dignity. It does not tie the theory of human 
dignity exclusively to the rights approach, for it leaves open the possibility that human dignity 
could still play other noteworthy normative function outside the realm of rights morality.  
Nevertheless, if we can connect rights morality to the theory of human dignity in the way that I 
propose, we will cast a ray of light on one of the fundamental philosophical questions: why be 
moral? Perhaps it would be an overstatement to say with Dworkin that "without dignity our lives 
are only blinks of duration", but it would be wise to join him in declaring that "if we manage to 
lead a good life well, we create something more. We write a subscript to our mortality." With 
that thought I indulge my readers to the main content of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 1. 
Skepticism About Human Dignity 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The concept of human dignity does not only attract ardent proponents but also vocal detractors. Two 
kinds of skeptical arguments appear principally in the moral discourse on human dignity: one that 
views dignity as an indeterminate, ambiguous or empty concept; and another that endorses an adequate 
meaning to dignity but insists that its substantive content has to come from another, more familiar, 
moral concept. My principal concern is to evaluate different versions of skepticism against the 
mainstream contention that human dignity is a fundamental moral concept.  
The discussions in this chapter proceed in the following order: I shall first identify the charges that 
critics have mounted against a positive appraisal of human dignity, highlight what aspect of the concept 
each objection aims to undermine, formulate plausible ways by which we can resist unjustified 
objections or debunk overstretched conclusions that may be based on legitimate initial observations, 
and finally explore some suggestive ways for conferring positive content to the concept of human 
dignity. 
1.1.1 Summary of the General Status of the Skeptical Discourse 
In all fairness, the majority of dignity skeptics are principally motivated by the need for critical analysis 
of the concept, while being bewildered by the confusing ways with which dignity appears in the debate. 
Whereas, with Doris Schroeder, others are alarmed by what they consider as dignity's unavoidable 
metaphysical, ideological or religious underpinnings. Such is the difficulty of importing the notion of 
dignity into our modern, secular, post-mataphysical 'foundations' of normative ethics, according to the 
view shared by a number of dignity skeptics. But for some, it is very hard to tie concepts as abstract as 
human dignity to one specific ideology. This fact instead opens the floodgates for localized 
interpretations of the concept; dignity is often presented as an abstract universal without a precisely 
defined content rendering it vulnerable to skilful appropriation for the purpose of providing 
controversial claims the appearance of universal validity. This is the sense in which Dieter Birnbacher 
referred to dignity as a ―conversation stopper‖— a particular predicament of a concept ―that is not fixed 
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in its meaning and can therefore marry otherwise opposing views.‖1 Incidentally, the proliferation of 
the talk of dignity in applied ethics, specifically in what is otherwise known as ‗the ethics of marginal 
cases‘2 illustrates how the concept of dignity can be employed by both sides of the debate, and often in 
the same discursive context, to settle ethical controversies. In Birnbacher's observation, the introduction 
of dignity by each side of the debate was not particularly designed for injecting clarity and critical 
advantage over the contrary view. Instead, the fact that the concept was presented as notoriously vague 
as it is signals the end of the conversation; for when one claims that human dignity underlies his 
preferred position at any given debate in applied ethics, often times, what he consequently declaring is 
that his position has universal validity.  
What seems problematic is the fact that dignity is merely postulated to confer argumentative edge 
without at the same time accompanied by, if anything, a careful articulation of its content. I think, this 
is a fair objection against many employments of dignity in contemporary ethical controversies. 
Incidentally, at least three skeptical reactions resonate with the stated observation. Firstly, as 
Christopher McCrudden observed, ―[s]ome will undoubtedly be impatient with inconclusive and 
potentially nerve ending debates, and may prefer to opt for a placeholder idea of dignity, without (…) 
content.‖3 Although this might help avoid the dangers of uncritical deployment and distortion of such a 
powerful concept as human dignity, it too has its problems. And secondly, some would want to 
preserve a localized content to dignity by promoting the recognition of contextual meanings to it. We 
have different senses to dignity not because we cannot agree on one usage, but because dignity serves 
different purposes relative to the context in which it is deployed. Furthermore, there can be no 
overlapping consensus over a single conception of human dignity for contextual meanings to dignity 
cannot be easily reconciled, or for that matter superseded. In both cases, the search for a more 
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comprehensive content to dignity is abandoned in favour of a more pragmatic formulation of human 
dignity.  
Obviously, contextualism challenges the presumed fundamental moral significance we routinely accord 
to dignity when, for example, dignity is often deployed to stress the fundamental moral corruption of 
slavery and degrading treatment. Ethical contextualism is not as such a formidable challenge to moral 
theorizing about human dignity. There is a sea of literature to the effect that contextualism is 
significantly less of a threat than meets the eye. I believe, there is no pertinent reason to dwell much on 
the discussion of ethical contextualism and how it figures in the discourse on human dignity. For that 
matter, there is a thornier and more sinister attack on human dignity that requires more attention. 
Unlike ethical contextualism that merely challenges dignity's alleged universal appeal, some critiques 
dismiss human dignity as a meaningless, or as meaningful but useless, concept.   
Thirdly, if a placeholder idea of dignity does not hold and ethical contextualism is found untenable, 
some suggest that we rid moral theory off any recourse to dignity. The disdain with which some 
philosophers seem to hold the concept of human dignity is illustrated by none other than Schopenhauer, 
who declared that the concept of dignity is a "shibboleth" devised by ―perplexed and empty headed 
moralists who concealed behind that imposing expression their lack of any real basis of morals, or, at 
any rate, of one that had any meaning.‖ Schopenhauer‘s hostility towards the idea of dignity is very 
similar to what Jeremy Bentham in his Anarchical Fallacies had to say about the talk of natural rights: 
for Schopenhauer recourse to the idea of dignity is useless in the same way that for Bentham the talk of 
"natural and imprescriptible rights" is ―rhetorical nonsense—nonsense upon stilts.‘‘ A similar 
sentiment, which is downright scornful to any recourse to human dignity in moral and legal theorizing, 
has  recently been echoed by Ruth Macklin.  
According to Schopenhauer, dignity is capricious since the meanings traditionally ascribed to it are 
arbitrary. He claims, the problem with this imposing but mysterious concept—human dignity—is that 
its obscurity is widely celebrated as its strength, which he thought was rather borne out of 
philosophers‘ poverty of imagination and lack of critical pedantry rather than out of a sincere yearning 
for a deeper understanding of moral questions.4 The talk of the ''dignity of man'' is ―without any 
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genuine substance behind it‖, exclaims Schopenhauer. For that reason, we have no sensible reason to 
hold on to this vacuous concept. Macklin defends a similar view when declaring that the current 
discourse on human rights is better off should we dispense with the idea of dignity. That is because, the 
current discourse on human dignity has so far generated no valid account of the concept which 
designates a content of its own. Macklin suggests that we avoid the talk of human dignity altogether for 
―it adds nothing to the understanding of the topic‖ within which it may be invoked. For according to 
Macklin, dignity ''means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy.‖5  
Whereas, for Costas Douzinas, also a skeptic of Schopenhauerian ilk who holds that ―dignity is an 
empty and flawed signifier‖6, it is not wise to get rid of dignity completely for there are still adequate 
ways of putting dignity into formidable use in politics and morals. Douzinas argues that all abstract 
universals, human dignity included, often serve as battlegrounds for particular ideologies in their fight 
for hegemony; such is the oppressive power and violence of abstract concepts since they inadvertently, 
but inevitably, assist a particular ideology elevate itself to apparent universal validity. In different 
occasions, the idea of dignity has been utilized to vindicate the Catholic idea of the sanctity of life, the 
inherent worth of persons as advanced by the humanistic traditions, the Kantian as well as Libertarian 
idea of the inviolability of persons; these are just few notable examples in which dignity is presumably 
captured by comprehensive philosophical, religious or political doctrines. What allows for dignity to be 
adept at serving different, and often conflicting, worldviews is the axiomatic status it appears to hold, 
which is so for the simple reason that axioms by definition are not ideologically partisan. But once 
appropriated by a specific ideology, dignity adopts a content consistent with the core beliefs of the 
ideology or comprehensive doctrine to which it is attached and in effect helps create a de-facto 
monopoly of the right and of the moral truth. But such appropriation of dignity leads to a cul-de-sac, 
which is that, since 'it can marry otherwise opposing views', dignity cannot characteristically establish 
the transition from the particularity of comprehensive frameworks to universal validity.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
particular conception of human dignity as the foundation for morals, towards which his memorable polemic seems to be 
particularly hostile. 
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 Ruth Macklin, ―Dignity is a Useless Concept‖, British Medical Journal 237 (20 Dec., 2003): 1419-20. For a similar 
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6
 Paraphrased by McCrudden, op.cit. Supranote 3 
23 
 
One way of resolving this paradox, Douzinas argues, is to allow dignity for continuous redefinition, 
compatible with 'localized resistance and revolt' against the status quo. So we have to embrace the 
notion that the meaning of dignity shifts in ways fitting to the currents of contingent political struggles- 
struggles that aim at establishing a more equitable society.
7
 That means we ought to abandon the 
pretence that dignity confers immutable ground for the values and principles that seemingly capture its 
substantive core, just because these values best account for the legitimacy of a political movement 
aimed at resolving practical moral and political problems of the time in any given society. According to 
these moderate critics of the mainstream approach to dignity, it is imperative that we do not ignore the 
waves of political struggles in defining and redefining the content to human dignity as well as in 
spelling out the functions that it serves in moral and political praxis.8   
This chapter defends the thesis that there is a normatively relevant presence of human dignity in the 
(moral) human rights discourse. In order to establish that, it will first cast a considerable shadow of 
doubt on the outright rejection of the concept of human dignity. It does that first by pitching a case for 
the importance of not neglecting some aspects of the historical employment of the concept. Of special 
importance are the narratives that inspired great historical upheavals against injustices whose towering 
significance in shaping human history is demonstated by their persistent presence in our collective 
memory. History is replete with various examples of the sort I am talking about. Take the institution of 
slavery, for instance: the struggles for its abolition was clearly informed by the idea of inherent equality 
in worth of all human beings. At the outset, the narratives informing the struggles for freedom were 
perceived as revolutionary, if not utopian, for they were loaded with, by the measure of the time, an 
esoteric high language of 'inherent dignity and equal worth of all human beings'; nonetheless, under the 
tutelage of the idea of human dignity, those movements proved to be powerful catalysts for the 
abolition of institutions that persistently served to oppress, objectify, humiliate, dehumanize, infantilize 
and reify countless peoples across the globe. That suffices to cast some shadow of doubt on the charge 
that dignity is a useless and vacuous concept. Although I acknowledge that historical usage is not a 
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final proof of conceptual verity, it is nonetheless indicative of possible theoretical significance of the 
concept.  
Obviously, there is a lot to be done with respect to establishing a sound and comprehensive account of 
human dignity. Nevertheless, I maintain that we should not give up on exploring the concept of dignity 
merely on the basis that much of its existing employment is unbearably confused. In this regard, I 
concur with Ronald Dworkin's imposing commentary on dignity when he states: 
 The Idea of dignity has been stained by overuse and misuse. It appears regularly in human 
 rights conventions and political constitutions and, with even less discrimination, in political 
 manifestos. It is used almost thoughtlessly either to provide a pseudo-argument or just to 
 provide an emotional charge: campaigners against parental genetic surgery declare it an insult 
 to human dignity for doctors to repair disease or deficiency in a fetus. Still it would be a shame 
 to surrender an important idea or even a familiar name to this corruption. We should rather take 
 up the job of identifying a reasonably clear and attractive conception of dignity.9 
Similarly Jeremy Waldron views the controversy surrounding the concept of human dignity in positive 
light. I concur with Waldron's thoughtful remark that "contestation [between rival accounts of dignity 
or of any other concept] might generate for us a richer sense of what the concept involves than we 
would have with a concept that had been arbitrarily pinned down for example with a stipulative 
definition."10 
1.2 Types of Dignity Skepticism  
Dignity skepticism, says Jeremy Waldron, "is actually hard to pin down, because there is no well 
known locus of philosophical skepticism concerning the human dignity principle."11 But, one 
suggestive way of sorting out dignity skepticism may be on the basis of their stringency: by that 
measure, we can have either a 'moderate skepticism' of cautionary nature directed at the specific ways 
in which dignity figures in the normative ethical discourse, or a radical skepticism which principally 
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challenges the prevailing intellectual culture of appraising dignity as a basic moral concept. I believe 
this dichotomy is in concert with the purpose of this chapter, because it helps isolate the most 
formidable challenges to the mainstream theoretical standpoint that confers human dignity a prominent 
place in moral and political discourse.  
Michael Rosen discusses the case against dignity on both grounds, although he neither makes explicit 
distinction of that sort nor does he commit himself to dignity skepticism on either ground. Yet, Rosen 
seems to be more sympathetic to a moderate skepticism that challenges the specific ways in which 
human dignity has been used or misused both in moral and legal reasoning and practice. For him, 
whether we should do away with human dignity is a misplaced question since the concept of dignity 
has already been firmly established in our moral discourse.
12
 It therefore seems more appropriate to 
draw on a more tempered approach at dignity skepticism. He articulates 'moderate skepticism' along the 
following frequently stated charges against dignity: that in judicial decision making dignity is 
potentially anti-democratic; that it could serve as an attack on autonomy in the hands of the powerful; 
that it can be a ―Trojan horse for religiously inspired attacks on equality‖; that it is an obscure concept; 
―and that it can end up being used on both sides of the debate‖.13 In the forthcoming sections, I shall 
elaborate some of these points in detail.  
1.2.1 Dignity and Judicial Review 
Evidently, the familiar practice of judicial review has sometimes been used to override a legislative act 
or an administrative action over delicate and sharply divisive social issues. For example, in 1993 the 
German Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a legislative motion that would partially 
legalize abortion, on the ground that it conflicts with human dignity.
14
 As clearly stipulated under Art. 
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1 of the Grundgesetz, which declares that ―Human dignity is inviolable. To protect it shall be the duty 
of all state authority‖. This decision was consistent with an earlier decision of the Constitutional Court 
to overturn a 1974 law that would decriminalize abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. Citing 
Arts. 2(2)(1) and 1(1)(2) of the Basic Law, the court reasoned: ―Where life exists, human dignity is 
present to it‖, therefore, the duty of The State to protect unborn life flows directly from the fundamental 
provisions of the Basic Law.  
However, the case for partial legalization of abortion had already gained traction by a substantial 
majority both at the level of legislative representatives as well as by the court of public opinion. But in 
a decision that sets a chilling precedent, the court invoked human dignity to counter what would 
otherwise be a legitimate democratic authority. Obviously, the point is not that judicial decision should 
always mobilize the principle of dignity in ways that serve the liberal perspective on social issues. But 
it seem to clash with the democratic pillar of political liberalism, regardless of whether substantively 
the legislative majority supports a liberal or conservative agenda. 
What is more striking is that in legal systems in which dignity is explicitly articulated as a basic 
constitutional principle, there exists a parallel legal practice of considering the principle of dignity as a 
bulwark against possible infringements of basic rights by the state under extraordinary circumstances. 
For instance, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the German legislature deemed it necessary 
to promulgate a legal statute that would legalize a wilful sacrifice of the lives of the unlucky few on 
board a high jacked plane in order to help prevent a tragedy of epic proportions, for they are doomed 
anyways. In a famous ruling- otherwise known as the Aviation Security Case, the Federal Constitution 
Court of Germany stroke down as void the Aviation Security Act of 11 January 2005, which would 
authorize the Armed Forces to shoot down a hijacked plane that would inevitably be used as a weapon 
against substantial civilian life. The court responded by invoking the provision that human dignity is 
inviolable, which it subsequently interpreted in the spirit of Kant. In concrete terms, the inviolability of 
human dignity signifies that no single individual's life can be used as a means for saving the lives of 
others. Consequently, ―[s]uch an action [i.e. deliberate killing of innocents, despite the fact that they are 
doomed]", the court argues, "ignores the status of the persons affected as subjects endowed with 
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dignity and inalienable rights. By virtue of their killing being used to save others, they are treated as 
objects and at the same time deprived of their rights. Given that their lives are disposed of unilaterally 
by the state, the persons onboard the aircraft who, as victims, are themselves in need of protection are 
denied the valuation which is due to a human being for his or her own sake.‖  
Moreover, taken as a constitutional value, human dignity sets a very high bar for judicial intervention 
against certain infringements of basic liberties. Courts have occasionally refused to intervene in what 
appears to be a flagrant invasion of privacy, for instance, when the state arrogates to itself the power to 
conduct extensive mass surveillance of citizens on the grounds that it does not necessarily constitute 
contempt for the inherent dignity of persons. The downside is that, this could set us on a slippery slope 
towards a culture of judicial tolerance over state sponsored violations of basic rights under the pretext 
of imminent and extraordinary danger to national security. Some may challenge the slippery slope 
argument on the basis that there is no sufficient empirical evidence to back it up, although post 9/11 
anti-terrorism legislation appears to prove otherwise. Nonetheless, the relevant point is, in the legal 
sphere human dignity may serve conflicting purposes both as a reason for intervention and as a reason 
to refrain from intervening in familiar cases of attacks on basic rights.
15  
 
The manners in which human dignity figures in law gives the impression that law has it serve a 
confusing function; to put it mildly, law confers no single canonical interpretation of dignity. But the 
jurisprudence of human dignity is much more evolved than the appearance of unruly application might 
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seem to suggest. Perhaps, we need to look into the validity of some court rulings that are grounded on 
the interpretation of constitutional provisions of dignity. Legal hermeneutics is an evolving enterprise, 
perfecting its trade through practice over time; so we should not judge the adequacy of such a 
prominent legal concept entirely by some selected incidental interpretations of legal texts that appear to 
head in the 'wrong' direction.  
Besides, what seems to be true of human dignity in the legal sphere does not necessarily bear on its 
equivalent in the moral domain, as law and morality are partly characterized by distinct normative 
realms. Even those who subscribe to the 'inner morality of law', or, for that matter, even a very stern 
natural law theorist, must acknowledge that law encompasses a normative sphere that can stretch 
outside of moral parameters. On the one hand, law's procedural nature partly accounts for its 
bindingness in ways moral obligations would not plausibly be vindicated, underscoring that the 
procedure I am referring to does not mean to include argumentative procedures and adequacy 
conditions but something like an adoption process. On the other hand, one who subscribes to the idea 
that the legal concept of human dignity is structurally similar to the moral concept must recognize that 
it is a different matter to consider whether the legislation of human dignity is ―supposed to be the legal 
representation of the moral concept.‖ I am inclined to agree with Jeremy Waldron when he claims that 
―[m]ay be every legal idea has a moral underpinning of some sort; but it would be a mistake to think 
that the moral underpinning has to have the same shape or content as the legal ground.‖16 The same 
thing can be said about human dignity as it manifests both in the legal and moral frameworks. Its legal 
recognition may lead to misleading interpretations or generate inconsistent applications; but that does 
not necessarily reflect an obscurity inherent to the concept of human dignity in morality.  
1.2.2 Problem of Content:  A Prelude to the Redundancy Argument  
Many skeptics have stressed that the most pervasive problem with the concept of human dignity is the 
problem of content. Like any other concept in philosophy, dignity is no stranger to various nuances in 
meaning and that it can be used in many distinct ways. This fact is hardly one that skeptics would take 
an issue with had the core substantive content of the term been distinctively clear. However, from 
Schopenhauer's ―animus against dignity‖ to Maklin and Birnbacher's charge at redundancy, it seems 
evident that dignity skepticism is principally concerned with the problem of content. Some of the most 
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outstanding charges against dignity—namely, the view that it is a vacuous concept, that it is obscure, 
that it is capricious, that its content is subject to contextual redefinition over time, and that it is 
redundant—are clear instances of the problem of content. 
This chapter is mainly concerned with a model of the problem of content which declares that dignity 
means nothing more than respect for autonomy or respect for rights. According to the most popular 
formulation of this view, as spearheaded by Macklin, dignity can be supplanted by autonomy without 
any loss of meaning; in that regard, dignity could serve as a mere decorum, casting an attractive 
impression on a controversial position that may follow from autonomy affirming premises.  
The redundancy thesis may be contrasted, and ought not be conflated, with another brand of dignity 
skepticism according to which arguments from dignity occasionally serve as an attack on autonomy. 
The most familiar dwarf tossing case clearly illustrates the point: it is the story of Manuel 
Wackenheim, a French dwarf who was prohibited from participating in a dwarf-tossing contest by the 
Conseil d’État (henceforth, the Conseil) on the grounds that such practice violates human dignity, 
despite his vigorous insistence that he has a constitutionally protected right to autonomy that permits 
him to chose to do with his body whatever he so desires. He further claims that the Counseil's 
prohibition, since it unceremoniously violated his fundamental right to autonomy, amounts to a flagrant 
violation of his dignity. 
This dwarf-tossing debate may be framed as a clash between two contrary views of dignity skepticism. 
Clearly, both parties to the dispute have no doubts about the significance of human dignity; in fact, 
both explicitly deploy human dignity to substantiate their respective (competing) views on the matter. 
Their dispute is on the relationship between the principle of human dignity and the right to autonomy. 
It should, however, be noted that neither the Conseil’s position nor Wackenheim‘s view appeared to 
have been informed by Kant‘s idea of autonomy, but by the same idea of autonomy in its modern 
emancipatory sense, as familiarly present in our current moral and legal traditions. On the one hand, we 
have the Conseil ruling that clearly views dignity antithetical to, and thus overriding, individual 
autonomy, while on the other, Mr. Wackenheim was convinced that the dignity of persons chiefly 
protects individual sovereignty through a prescription of the state's categorical duty not to intervene in 
individuals‘ sovereign choices.  
30 
 
Michael Rosen perceives this legal dispute along the lines of the Conseil's position—as a clear instance 
of dignity‘s occasional hostility to the principle of individual autonomy. For that matter, Kant would 
have a very different thing to say, that he would approach the dwarf tossing case in a totally different 
light. The idea of autonomy that Rosen and Macklin subscribe to is quite different from what Kant 
mean by it, even though Kant and Macklin recognize an essential connection between dignity and 
autonomy. At the heart of Macklin and Rosen's understanding of autonomy is found an echo of the 
modern view of autonomy, for which being autonomous means 'being able to do as one chooses' or 
being granted the sovereignty to self-determine essential aspects of one's life. Kant's idea, however, 
differs profoundly from that. For him, the individual's autonomy is a function of self-given moral law, 
such that by constraining oneself through self-legislated categorical moral imperatives, the rational 
agent thereby renders herself answerable only to herself. In support of the general substance of 
Wickenheim's standpoint Kant would say that "all rights are based on the concept of freedom, and are 
the result of preventing damage to freedom in accordance with [the moral] law" but against 
Wickenheim's specific interpretation of autonomy as unbridled freedom, Kant would claim that "[a]ll 
obligation is the restriction of freedom to the conditions of its universal agreement with itself."(Virgil, 
V 27:587; 19:294) 
Imposing constraints on one's choice is, therefore, consistent with the autonomy of persons; it may 
even be more accurate to say that, according to Kant, moral constraints on one's freedom of choice are 
rather constitutive to autonomy. Hence, a rational person must not choose a course of action that 
curtails his chance of leading an autonomous life; that is precisely why voluntary servitude is immoral 
since it violates our ―duty with reference to the dignity of humanity within us‖. Kant would certainly 
argue that consenting to a dwarf-tossing practice constitutes self-objectification, which consequently 
dishonors the humanity in the person. Respect for the humanity in one's person is a categorical moral 
duty that the game of dwarf throwing certainly, but perhaps unassumingly, fails to respect.
17
 
Furthermore, a Kantian may declare the game of dwarf-tossing as morally impermissible on account of 
Kant's formula of humanity according to which it is incumbent upon one to: ―treat humanity, whether 
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31 
 
in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end never simply as a 
means.‖ Since morality, for Kant, is the condition under which a rational person can be truly 
autonomous, in the dwarf-tossing case, what is to be the adequacy condition for autonomy (i.e., moral 
constraints against raw, unbridled liberty) is registered as its anti-thesis. Therein lies the fallacy of 
claiming that dignity can be invoked in order to mount an attack on autonomy, because the very 
condition for autonomy can only be an internal constraint but never its nemesis.  
The above discussion on Kant was simply to brainstorm the discussion by highlighting that autonomy 
can mean much more than a simple account of personal sovereignty. As noted earlier, neither 
Wickenheim nor the Counseil have adopted a Kantian reading of autonomy. It seems clear that, the 
Conseil must have had autonomy-overriding notion of human dignity in mind when it vetoed against 
the practice of dwarf tossing. And such an understanding of dignity that clearly placed it at odds with 
the hard-won civil liberties of our time runs suspect of inadequacy. Nevertheless, I would say that the 
indignant posturing of dignity's apparent hostility to personal sovereignty ought not pass for 
philosophical critique.  
Whereas, on the flip side, Mr. Wackenheim‘s position may help ward off the suspicion that dignity 
may be inadequate and an ‗empty or flawed signifier‘; nevertheless, it brings into perspective another 
strand of skeptical charge. One may wonder: ‗clearly autonomy regarding account of dignity is a 
welcoming prospect. But, then, why bother introducing a blurry concept while the idea of autonomy 
would do?‘ With this rhetorical question we now turn to, what I believe to be, the most rigorous type of 
dignity skepticism —to what is sometimes referred to as 'the redundancy argument'.  
1.2.3 The Redundancy Argument  
Roughly put, the redundancy argument claims that the normative core meaning of dignity can be 
cashed in terms of respect for autonomy or in terms of other more familiar and clearer concepts, we can 
thus declare dignity redundant and steer clear of utilizing it in moral theorizing. Nevertheless, dignity 
could still be used for heuristic purposes, and nothing more substantial than that; for, according to this 
view, the concept of dignity adds no further normative fact than respect for autonomy or respect for 
rights.  
I believe the argument for redundancy rests on premises that pinpoint some element of truth about the 
status of the current discourse on human dignity: it rests on observations that the discourse on human 
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dignity is deeply disoriented, that delineation of dignity‘s content has been riddled with questionable 
ideological battles and that the most prominent, and perhaps promising, substantive conceptions to 
dignity are invested in the idea of rights and of autonomy.18 I will, however, argue that the charge of 
redundancy is a strong claim based on weak premises. 
Redundancy claim has not always been asserted with an acute critical intent; sometimes it is an honest 
but ill-fated attempt at demystifying the concept of dignity that eventually morphs into an argument for 
redundancy. James Griffin for example states that ―autonomy is a major part of rational agency rational 
agency constitutes what philosophers have often called, with unnecessary obscurity, the 'dignity' of 
persons.‖ 19 According to Michael Rosen it is evident that, for Griffin, the dignity of persons is, at least 
partly, substitutable with 'autonomy'.  
Rosen also believed to have found traces of redundancy claim in the writings of Joel Feinberg; 
according to him, Finberg‘s idea of human dignity is perceptively akin to Griffin‘s view.20 In 
Feinberg‘s writing, we find the discussion on dignity at the forefront of the passage where he laid down 
his account of the nature and value of rights. In "The Nature and Value of Rights", Feinberg refers to 
dignity as ''the recognizable capacity to assert claims"; and, equating respect for human dignity with 
respect for persons simpliciter, Feinberg states that taken as a normative disposition, ―[t]o respect a 
person…or to think of him as possessed of human dignity simply is to  think of him as a potential 
maker of clams‖.21 But in moral practice, ―respect for persons may simply be respect for their rights, so 
that there cannot be one without the other; and what is called 'human dignity' may simply be the 
recognizable capacity to assert claims.‖22 At first glance, this passage appears to suggest equivalency 
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between possessing rights and being possessed of human dignity. Again, being worthy of respect (or 
being possessed of human dignity) means having the recognizable capacity to assert claims. It follows 
that, since respect for persons may just mean recognizing his/her capacity to assert claims, simply 
respecting the person‘s rights may do that. It would be unnecessary to bother about respecting one's 
capacity to assert claims if one's right-claims are duly respected.  
However, thinking in reverse may reveal that respect for dignity may not simply be respect for their 
rights. The point is further illustrated by the fact that violating the rights of persons does not necessarily 
imply the denial of their recognizable capacity to assert claims. Most incidents of right violation do not 
by definition rest on the denial of the victim's recognizable moral capacity (standing) to assert claims. It 
is fair to say that, within Feinberg's conceptual framework, respect for the dignity of persons is not 
reducible to respect for their rights. And, for exactly the same reason, Feinberg may be criticised for 
missing such an important implication that his own theoretical framework suggests. 
Whereas, with Griffin we may have three layered Russian doll type of relation between autonomy and 
human dignity, wherein dignity is inscribed in normative agency which partly constitutes autonomy. It 
seems to me that Griffin propounds the view that dignity(as normative agency) is the foundation of 
human rights— a topic that shall be discussed in chapter two of this dissertation. As with Rosen's 
interpretation of Feinberg's view, so in the same way, I found Rosen's reasons for taking Griffin as an 
unwitting proponent of the redundancy argument are rather unconvincing.  
 In the forthcoming section I will take up this discussion on redundancy and discursively analyze a 
defense of the claim that dignity is substantively reducible to certain minimal rights, by Dieter 
Birnbacher.   
1.2.4 Problem of Concretization 
Human dignity is one of the concepts that strikes as familiar when appears in everyday moral 
discourse. And yet, regardless of how frequently it figures in the public sphere, "its meaning is often 
left for intuitive understanding".23 Circular reasoning appears endemic to any decent attempt at pinning 
down its meaning: it has been claimed that we possess dignity in virtue of our humanity and that at the 
core of our humanity lies our dignity. It is indeed this essentialist approach to human dignity that 
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encounters the problem of concretization, which is a specific instance of the problem of content. In a 
similar undertone, Rosen observed that there are epistemic and metaphysical difficulties in establishing 
human dignity as a residual human essence. This has to do with the specific logic often used in the 
attribution of human dignity. The supposition that dignity might be an inner transcendental property 
puts it on a par with abstract universals of the Platonic 'intelligible world'. The problem with abstract 
concepts is that, it is often difficult to cash them in concrete substantive terms. When it comes to 
bringing abstract entities down to the practical world of morality we arrive at multiple meanings that 
are invariably shrouded in irreconcilable ideological differences, which in effect allows for the 
proliferation of dignity talk in almost any controversial moral issue.  
Although opinions about the precise content of human dignity is highly polarized across different 
conceptual traditions, which at times has brought about a premature dignity fatigue by moral 
philosophers, one feature of the concept that a seasoned scholar would strike accord with relates to the 
critical function that it plays. The idea of dignity inherently critiques theories that confer lexical priority 
to perceived collective goods over individual well-being in a manner that justifies stifling the rights and 
interest of individuals in the name of preserving collective good, however that may be defined. It would 
be unjustified to religiously stick to our collective interest in sustaining a distinct way of life if that 
meant doubling down on discriminatory and predatory laws against individuals that do not fit into the 
supposedly standard scheme of things. To think of the well-being of individuals as of subservient 
importance amounts to treating them not as ends-in-themselves, and that violates their dignity. We 
don't need to have a deeper philosophical understanding of Kant's fine arguments about the moral 
imperative to treat 'humanity...always as an end' to see that at the bare minimum dignity protects human 
subjectivity. Important moral and legal implications obtain from the stated critical function that dignity 
plays; for instance, existing practices of disenfranchisement of women and minorities, political 
persecutions or 'convert or die' approach to religious persuasion succinctly illustrate the widespread 
appeal of a dignitarian based protection of human subjectivity.   
Moreover, for the legal interpretation of the idea of dignity, ―from an international comparative 
perspective to a surprising degree, international case law and legal doctrine coalesce in certain crucial 
aspects explicitly or implicitly around certain ideas: autonomous subjectivity, basic respect, non-
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instrumentalization, non-objectification and non-reification.‖24 Such norms that collectively define the 
trajectory of the post war jurisprudence of dignity come from intellectual traditions as diverse as 
Renaissance humanism, enlightenment reason, Christian idea of the individual as an embodiment of 
divinity, and socialist political thought. Interestingly enough, the foundation of modern human rights 
law had to be initially set on muddy grounds for it was significantly influenced by negotiations in the 
process of which competing ideologies compromised in achieving a common ground fairly acceptable 
to all interested parties. The provision on human dignity is arguably one of the few propositions that 
resonated well with the drafters of the UDHR. Despite some disquieting facts about the origins of 
human dignity in human rights law, it has grown into something meaningful over time ―beyond the 
narrow-minded intentions and expectations of some of those who played an important role in their 
development.‖25 Accordingly, as Mathias Mahlmann has stated,―[t]he ascertainment of the worth of 
human beings created the normative nucleus for a crucial limitation of any relativizing of the value of  
individual human lives, whether by assertions of the supremacy of state power, the greatness of the 
nation, the importance of class interests or the superiority of a race.‖26 These are real and fascinating 
achievements of our modern legal system.  
Nevertheless, some concerns still remain. Clearly, there is a direct correlation between legal validity of 
a concept and established legal practice. Even if we grant that the brief historical account accurately 
describes the evolution of the concept of human dignity in the legal sphere from a mere subversive idea 
to 'a more or less convincing doctrine of law', that does not bespeak the derivation of dignity's 
corresponding substantive content as a moral idea.  
This brings us to the following point: some argue that as a legal concept human dignity is merely 
―different in function but identical in content with the ethical concept.‖27 Yet the moral concept is 
incredibly hard to pin down in concrete terms. In fact, there is no unitary concept of human dignity 
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which is tailor made to suit every ethical context on which dignity seems to have a bearing; but dignity 
rather designates ―a family of meanings, the members of which behave differently not only 
semantically but also syntactically‖.28 According to Dieter Birnbacher, human dignity is characterized 
by multiple meanings each of which can display a moral charge of varied nature and stringency, 
diffused across different ethical traditions stretching from virtue ethics to the morality of rights. That, 
however, should not be viewed as posing an intractable problem for delineating the most adequate 
meanings; towards that end, Birnbaher defines Menschenwürde in two distinct senses, which he call the 
core and extended meanings respectively. With respect to the core meaning, Birnbacher states that ―[t]o 
respect menschenwürde [human dignity] means to respect certain minimal rights owned by its bearer 
irrespective of considerations of achievement, merit, quality, and owned even by those who themselves 
do not respect these minimal rights in others.‖29  
Birnbacher lists four basic rights that Menschenwürde denotes in its core individualistic sense: ―1. 
Provision of the biologically necessary means of existence, 2. Freedom from strong and continued pain, 
3. Minimal liberty, 4. Minimal self-respect‖.30 But in a later writing he introduced one additional 
right—which evidently resembles the Kantian proviso not to treat others merely as means but always at 
the same time as ends in themselves. He writes, ―human dignity in its central individualistic sense 
seems to comprise at least the following five moral rights: (i) the right not be made the object of 
humiliation or to be treated in humiliating ways, (ii) the right to a minimum of freedom of action and 
decision, (iii) the right to receive assistance in undeserved situations of need, (iv) the right to a 
minimum quality of life and a freedom from suffering, (v) the right not to be used to others‘ purposes 
without consent and with seriously adverse affects to oneself.‖31 Some legitimate concerns can be 
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raised concerning a number of points, including how he arrives at these rights without imposing a valid 
criterion of adequacy. Moreover, the catalogue of rights he puts forth are as vague as the concept of 
human dignity itself, incidentally, some of which are separately pronounced by different authors as the 
single precise meaning to human dignity.  
Moving on, in contrast to the core meaning, the extended meaning is purported to have a wide outreach 
beyond the narrow category of persons, subsequently connoting weak moral protection: it applies to 
entities yet to be or no longer living humans and also to humanity in the generic, speciesist, sense. 
Whilst for the core meaning, the object of respect and protection is the concrete human person, the 
extended meaning in contrast applies to ―the early and residual stages of human life (human embryos, 
foetuses, and corpses), and one in which it is applied not to any individuals but to the human species.‖32 
It covers ethical issues relating to human enhancement, trans-humanism, stem-cell research, abortion 
and the debate concerning the moral status of human beings in permanent vegetative state.  
What is relevant here is that Birnbacher's dual conception of dignity systematically challenges flawed 
deployments of human dignity in controversial bioethical issues. He believes, the recent currency of 
human dignity, specifically in bioethical debates, is blighted by the recurrent conflation of the extended 
meaning with the core meaning of dignity. Many debates in the ethics of marginal cases, namely on 
abortion, embryo research or on human cloning miss the point for the simple reason that they often 
make a recourse to the sense of dignity that does not naturally suited to the moral dispute that each seek 
to resolve. To be more precise, most of the controversial issues in bioethics and biolaw deal with the 
treatment of "non-persons" and, the problem is that, more often than not, the core meaning of dignity is 
wrongly made applicable to the moral situation that involves no concrete persons who could be 
identified as bearers of the rights. Embryos and foetuses are not moral persons (although they may be 
conferred legal personality); it, thus, would be misleading to ask whether they are possessed of core 
human dignity. For that reason, Birnbacher may be right in declaring that most bioethical debates are 
misguided; I think we should not quarrel with him on that score.  
I would like to make one crucial remark though: the core or personal meaning of dignity, as Birnbacher 
has it, is essentially reductionist. He overlooks one crucial fact about the core meaning, which is that, 
when conceived in the personal sense dignity doesn‘t necessarily need to correspond to a set of basic 
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moral rights, and that there is no rule that prohibits the dignity of persons from being derived from 
generic dignity. His analysis does not show an inherent and more importantly exclusive connection 
between the core meaning of dignity and minimal rights. Indeed the notion of ‗dignity of persons‘ 
conceptually requires concrete persons to whom dignity can be predicated. But, on the one hand, the 
principle of the dignity of persons need not, however, be cashed exclusively in terms of a set of basic 
rights- the sort of analysis Birnbacher offers does not sufficiently warrants it. On the other hand, 
although the dignity of persons is predicated to 'human persons', that does not perforce preclude generic 
dignity from prescribing equally stringent moral injunctions. If generic dignity is articulated differently 
from the standard approach to it, for instance as recently conceived by George Kateb
33
, it may undercut 
the plausibility of Birnbacher's strict, either-or, distinction between the core and extended meanings.  
  
Consider the principle of non-humiliation, and for the sake of argument ignore the fact that Birnbacher 
framed it as a right. Also suppose that the principle of humiliation (or non-humiliation to be precise) 
reflects part of what we mean by respect for the dignity of persons. Humiliation figures predominantly 
in torture or slavery or any other form of cruel and inhuman treatment, and one can even maintain that 
it figures exclusively in those severe violations of rights. But from this premise alone it is erroneous to 
conclude that the reason why those treatments are humiliating is on account of rights‘ violations per se; 
I think it is intuitively more plausible to say that rights‘ violations account for the how but not the why 
of humiliation, or to put it succinctly in Rawlsian terms, violation of personal dignity may begin with 
but does not necessarily arise simply on account of basic moral right violaitons. What makes such 
treatments characteristically humiliating may not be rights‘ violations per se but perhaps due to the 
accompanying dehumanization that lead to the loss of moral standing/authority, or the loss of self-
control due to the treatment as if one counts for nothing, or a justified loss of self-respect in the eyes of 
the victim himself.
34
 That being said, one can still preserve the conviction that humiliation (or violation 
of dignity) does not figure in the context in which no rights violation eventuates. It seems intuitively 
plausible that some violations of rights may be direct instances of humiliation, but humiliation is partly 
a function of humiliating gestures and, for that reason, the manners in which rights are violated matter 
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to the dignitarian analysis. That being said, I shall set aside the full defense of this position for another 
occasion.   
Furthermore, the four/five basic rights may be said to collectively mirror the substantive content of core 
human dignity. Then again, one may conjecture that the dignity of persons designates a moral category 
whose normative core is expressed in terms of a couple of fundamental moral right. This line of 
reasoning is reminiscent of the conception that human dignity is a moral status/standing for the 
possession of rights, of which certain specific rights may be considered as direct instances. 
Accordingly, the four or five rights could be interpreted as having a unique relationship with the said 
moral standing. It suffices to say that these minimal rights have a direct bearing on human dignity 
(understood as a moral standing) such that their violation exhibits a direct assault on the very moral 
standing that underscores our possession of rights. The right not to be made an object of humiliation 
clearly illustrates that point; humiliating action is effective when the victim is made aware of the 
assault to her person with the sole purpose of diminishing her in the eyes of her abusers, even more 
sinister is when it is specifically intended for debasing the victim in her own eyes.  
At its core, respect for human dignity is about protecting the individual from certain qualified moral 
offenses through the provision of a set of subjective moral rights. For that matter, so Birnbacher insists:  
―Indeed, all the goods or rights protected by the principle of Menschenwürde, at least as an ethical (as 
opposed to legal) principle, are also protected by other moral principles. In this ―material‖ sense, then, 
the principle has no specific content of its own.‖35 While apparently striking a positive note, Birnbacher 
continues, ―what is specific to it, however, is the priority it gives to certain minimal individual rights 
and claims.‖36 In the first place, I do not really see any problem with the declaration that the basic 
rights that supposedly protect the principle of dignity do also underscored by other familiar moral 
concepts. Once again, consider the right not to be treated in humiliating ways, a right protected by the 
principle of Menschenwürde. It is also clear that violation of the victim's dignity is not the only thing 
that is morally objectionable about humiliating treatment. It is also objectionable, for instance, on the 
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grounds that humiliation causes the loss of self-control, or on the grounds that it violates the person's 
basic right for bodily (and psychological) integrity, or because it violates the fundamental right to 
autonomy.  
Secondly, Menschenwürde is a principle of ranking rights that are independently postulated by other 
principles, so argues Birnbacher. It follows that basic goods and rights that dignity purportedly 
prioritizes are identified as basic for the reason unrelated to the fact that they reflect Menschenwürde. 
This is because Menschenwurde is not ―a principle postulating a good of its own‖ but is more like an 
umbrella term. It‘s rather a principle that protects them from being weighed against other goods and 
rights ‗outside its sphere‘. However, the normative primacy of basic rights is postulated by the very act 
of pronouncing them basic, and the principle that grounds the selection of some rights as basic also, by 
implication, serves as a prioritizing principle. Therefore, there is no need to turn to other principles to 
give priority for minimal individual rights that are already identified as basic. And therein lies the 
problem with Birnbacher's reasoning. 
It is my contention that defending dignity as a prioritizing principle is incompatible with the description 
that human dignity does not postulate a good of its own. If dignity is a mere placeholder, it is then 
rather baffling why Birnbacher went to great lengths to demonstrate that human dignity is 
indispensable in rights morality. I suppose, the structure and substance of his own arguments have, 
perhaps unwittingly, commit him to insist on dignity's dispensability. But if we take him at his words— 
that human dignity has no content of its own, combined with the premise that a placeholder role to 
dignity is incompatible with Birnbacher's framework, we will wind up with this conclusion: human 
dignity has no significant moral function, but it may serve as a rhetorical device for making an 
emotional charge.
37
  
Finally, I would now like to take on Birnbacher's principal claim that dignity does not prescribe a good 
of its own. I can see the rigor in his reasoning, for it is based on an astute observation that every single 
time one makes a dignity-claim it is always attached to a claim for respecting one's basic human rights. 
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However, it seems to me that when I exclaim- ‗respect my dignity‘ in relation to that which I have a 
right to, what I, in effect, am saying is that your display of respect for my rights is symptomatic to the 
appropriate attitude of respect for my dignity that you must always display. In some cases I might 
demand that respect for my rights must be accompanied by the right attitude reflecting your general 
disposition to act in a certain way when the occasion warrants it.  
If I then succeed in making you acquiesce to my legitimate demands but you execute it in a sort of 
dismissive demeanor, I could still protest that you did not in fact accord me the proper respect, such 
that my legitimate moral demand is not only that my rights should be respected but indeed with the 
right attitude and moral disposition. I could otherwise have simply demanded that a person respects my 
rights, but stressing on the dignity element would, on the one hand, underscore the moral gravity of the 
situation, and, on the other hand, suggest that the situation requires more than an automated respect for 
rights. Rather than a frosty, withdrawn, robotesque and prickly posture of a rule governed moral 
behavior often associated with the regime of rights, the concept of dignity rekindles the long-lost moral 
spirit of recognition, veneration, reverence, honor and deference into our increasingly detached 
practical moral life. That is what, in a nutshell, respect for the dignity of persons demands. Reference to 
human dignity may, thus, have both expressive as well as normative constitutions. Birnbacher appears 
to question the latter and, as a result, becomes an unwitting bedfellow of those who branded dignity "a 
useless concept."   
1.2.5 Problem of Justification: Objections to a Dignitarian Foundation of Rights 
Human dignity admits disparate meanings and that can be a source of enormous problem for its 
paradigmatic use in human rights theory. Although in the mainstream discourse dignity is taken to be a 
bedrock moral and legal principle, the concept has increasingly unsettled keen observers who argue 
that the fact that dignity connotes various meanings constrains certain aspects of its practical use. From 
their perspective, having no single overarching meaning means human dignity seems to have no 
foundational role to play in the constitution of human rights. 
According to Doris Schroeder, the many meanings to dignity philosophers have so far espoused and 
defended can be classified into two categories: inviolable dignity and aspirational dignity.
38
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first, she placed ―traditional Catholic dignity‖ and ―Kantian dignity‖ for both subscribe to the view that 
human dignity is an inviolable and non fungible normative property. Aspirational dignity consists in 
―aristocratic dignity‖, ―comportment dignity‖ and ―meritorious dignity‖. Aristocratic dignity is closely 
tied to the notion of (superior) rank whether conferred on the basis of purportedly inherent attributes 
and merits attached to social statuses and offices which the person happens to hold in virtue of birth or 
accomplishment. In this respect, rank reflects some salient features of the Roman dignitas. On the other 
hand, comportment and meritorious dignity function within the realm of virtue ethics- constituted by, in 
the case of the first, ―the outwardly displayed quality of a human being who acts in accordance with 
society‘s [rather contingent] expectations of well-mannered demeanour and bearing‖ and observance to 
objective standards of virtue, ―which subsumes the four cardinal virtues and one‘s sense of self-worth‖, 
in the case of the latter.39  
In her view, the principal reason behind the controversy surrounding human dignity is due to the 
recognizable but "unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity and inviolable dignity."40 As long as 
this tension remains unreconciled, it is pointless to explore whether human rights are derived from 
human dignity. She intuits, a coherent and precise account of human dignity should first be at hand 
before considering what use it might serve in the constitution of human rights. Consequently, given this 
rather messy discourse on human dignity, the discourse on human rights is better off without the 
purchase of human dignity and instead should be "looking for alternative frameworks to justify [or 
ground] human rights than relying on the concept of dignity."41  
One can say that human rights theory runs the risk of ―hazard by association‖ when it attempts to 
ground rights with the significantly obscure concept of dignity. The point is simply that, foundational 
concepts ought to be clear, unambiguous and substantively rich; however, Schroeder contends, dignity 
admits a number of mutually exclusive, perhaps equally valid, contextual interpretations. This is by far 
Schroeder‘s most sensible argument against a dignitarian foundation of rights; I use the term sensible 
not as valid but in the sense that it illustrates her point with some measure of philosophical lucidity.  
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In one of her arguments against dignity, Schroeder argues that controversy breeds ambiguity and, for 
that reason, "the concept of human dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights but 
rather aggravates it in secular societies."42 One reason for this has to do with the fact that dignity is 
understood in far too many ways, and that gets in the way of it potentially providing us with the 
justification of human rights. In philosophy, being controversial is not necessarily a recipe for disaster, 
it can rather be a welcoming prospect in certain circumstances.  
Controversy stimulates thought, which is a necessary ingredient for sharpening one's views and 
arguments about the philosophical problem under consideration. If anything, being controversial is no 
argument for giving up a concept of enormous significance. After all, one can say with Peter Schaber 
that ―there are various [some incompatible] understandings of other normative and descriptive concepts 
as well…[for example], of justice, fairness, autonomy, respect for persons and so on. In none of these 
contexts would disagreement about the meaning of the relevant concepts be accepted as a reason for 
giving up the concept; they would more likely be seen as a good reason for continuing the discussions 
about the right understanding of the term in question.‖43 Why should that be any different for the 
concept of human dignity? 
I believe Schroeder‘s main thesis is unwarranted, for the following reasons. In the first place, the 
professed tension between "inviolable dignity" and ''aspirational dignity'' is neither inherent nor 
insurmountable. Secondly, her list of meanings to dignity does not actually portray a clear distinction 
but rather obscures it,  nor does it exhaust all the morally relevant meanings conveyed by the notion of 
human dignity. For that matter, I believe that the list of meanings to dignity that Schroeder classifies 
into "inviolable" and "aspirational" confuses rather than meeting its intended purpose of clarifying the 
concept.  
For instance, beneath Schroeder‘s survey lies an error of equating inherence with inviolability. A 
property that is inherent in the human person doesn‘t necessarily imply that it is inviolable. 
Inviolability is a normative commitment but ‗inviolable property‘ is a misnomer. A property is either 
inherent/intrinsic or extrinsic, but whether inherent properties are inviolable (resistant to trade-offs) is a 
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matter of higher order normative consideration. Take the capacity for laughter, for example, an inherent 
property of the human person; any right pertaining to the free exercise of this wonderful human 
capacity is not by definition immune from violation or infringement under any circumstances. 
Incidentally, it is more convenient in moral reasoning to directly infer inviolability from inherent 
properties than from contingent qualities, regardless of how morally pervasive those contingent 
attributes might be.44 Nonetheless, claims of inviolability are not given by inherence. Analogously, 
most legal rights enshrined in national constitutions are framed to be inviolable but arguably not all of 
them are attached to inherent properties of persons, and vice versa; the same thing may be said about a 
number of rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
For that matter, some conceptions of ‗aristocratic dignity‘ are best placed under the category of 
inherent dignity (and perhaps inviolable dignity) rather than to ‗aspirational dignity‘- unlike what 
Schroeder would have us consider it to be. Aristocratic ranking within the human species, as a matter 
of historical fact, was established as if it was a perfect reflection of the natural order of things. 
Moreover, the dignity invested with the superior rank is defended as inviolable to the extent that the 
supposed hierarchical scheme of things is foundational to the normative moral order. Any society, 
pastime or present or imaginary, which has established caste systems of one type or another, defends its 
claim for differential moral status by resorting to a fitting natural law theory. In contemporary post-
metaphysical value system, this obsolete aristocratic hierarchy commands little normative appeal. In 
any case, the dignity accorded to the highest caste is by definition supposed to be considered as 
inherent to their person. Also the respect that their dignity allegedly commands would, by the same 
reasoning, be inviolable.  
It may not be accurate to say that aristocratic dignity accords unequal status to persons, simply because 
it discriminates some class of people from others; rather, it narrows down the category of persons only 
to those who nature allegedly graces with superior attributes and are entitled to full personhood by that 
count. Apologists of aristocratic moral systems defend the legitimacy of what is (the status-quo) to the 
degree to which it reflects what ought to be, i'e, whatever they believe is given by natural design. The 
foundation of aristocratic moral status is, therefore, both purportedly inherent to the human person and 
also informed by a policy of equality of respect.   
                                                          
44
 For an interesting distinction along the lines I sketched here, see Christine M. Korsgaard "Two Distinctions in Goodness" 
The Philosophical Review, 92: 2 (April 1983): 169-195 
45 
 
That being said, one can now easily discern an essential congruence between ‗aristocratic dignity‘ and 
the religious temperament that governs the traditional Catholic conception of dignity. What does this 
realization help in terms of refuting Schroeder's claim? Now, once aristocratic dignity promoted to the 
first category, we may have a more coherent basis of distinction. Interestingly, with the introduction of 
this subtle change, the perceived tension between the two categories of dignity- namely inherent (or 
inviolable) and aspirational dignity- evidently evaporates. How so?  
There is one suggestive way of harmonizing the two categories of dignity, without losing sight of the 
specific foundational issue in question. I would like to, specifically, bring to attention a conceptual 
framework through which we may reconcile different meanings to dignity, while still maintaining that 
foundational issues for human rights is the domain of the normative framework within which inviolable 
dignity can be found. Virtue or character based accounts of dignity are not central to a normative 
system that constitutes the sort of moral prescriptions human rights presumably envelop. Linking 
dignity to virtue and merit or assigning it in accordance with comportment abilities would exclude a 
significant number of human beings, hence, these accounts, Schroeder reckons, ―have no place in 
discussions about human rights.‖  
I can see the force of Schroeder's argument; nonetheless, I disagree with her for two reasons. Firstly, 
there is no reason to dispense with aspirational dignity in discussions about human rights even if 
''inviolable dignity'' were proven to successfully in providing us with justificatory basis for human 
rights. And secondly, aspirational dignity is not necessarily detached from inviolable dignity, instead, a 
justificatory role to human dignity in the human rights discourse will inevitably smuggle aspirational 
dignity with it. 
Aspirational dignity could still be argued to play a pivotal, though not foundational, role in the 
constitution of rights.
45
 For human rights to be of any significant moral function, setting aside, for now, 
what might justify them, they ought to be attached to ―our ability to make these rights serve our own 
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ends‖, which in turn require a minimal capacity for self-control. Michael J. Meyer advances this view, 
for he contends: ―[t]hough human rights do perform a moral function (the moral function of obliging 
others to respect us by way of respecting some of our most basic claims), what makes their function 
moral is the fact of the human capacity for authentic self-control.‖46 Human rights, on his account, 
perform two functions: (a) they oblige others to respect us, and (b) the fact of having them makes 
possible for authentic self-control. Each of the two components of the moral function that human rights 
perform correspond with the two distinct but complementary notions of human dignity- the moral 
function of constraining others corresponds with inviolable dignity and the latter (namely, making up 
for a morally appropriate use of their obliging nature by providing the opportunity for authentic self-
control) by aspirational dignity.  
It may be true that inherent/inviolable dignity and aspirational dignity are different limbs of the same 
conceptual framework; but I see nothing troubling in that, much less a fundamental tension between the 
two. Furthermore, one may declare with Ronald Dworkin that the inherent/aspirational distinction in 
dignity perfectly matches with the distinction and unity between the 'ethical and the 'moral', as 
championed quite prominently in his latest book—Justice for Hedgehogs. Aspirational dignity reflects 
one‘s ethical responsibilities for "living well" while inherent dignity captures the essence of morality, 
of what we fundamentally owe to each other, which together make up a unified system of values.
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According to Dworkin, dignity is attached to two ethical principles: self-respect, which requires taking 
seriously the objective importance of one‘s life; and authenticity, i.e., taking personal responsibility for 
creating a life according to one‘s own coherent narrative on what counts as success in life.48 These two 
principles of dignity, on the one hand guide our ethical life by instructing us to live well through the 
pursuit of a coherent yet objectively valuable path in life, and on the other hand ―elucidate the rights 
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individuals have against their political community‖ within the ambit of interpersonal moral duties we 
owe to each other. Dworkin puts forth an account of dignity which unifies the normative demands of 
ethical responsibility with categorical moral duties of respect for persons. He writes, 
Each person must take his own life seriously: he must accept that it is a matter of importance 
that his life be a successful performance rather than a wasted opportunity. I‘m talking about 
dignity. It‘s a term overused by politicians, but any moral theory worth its salt needs to proceed 
from it...[secondly], [e]ach person has a special, personal responsibility for identifying what 
counts as success in his own life; he has a personal responsibility to create that life through a 
coherent narrative or style that he himself endorses. Together the two principles offer a 
conception of human dignity: dignity requires self-respect and authenticity. 49 
The ethical and the moral realms are analytically distinct, the same goes for inviolable and aspirational 
dignity, and yet when expressed in normative terms both reinforce one other. According to Dworkin, 
the principle of self-respect is not in itself a moral claim: it denotes an ethical imperative which 
requires that people recognize the objective importance that the live well. Drawing from Stephen 
Darwall's discussion on recognition respect—"the respect we must show people just out of recognition 
of their status as people", Dworkin states that "[t]he self-respect that dignity demands is recognition, 
not appraisal [or aspirational], respect."50 His project seeks to connect the two principles of dignity with 
moral principles including the mainstream view that each person's life has an equal intrinsic worth. For 
"[i]n practice, the equal-worth principle is usually understood not as an ethical principle but as a moral 
principle about how people must be treated. It insists that all human lives are inviolable and that no one 
should be treated as if his life were less important than anyone else's."51 "Any moral theory worth its 
salt" ought to, therefore, connect the two principles of dignity with the above described and other moral 
principles, and construct a unified value theory, exclaims Dworkin in the spirit of the hedgehog.
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 At the very outset of Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin explains the origins of the rather unusual title of the book. It refers 
to an expression from ancient Greek poet, Archilochus, that Isaiah Berlin made famous in his essay  ―The Hedgehog and the 
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1.2.6 Does Grounding Human Rights in Human Dignity Engender a Paradox? 
In so far as they are claim rights and regardless of their content, basic human rights ―have their home in 
normative systems with constructed personae.‖53 When uncertain about which conditions obtain to 
invigorate the ‗moral personae‘ that human rights are meant to protect or promote, we will remain 
ambivalent about what human rights there are. The role of human dignity as a possible justificatory 
basis for human rights has to do with meeting the conditions under which human right-claims are valid. 
Thus, as a justificatory basis for human rights, dignity ought to define what constitutes as well as 
vindicates the common ‗human moral personae‘. And the question is: under which conditions does a 
dignity based justification of human rights lead to a paradox?  
One who advances the orthodox claim that human dignity does a justificatory work in the constitution 
of human rights will inevitably face a justification paradox, declares Schroeder. According to her, 
here's how the paradox materializes: if we wish to advance a secular conception of human dignity, then 
we should abandon the hope for attributing human rights to all human beings by virtue of their 
humanity. Whereas, ―[i]f we want to use dignity as a foundation for human rights and accord all human 
beings human rights, then only the Traditional Catholic understanding of dignity is appropriate‖.54 
Without reference to religious authority, she argues, human dignity loses its unique persuasion- which 
relates to the pretence that it invariably protects all human beings regardless of birth, or physical and 
mental capacity. If one, however, wants to rid dignity off  problematic religious or metaphysical 
underpinnings, one must at the same time be ready to abandon the idea that all human beings possess 
dignity in virtue of their humanity (and rest content with Kant's conception of ''the dignity of persons'' 
that excludes a significant number of human beings who are not capable of moral agency).  
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I think Schroeder's claim rests on a false dichotomy. For the sake of argument, we may even discount 
Kantian dignity as implausible, but still there is no reason to suppose that only one other alternative 
conception is appropriate as a possible foundation for human rights- namely the traditional Catholic 
conception of dignity or a similar conception with equivalent religious underpinning.  
The concept of human dignity has undeniably been a subject of serious scholarship, despite its late 
resurgence in philosophical discourses, and one should not undermine the enormous contribution it has 
already made in this relatively late re-emergence in morality: for example, Jeremy Waldron advances a 
status conception of human dignity which he considers foundation-ish to human rights; Ronald 
Dworkin argues that the ethical conception of  human dignity must at the same time confer moral 
purchase to dignity, by underscoring moral duties we owe to each other, including fundamental 
entitlements otherwise known as human rights; and finally, Stephen Darwall suggests that it is more 
plausible to conceive of dignity as a moral authority governing the most basic framework of 
interpersonal morality. Consequently, it is not true that the discourse on human dignity has lost its 
persuasion due to the fact that religion has lost its footing in contemporary moral theory. Dignity‘s 
recent currency in philosophical and legal reasoning merely states that we just have begun to tap into 
the enormous repository of ideas underneath its apparently messy surface. Even though Schroeder's 
bleak description about the current state of the discourse were accurate, that would not still warrant the 
urge to abandon the exploration of a possible dignitarian basis of human rights. 
On a related issue, I beg to differ with Schroeder and other critics' wholesale approach to foundational 
issues. Universal attribution of human rights to all members of the human species does not necessarily 
sanction a wholesale purchase of one single foundational idea or principle. I suggest, we rather 
consider dignitarian foundation of human rights in light of foundational pluralism. After all, why 
should we think that human dignity is less relevant for the vindication of human rights unless it is 
defended as the sole normative foundation for the latter? Some human rights may turn out to be derived 
directly from dignity while others from autonomy or liberty or other moral values ―without regard to 
the place those ideas have, in turn, in the analysis of dignity.‖55 Moreover, consistent with our intuitive 
attachment of the concept with paradigmatic violations of human rights, dignity may be germane to 
some rights than to others. The talk of dignity violation often comes at the forefront when discussing 
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about torture or slavery or other instances of humiliating and dehumanizing treatments, in contrast to 
philosophical debates concerning the right to privacy, freedom of speech and expression, or the right to 
periodic holidays with pay.  
I take it that, some human rights-claims enumerated under the Universal Declarations are not clearly 
inspired by dignity, and perhaps not derived from it. The idea of foundational pluralism that I alluded 
to has dual meanings: the first has to do with the understanding of foundations of human rights in more 
than one relevant sense, for which normative foundation or justification constitutes just one; the second 
is the idea that there can be a plurality of justificatory bases for human rights. I leave the rigorous 
exploration of the foundations of (moral) human rights to the next chapter. 
1.3 Human Dignity as a Conversation Starter 
In this primary chapter of my dissertation I did not expound a positive account of human dignity, I only 
tried to lay the groundwork for a successful defense of human dignity by undermining its detractors. 
Without indulging my readers with too much detail at the outset of my dissertation, I would, however, 
like to state some suggestive ways of advancing a positive thesis. As I have emphasized earlier, 
dignity's rich historical relation with political and social struggles of pastime and present is one rich 
source that should not be neglected by a normative theory of human dignity.  
Women's movements and to a certain extent civil rights movements furnish good examples wherein the 
notion of human dignity govern their respective movements' normative core. The fight for the 
emancipation of women, in whichever form it presents itself, basically signifies the yearning for the 
recognition that women are equal and autonomous persons and that they ought not be treated as objects 
of sexual gratification or reproductive necessities, nor should social, political and public offices are 
deliberately designed to stand beyond their reach. Human dignity can be a unifying idea that 
summarizes and abbreviates specific moral demands that these movements have rallied behind. 
Demands for freedom, equal respect and for the right to decent living conditions are all encapsulated 
under the banner of women rights. Nonetheless, one needs a unifying narrative to underscore that those 
demands have a common normative core. And in principle, the idea of human dignity can consistently 
mean respect for the right to autonomy, the right to equality and the right for the procurement of goods 
necessary for living a decent and humane life. In societies in which subjugation of women and of 
minorities were not just limited to social norms and corresponding acts  reflecting those norms but also 
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embedded in civil and political institutions, as it was clearly the case in the past and is still true today; 
and thus framing the struggle for such rights as a case for human dignity raises its moral profile, and 
rightly so. On the one hand, this task perfectly suits a familiar attribute of human dignity in public 
discourse- precisely that it is subversive; on the other hand, such framing captures dignity's normative 
essence. Even in the absence of adequate institutions of society or their inherent incapacity to effect the 
material existence of freedom and equality, one could still advance a claim for respect to one's dignity- 
which would in effect amount to making substantively identical claims as in the case of similar claims 
made in fairly decent societies. That is to say, there is a deeper substantive significance in structuring 
these protracted struggles for equality and freedom as struggles for respect for human dignity. And 
consequently, commitment to human dignity does not preclude embracing apparently conflicting goals 
(such as freedom, equality, and welfare) at the same time. Furthermore, the recourse to human dignity 
signifies that the refusal to grant basic rights to a segment of humanity on the basis of morally 
irrelevant factors implies the denial of their moral status.   
Consider the following thought. There is an aspect of rights' violation that may not be sufficiently 
captured by the institutional language of rights. For instance, the proposition that torture engenders 
violation of the bodily integrity of persons is true, nonetheless incomplete. What principally manifests 
in torture is an abrogation of the victim's moral standing as a person whose life, liberty and the power 
to determine what happens to himself should never be under the total control of others. Similarly, the 
examples discussed earlier, which have to do with the illustration of dignity's  historical deployment as 
a subversive idea, suggest that there is more to appeal to respect for dignity than respect for a given set 
of rights. All the rights for the recognition of which those historical struggles for equality were fought 
reveal a common thread, precisely that the victims were denied their rights and entitlements on the 
basis of some identifiable morally irrelevant characteristics such as gender, sexual orientation, skin 
color, clan or ethnicity, political or religious persuasion. That often results in humiliating the victims by 
making their debasement evident to them through gestures of one sort or another. I believe there is a 
point at which right violations devolve into humiliation. A number of factors may contribute to rights 
violations' descent into humiliation. It seems to me that, the moral outrage against inherently unjust 
institutions is primarily directed at their tendency to leave their victims justifiably feel indignant.  
It is obvious that rights unwittingly violated are rights violations nonetheless, as in the case of an 
accident committed by a drunk driver. But in the above mentioned historical examples, the rationale 
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explicitly or implicitly used by the perpetrators adds additional normative dimension to the 
accompanying violation of rights.56 Despite obvious similarities, there is a clear distinction between 
what I meant by 'the rationale' that perpetrators deploy and variations of intent in the legal sense; 
although, I must admit that the distinction is deceptively difficult to discern. For that matter, there is a 
parallel distinction in moral philosophy where one may speak of infringements as opposed to violations 
of rights- a distinction usually discussed in conjunction with the philosophical analysis of the famous 
doctrine of double effect.
57
  
In the context of the examples mentioned earlier, the intent to harm is already established and that 
questions of culpability are already settled. But my point is, ex-post determination of intent there is still 
another factor in play which does have a direct bearing on the stringency of the moral offense. That is 
what I call "morally proactive attitudes" that govern the internal moral-psychological reasoning at play 
illustrating why moral violators feel justified in treating others in certain disparaging ways. My 
stipulation of 'morally proactive attitudes' is reminiscent of P. F. Strawson's conception of ''participant 
reactive attitudes'' which he defined as moral "attitudes belonging to involvement or participation with 
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University Press, 1990) 
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others in inter-personal human relationships", attitudes include resentment, blame, anger, guilt and 
feeling indignant.58 Analogously, 'proactive attitudes' consist not in the moral attitudes that victims 
display but in the corresponding attitudes that the culprits had at their disposal either as the underlying 
motive or as a tool for rationalizing their actions. A sense of superiority usually occasioned by a 
degrading view of others, as reflected in covert and overt racism, actions designed to express contempt 
and corrosive disdain of others as in the well publicized case of torture and prisoner abuse by US 
military personnel in Abu Ghraib, scornful parading of prisoners before jeering crowds in Guantanamo 
bay, and the subsequent taking of pride and gloating at their humiliation. It also includes active refusal 
to acknowledge the presence of others and the moral space/standing they occupy by pretending as if 
they are invisible or look through them as if transparent. These examples of 'proactive attitudes' 
demonstrate that the moral pervasiveness of some right violations go beyond the mere intention to 
harm. To be clear, what I called participant proactive attitudes are also constituted by positive 
dispositions, in the same way as Strawson's 'participant reactive attitudes' do. As a morally 'proactive 
attitude' to dignify may mean to respect, venerate, regard and defer to our fellow humans. So to treat 
people in the manner worthy of their human dignity may involve displaying these positive 'proactive 
attitudes', for which respecting the basic rights of others is possibly symptomatic of the proper attitude 
one has, or ought to have, with regard to them.  
And if the above thoughts do not succeed in shifting the trajectory of the current philosophical 
discourse on human dignity, to the very least, I believe they illustrate the need to not give up on an idea 
of enormous significance as human dignity.  
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Chapter 2 
Human Dignity as (a)the Foundation of Moral Rights 
 
2.1 Human dignity in the Human Rights Discourse 
Human dignity is established as a fundamental principle to virtually all human rights declarations, 
conventions, protocols and international court statutes since World War II. For instance, the opening 
preambulatory statement of UDHR tells us that "the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world." Whereas, expanding on the preamble, Article 1 of the same declaration 
underscores the inherent nature of our rights and dignity proclaiming that "[a]ll human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity." What it says is that equal freedom and dignity are inherent endowments or 
birthrights of the human person for the recognition of which this declaration is enacted, not something 
that came into being simply due to legal prescription or will cease to exist when no longer recognized 
by a given legal system. This notion that dignity and rights are enduring basically an egalitarian 
essence which basically prescribes that all people are entitled to be accorded the same basic rights 
regardless of accidents of birth and social class, and that eventually became the most salient feature of 
the human rights movement.  
Although human dignity figures prominently in the UDHR, its precise role has not been clearly 
stipulated; it is only later that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 has 
envisaged a direct and fundamental connection between rights and dignity. It addresses the 
foundational question for the rights listed under the covenant, declaring that they "derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person." Moreover, in many of the subsequent instruments, the 
expression "respect for the inherent dignity of the human person" evidently figures in various 
capacities, including as an overarching legal norm, guiding principle or as a foundation or basis for 
human rights claims.1  
                                                          
1
   For the discussion on the role of human dignity in the legal context, see Oscar Schachter "Human Dignity as a Normative 
Concept" The American Journal of the International Law, 77: 4 (Oct., 1983): 848-854 
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Certainly, human dignity has been given significant attention in the human rights law. Supreme court 
justices sometimes make recourse to human dignity in some high profile judicial reviews regarding the 
constitutionality of certain controversial pieces of legislation, subsequently demonstrating the extent to 
which human dignity is firmly entrenched in the legal discourse. But it is only recently that moral 
philosophers have undertaken a concerted attempt at providing a philosophical analysis of the idea of 
human rights and, in particular, exploring whether a foundational relationship obtains between human 
dignity and (moral) human rights has been their preoccupation of late. Although philosophers who take 
human rights seriously do usually mention declarations of human rights, most, however, do take issue 
with the extensive list of human rights contained in those human rights covenants. They recognize the 
political dimension to the negotiations leading up to the drafting and subsequent adoption of the human 
rights instruments; it is, therefore, easy to see that some philosophers' skepticism and uneasiness 
towards the given list of human rights provided by those documents is partly driven by the fact that 
human rights practice did not stem from a unified substantive theory. Some, for instance, are doubtful 
whether economic and social rights are genuine human rights, in terms of whether the claims they have 
on us correspond to an adequate moral title; for that reason, they often refer to such claims as 
''manifesto rights"- used almost unanimously as a pejorative term.  
In any case, most philosophers prefer a more constrained list of human rights for only a handful of 
those rights command near universal agreement, testament to the fact that moral and political 
philosophers fiercely disagree about the nature of human rights. The idea of human rights is a very 
peculiar moral category and it is deceptively unclear whether human rights comprise a subset of moral 
rights, or whether we should take them in the first instance as legal rights towards which moral 
standards do apply, or should we, with Jürgen Habermas, declare that human rights have a ―moral-legal 
Janus face‖.2  
                                                          
2
    For a defense of human rights as a subset of moral rights, see Feinberg, Joel. (1970), ―The Nature and Value of Rights,‘‘ 
Journal of Value Enquiry, 4: 243-257; Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973). For Jeremy Waldron, 
both human rights and human dignity are best taken in the first instance as legal concepts; see Waldron, Jeremy. Dignity, 
Rank and Rights; Meir Dan-Cohen (Edn.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). On Habermas‘ view on the role of 
human dignity in human rights discourse, see his ―The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human 
Rights‘‘ Metaphilosophy, 41: 4 (July 2010): 464-480  
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Of course, there are others who defended a practical (or what has crudely been referred to as a political) 
conception of human rights- according to which the currently prevailing human rights regime has 
presumably rendered the search for foundations of human right-claims not only obsolete but also 
grossly misguided. In this context, foundational issues do not naturally arise because this approach to 
human rights presumes that human rights practice has already conferred the requisite validity that a 
foundational account is supposed to provide. This so called ''political conception'' draws heavily on 
John Rawls' conception of justice as he studiously revisited in his later works- Political Liberalism and 
The Law of Peoples.3 In his later works Rawls‘ concern was in finding plausible ways of integrating 
human rights claims into a reasonable Law of Peoples (which governs the relationship between 
―peoples‖ as autonomous political entities) independently of any recourse to comprehensive 
philosophical doctrines. His theoretical approach is, therefore, devised to sidestep disputes concerning 
the foundations of human rights, than to resolving them.  
Although Rawls's view of human rights as international standards involves no direct critique of deep 
foundational accounts or projects "that approach human rights through the analysis of human dignity or 
through a theory of natural rights", such a critique is rather implicit in the basic argumentative structure 
of his conceptual framework; "with its rejection of appeals to "comprehensive" moral views as 
foundations for a theory of justice. The critique does not, however... take the form of real skepticism 
about foundational projects in value theory."4 Some, however, have expanded on Rawls' position in 
order to bring it to bear a more direct critique of deep foundational projects. Charles Beitz advanced 
what could be taken as an extension to Rawls' view when in his recent book- The Idea of Human 
Rights- he mounts a direct critique towards naturalistic conceptions of human rights, including theories 
that conceptualize human rights through the analysis of human dignity.5 
                                                          
3
   John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Colombia University Press, 1993); The Law of Peoples: With, The Idea of 
Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2001) 
4
   A. John Simmons, "Human Rights, Natural Rights and Human Dignity" in Rowan Cruft, et.al (eds.) Philosophical   
Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 138-152, at p. 146 In the same passage, Simmons 
further stated that "Rawls famously denies that the arguments in Political Liberalism (and, by implication, the subsequent 
arguments in The Law of Peoples) rest on such skepticism" about foundations in value theory. John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, 62-63 
5
   Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Similarly, Joseph Raz's defense of a 
functional/political approach exhibits marked similarities to Beitz's critique of foundational projects. In a suggestive article 
by the title "Human Rights Without Foundations", Raz argues that the role of human rights claims is to set limits to the state 
57 
 
This is as far as I can go with sketching different approaches at human rights theorizing. For it is not 
the objective of this chapter to provide a comprehensive account of human rights or to tackle head-on 
fundamental points of dispute amongst human rights scholars; instead, this chapter is concerned 
primarily with the question what if, and in what sense, human dignity can be a valid foundation of 
human rights.  
That being said, I think it appropriate to submit my dispute with the so-called political conception of 
human rights. The essence of my claim is that one specific version of the political conception, whose 
core thesis is based on skepticism towards foundational projects in value theory, is untenable. 
Evidently, all versions of the political conception have a positivistic outlook of human rights, but not 
all of them reject the idea of a foundation in value theory. One may with Alan Gewirth formulate the 
basic claim of this conception: "For some person A to have a [human] right to X in this sense means 
that there is social recognition and effectual legal protection of A's having or doing X."6 But the 
concept of a human right I subscribe to is precisely what Gewirth aptly characterized as "normatively 
moral." It roughly takes the following form: for A to have a human right to X in this normatively moral 
sense means there is an underlying moral reason for A‘s being protected in the having or doing of X, as 
something that's due to him by a moral argument, even if such protection is in fact lacking in terms of 
social recognition and effective legal protection. In other words, the statement that a person has a 
human right to X in the normative moral sense cannot be falsified by the fact that in some places on 
earth, at present or in the foreseeable future, there exists neither the social recognition nor an 
established legal practice granting that the person is entitled to X.  
To be clear, my critique of the political conception has no bearing on the legal validity of human rights 
but only in so far as the talk of validity presupposes a concept of human rights regarded as normatively 
moral. My view is that an adequate defense of the moral significance of human rights does, in fact, 
require a search for deep foundations, not something reducible to a historical account of the human 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
sovereignty-otherwise an established norm deeply engrained in international law and politics. See Raz, Joseph "Human 
Rights Without Foundations" in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010)  
6
   Alan Gewirth, "Dignity as the Basis of Rights" in Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent (eds.) The Constitution of 
Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992): 10-28, at p. 14 
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rights practice. This is not to categorically deny human rights practice some normative force but only to 
emphasize that a sound conception of human rights requires an adequate account of their foundation.  
It is important to note that a particular way of conceiving human rights is implicit in my critique of 
foundational skepticism. In particular, I draw on a philosophical point of view that many prominent 
figures subscribe to whose underlying thesis is that human rights are essentially, perhaps not 
exclusively, moral rights. With the exception of a few outliers, the vast majority of philosophers concur 
that human rights are distinct s of moral rights.  
One may, however, find this characterization of human rights as moral rights confusing or at best 
insufficiently informative. Feinberg offers a concise but precise description of moral rights; he says, 
"the term 'moral rights' can be applied to all rights that are held to exist prior to, or independently of, 
any legal or institutional rules."7 This is simply to say that the norms that constitute moral rights are not 
established by appeal to some authority but by a moral argument. In respect to human rights, Feinberg 
further declares: "I shall define "human rights" to be generally moral rights of a fundamentally 
important kind held equally by all human beings, unconditionally and unalterably."8 In other words, 
"human rights can exist only if in some sense moral norms exist."9 I think, some of the suspicion 
towards characterizing human rights as moral rights is due to the fact that "[t]he word 'moral' seems to 
be doing much of the same work in this context that the word 'natural' use to do. Describing rights as 
natural implied that they were not conventional or artificial in the sense that legal rights are, and the 
same is implied by describing human rights as moral rights."10 But the semantics of ―moral rights‖ 
does, indeed, have explanatory advantage over the other for it is more sanitized from problematic 
metaphysical implications that the term ―natural‖ appears to import.  
                                                          
7
   Feinberg,  Social Philosophy, 84 
8
   Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 85 
9
   Rex Martin and James W. Nickel "Recent Work on the Concept of Rights" in C.L. Ten (edn.) Theories of Rights 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2006): 1-16 at p. 11 But Feinberg has some concerns over considering all human rights as 
natural rights, without qualification. He writes, "[a]ll of the rights that have been characterized as ''natural rights'' in the 
leading manifestos can also be called human rights, but, as I shall be using the terms, not all human rights are also by 
definition natural rights. The theory of natural rights asserts not only that there are certain human rights, but also that these 
rights have certain further epistemic properties and certain metaphysical status. In respect to questions of moral ontology 
and moral epistemology, the theory of human rights is neutral." Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 85  
10
   Rex Martin and James W. Nickel "Recent Work on the Concept of Rights", 11  
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In merely describing human rights as moral rights, one must note that, what sort of moral norms 
constitute human rights is not entirely settled, since critical morality is composed of competing 
normative frameworks wherein each conception of morality imposes its own standard of what is moral 
and more importantly its standard of what constitutes a right. It might be claimed, for the sake of 
argument, that ―it is possible for moral, and hence human, rights to exist even if moral norms are 
[were] conventional or are relative to culture, but if human rights are to serve their role as international 
standards of political criticism then such a conventional morality would have to include some norms 
that are accepted worldwide.‖11 Nevertheless, since we usually insist, often with valid reasons, on 
deploying moral norms as universal normative standards, the inadequacy of conventional morality for 
giving birth to truly universal human rights claims eventually becomes apparent. For reasons of space 
and adequacy, I shall not put forward an elaborate argument why I think we must overlook 
conventional morality from our considerations of a possible theoretical space within which the notion 
of human rights could emerge. The limitations of conventionality is one of the fairly established 
notions in meta-ethics and normative-moral theory and it, therefore, needs no further elaboration. 
And if we agree on the supposition that human rights exist only if moral norms exist, and can further 
assert that moral norms are in some fundamental sense distinct from conventional norms of any kind, 
then we are effectively within the domain of critical morality in which the ‗moral‘ in moral rights 
connotes something equivalent to what the word ‗natural‘ used to mean. Furthermore, I believe, the 
conceptual space made available by critical morality designates the theoretical framework within which 
the analysis of human dignity would have significant implication for the understanding of the grounds 
of human rights.  
Even within the framework of the legal discourse on human rights some scholars acknowledge the 
moral underpinnings of those familiar references to human dignity in major international declarations 
of human rights. In his brief but seminal article, a prominent legal scholar Oscar Schachter insists that 
the invocation of human dignity in positive law ―should be understood in a philosophical rather than 
historical sense.‖ Although the idea of human dignity may reflect historically existing notions of 
freedom and equality without generating or, at any rate, justifying them, he contends, ―as a 
philosophical statement, the proposition that rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
                                                          
11
   Rex Martin and James W. Nickel "Recent Work on the Concept of Rights", 11; emphasis mine.  
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person…implies that rights are not derived from the state or any other external authority.‖12 
Declarations of human rights could be seen as attempts at making the concept of human dignity 
operational, in particular, as a practical response to unspeakable atrocities committed during the Second 
World War. Similarly, Schachter maintains that human dignity reflects that underlying ―suprapositive‖ 
element underlying positive law‘s recognition of human rights claims as universal, inalienable, and 
non-forfeitable, ―not simply a matter of our having decided to create positive law in this form‖.13 It 
seems to me that Schachter‘s characterization of human dignity as an underlying moral content of 
human rights claims is an earlier attempt at making sense of the all too familiar references to human 
dignity in human rights Law and practice. Moral philosophers, on the other hand, need not have to 
undermine the notion that contemporary human rights movements are partly embodiments of political 
projects that aspire to install international norms for the protection of people and consequently 
"promote international peace and security." Philosophical analyses of human rights may be seen as 
responses to this international effort at codifying legal norms and standards. I would, with Karl 
Wellman, say that "one cannot fully understand either the reaffirmation of human rights in the United 
Nations Charter or the continuing human rights movement without examining the relevance of human 
rights theories of noninstitutional moral human rights."14 
Analogous to human dignity's prominence in the legal discourse regarding human rights, those moral 
and political philosophers who have taken seriously the significance of clarifying the concept have 
predominantly conceived it within the ―rights approach‖ to morality. The following passage from 
Ronald Dworkin reflects an outlook widely shared among philosophers that affirms the significance of 
human dignity in the philosophical analysis of rights.  In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin declares:  
                                                          
12
  Schachter, op.cit., p. 853 Without doubt, the horrors of the Holocaust and the ensuing global outcry that it triggered have 
made it imperative for an international legal regime to prevent such indignities from ever happening again. Likewise, 
drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights saw these horrors as violations of human dignity. They emphasized 
that the point of declaration of universal human rights, among other things, is to ensure a dignified existence for all 
members of the human family.  
13
   Jeremy Waldron reads Schachter as invoking something akin to Kelsenian idea of the “grundnorm“- that would mean ―a 
norm regarding human dignity might be an ultimate source fort he legitimacy of human rights norms‘‘. Jeremy Waldron, "Is 
Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?" in Rowan Cruft, et.al (eds.) Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) pp. 117-137, at p. 127 
14
   Carl Wellman, The Moral Dimensions of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 7  
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―Anyone who professes to take rights seriously, and who praises our government for respecting 
them, must have some sense of what that point is. He must accept, at the minimum, one or both 
of two important ideas. The first is the vague but powerful idea of human dignity. This idea, 
associated with Kant, but defended by philosophers of different schools, supposes that there are 
ways of treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full member of the 
human community, and holds that such treatment is profoundly unjust. The second is the more 
familiar idea of political equality. This supposes that the weaker members of a political 
community are entitled to the same concern and respect of their government as the more 
powerful members have secured for themselves, so that if some men have freedom of decision 
whatever the effect on the general good, then all men must have the same freedom.‖15  
The main takeaway for me is that Dworkin insists anyone who takes rights seriously must at the same 
time hold that we ought to ―treat violations of dignity and equality as special moral crimes, beyond the 
reach of ordinary utilitarian justification.‖16 The point he wishes to convey can be summed up 
accordingly: no legitimate basis for the discourse on rights exists in the absence of recourse to human 
dignity and political equality. This clearly tells us that the idea of human dignity is fundamental (or in 
some sense foundational) to the understanding of rights, but at this stage the full implication of this 
characterization is not yet clear.  
If dignity is to be treated as foundational to moral (human) rights, we must first discern what that 
foundational role entails or amounts to. Foundation can be predicated in different ways, as there is no 
unified sense in which one concept is considered to be foundational to another. Human dignity may be 
considered as basic or ―foundational‖ to rights in many distinct yet equally meaningful ways; one way 
of conceiving human dignity as a foundation could be in the sense in which Dworkin describes. That of 
course is different from recognizing human dignity as the ―source‖ of human rights, implying that the 
discourse on human rights is derived from or grew out of the discourse on human dignity which, in 
turn, is distinct from the thesis that dignity is the source of validity or justification of specific human 
rights claims, and again justification is distinct from the notion that respect for dignity buttresses 
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   Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977): 198-199 
16
   Dworkin, "Taking Rights Seriously", 199 supranote 1 
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respect for human rights. These are some of the many ways of conceiving human dignity as 
foundational to human rights, provided that human rights are conceived simply as basic moral rights.  
In a short while, I will return to the exploration of different meanings to the notion of foundation in the 
context of human rights, but first I should like to quickly discuss three closely connected assertions that 
might be, and often are, confused with the claim that human dignity holds the attribute of being 
foundational to human rights.  
 
2.2 Two Distinctions and one Common Misconception about a Foundational Thesis 
The consideration that human dignity is a foundation of human rights must be distinguished from (a) a 
feature that is common to all human rights and (b) from the thesis that dignity consist in the possession 
of human rights. Moreover, (c) we must take due diligence not to conflate every foundational account 
with Foundationalism according to which a single overarching value underlies or vindicates moral 
(human) rights. Jeremy Waldron brings the first distinction to attention, and with regard to (c), John 
Tasioulas presents an interesting distinction between the defense of dignity as a foundation and the 
orthodoxy of Foundationalism.  
In the following I shall explore the first two distinctions and demonstrate how they differ from a 
foundational account proper. Certainly, some misconceptions about the foundation of human rights can 
be attributed to the rather complex nature of rights, such that the concept of a right cannot be pinned 
down with a simplistic account of its content and foundation. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that a right's 
claim is posited in a distinctively demanding normative frame. The moral demand that a right's claim 
generates is supposedly stringent that it functions as a moral side constraint on the action and behavior 
of individuals who bear corresponding duties, since the point of a right's claim "is for the securing not 
just the adventitious satisfaction of the norm."17 Human rights claims, in particular, are thought to be 
resistant to trade-offs primarily against other norms or moral categories and also against other sorts of 
rights. And, since now we are talking about human rights in particular—"rights that all human beings 
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   Jeremy Waldron, "Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?" in Rowan Cruft, et.al (eds.) Philosophical   
Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) : 117-137, at p. 132 
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possess simply in virtue of their humanity,"18 we are at the same time talking about basic universal 
equality. In other words, if it is true that one person has these rights, it means everyone has them. 
Nevertheless, from the premise that human rights are to be held universally by all human beings, ―there 
is no [valid] implication that the duties must also be universal, i.e., that all persons bear the duties 
correlative to the human rights enjoyed by all.‖19  
In any case, one of the above noted common characteristics of human rights, namely, that they reflect 
moral equality between human beings, can be obtained by conceptual analysis; whereas, the notion that 
human rights are characterized by their being resistant to trade-offs could be established by a 
substantive theory. These are but considerations as to what distinctively characterizes human rights in 
contrast to other type of rights and norms. However, the fact of  being constitutive to human rights may 
lead some into mistaking these common features for foundations. For instance, just because human 
rights signify moral equality does not mean that moral equality is, therefore, the foundation of rights.  
In all fairness, it is not easy to delineate foundational elements out of all the constitutive features of 
human rights. For, when examined ―with the eye of a pedant‖, what may be considered constitutive to 
(moral) human rights encompasses not just their common characteristics and the adequacy conditions 
for something to be qualified as a human right, it also appears to include the consideration of their 
grounding. In other words, what concerns the basic constitution of such rights broadly captures what 
makes something a (moral) human right, including the foundations for such rights as well as the best 
method of determining their content. These distinctions are so subtle and abstruse that they are often 
confused in rights theorizing, especially significant is the blurred distinction between what reasons one 
might have in believing that X is a human right and what justifies human rights such as X. Despite 
seemingly intractable confusions, the foundation of rights ―is distinct from, although also related to, the 
epistemic one of finding reasons for believing that X is or is not a human right. One may have good 
reasons for such a belief without being in possession of an account of the foundations of human 
rights.‖20  
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   John Tasioulas, ―On the Foundations of Human Rights‖ in Rowan Cruft, et.al (eds.) Philosophical   Foundations of 
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) : 45-70, at p. 49 
19
   Tasioulas, “On the Foundations of Human Rights”, 50 
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   Tasioulas, “On the Foundations of Human Rights”, 45. I must admit that it is a tricky thing to separate the epistemic 
notion of having a sufficient reason to believe that X is a human rights claim from having at one's disposal a general 
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Certainly there are other distinctive features of moral rights that are also basic and presumably 
established by analysis but ought not to be equated with a foundational account. Rights serve a moral 
function; according to choice theory, the supposed moral function is to confer autonomy for the right 
holder over others in relation to their respective duties towards him/her. Whereas interest theory 
maintains that the point of having rights is to protect and promote the right-holder‘s interests or 
welfare. These two competing accounts of the point of rights do not establish the specific substance of 
a given right, although each may point towards a particular direction for delineating the content of 
rights by a substantive argument.  
On choice theory, for example, regardless of whether the content of each particular right directly 
concerns liberty, the point of having rights is to grant autonomy to the right-holder over the behavior of 
the duty-bearer, such that the right holder can hold the latter accountable for infringement or may 
otherwise release him from duty at will. Analogously, what the interest theory asserts is that rights exist 
in order to protect and promote welfare, and that holds true even for a specific right to liberty. To claim 
that the point of rights is to confer autonomy for the right-holder is not to identify rights with autonomy 
or ground them in it, any more than theories that seek to define the raison-d’être of rights in terms of 
interests or welfare identify the content of rights with interests or can be taken as declaring that rights 
are grounded in interests.  
Moreover, it is not uncommon for philosophers to declare that rights confer dignity and mandatory 
respect to all persons in virtue of being human. Nonetheless, a defense of human dignity as a 
foundation must not be conflated with an explication of the moral significance of having rights, at least 
not in the constrained sense in which ''a foundation" is understood here in this chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
understanding of what grounds human rights. At the superficial level, a reasonable understanding of human rights may not 
require being in possession of a philosophical account of the foundations of human rights. No human rights activist or 
lawyer is required to present such an account, for she can make a convincing case following the dictates of the law by the 
letter or by interpretation thereof. However, at the deeper level having good reasons to believe X is a human right may 
require defining its adequate content. It would otherwise be useless to assert that X, say a human right to life, exists unless 
one also knows what it requires, permits and entitles. However, Carl Wellman propounds a positive account of the 
relationship between the content and grounds of rights, when he states that ―[b]ecause the content of any right is determined 
by its grounds, the best method for defining any right will be shown by the best theory of the grounds of rights‖. Carl 
Wellman, An Approach to Rights: Studies in the Philosophy of Law and Morals (Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1997) p. 36  
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Secondly, it has seldom been argued that human dignity consists in the possession of rights. This 
suggests that having rights is a necessary quality of being endowed with dignity. Jacques Maritain 
appears to suggest that having dignity is substantively equivalent to having rights, when he declared: 
"The dignity of the human person? The expression means nothing if it does not signify that by virtue of 
natural law, the human person has the right to be respected, it is the subject of rights, possesses 
rights."21 From this direction of fit, the precise relation between dignity and rights is quite unclear, 
except the simple logical inference that possessing rights is a necessary condition for having dignity. 
However, if one were to say that human dignity consists just in the possession of rights, that is, for a 
certain person A, if being possessed of human dignity merely duplicates the simple fact of him 
possessing rights, it may then be argued, and quite plausibly so, that reference to dignity is redundant.22  
Nevertheless, some important aspect of this relation may in some sense be utilized in ethical theory, for 
instance in clarifying how having rights in the empirical sense reinforces the person's sense of dignity 
or as a way of describing a causality suggesting that respect for rights fosters respect for human dignity. 
Undoubtedly, ―there is a certain dignity in being the right holder.‖ There is analytic point to this view, 
for instance, according to a version of this view familiarly defended by Joel Feinberg, the dignity of 
persons is recognized and fostered when in virtue of one's capacity to claim rights one can ― ‗stand up 
like men‘, to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone.‖23 On 
Feinberg‘s view, to think of a person as possessed of human dignity ―simply is to think of him as a 
potential maker of claims‖, i.e., to recognize him as a right holder. This maybe one possible way of 
looking at the relation between dignity and rights, but, as Gewirth correctly pointed out, "it does not 
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   Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, trans. D. Ansem (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), 65 
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  Owing to the most prominent place rights have in morality, one might observe that progress has been made on a number 
of areas concerning what a right is, while, in contrast, since dignity is relatively obscure and quite notoriously became a 
subject of deep and persistent controversy, appeals to dignity seems to bring forth a corrosive element into the human rights 
discourse. In light of that, skeptics may argue that at best dignity is a mere decorum, ―or a place-holder to conceal 
intractable controversy― and, therefore, the discourse on human rights will be better off without this nebulous concept— 
human dignity. For a similar line of argument, see Doris Schroeder "Human Rights and human Dignity: An Appeal to 
Separate the Conjoined Twins" Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15: 3 pp. 323-335 Schroeder contends that even the 
most promising non-religious conception of human dignity, that is, the Kantian conception, cannot stand independently of 
his metaphysics of the ‗neumenal world‘. For that reason Kantian dignity is an epitome of a cul-de-sac.  
23
   Joel Feinberg, ―The Nature and Value of Rights,‘‘ reprinted in his Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 151 
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show how human dignity is the antecedent, the justificatory basis or ground, of human rights, as 
against being either their equivalent or their consequent."24  
I should say that there are nuanced, non-redundant, versions of the notion that having dignity consists 
in the possession of (human) rights. On some accounts, human rights are regarded as specific instances 
of a normative concept of human dignity. Although it is not immediately evident whether the assertion 
that rights are constituents of human dignity includes or rather precludes an account of their foundation, 
it is however possible to argue that human dignity is in some sense foundational to a given set of 
human rights while, at the same time, some rights are conceived to flow directly from human dignity. 
For instance, analogous to the relation between a general rule and its specific instances, (moral) human 
rights-claims may similarly be conceived as specific instances of the general norm, i.e., human dignity. 
In the same vein, some conceptions of human dignity have emphatically claimed that dignity ―is a 
status that comprises a given set of rights‖25; regarded as a status, human dignity also provides the 
rationale for ―how the various rights, duties, and so on hang together, i.e., the underlying coherence of 
the package.‖26 Therefore, the notion that dignity consists in rights must not deter one from exploring 
whether dignity is in some sense foundational to some of the rights that it consists in. Nevertheless, in 
its oversimplified and generic version, the thought that human rights are specific constituents of human 
dignity does not in itself suggest or imply that those rights are grounded in dignity.27   
Thirdly, many scholars resist the thesis that human dignity grounds rights for a striking reason that a 
defense of foundation inevitably begets foundationalism. Foundationalism holds that a single notion (or 
norm) is the overarching ground for the possession of a certain moral category; applied to the specific 
context about rights, dignity Foundationalism vis-à-vis (moral) human rights implies that human 
dignity is exalted above all other norms as the sole ultimate basis for human rights claims, which in 
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   Alan Gewirth, "Dignity as the Basis of Rights", 13 Gewirth identifies two concepts of rights that run in parallel to two 
correlating concepts of human dignity. One is empirical or positivist and the other is "normatively moral". On the empirical 
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   Waldron, “Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?”, 134 
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   Waldron, “Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?”, 135 
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   It may, as well, be the case that human dignity and rights share a common ground, or something that grounds dignity 
maybe part of the package that grounds rights. Both possibilities cannot be ruled out by the mere assertion that rights are 
constituent elements of human dignity.  
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turn might entail a commitment towards an objective, value-neutral, ontological understanding of 
human dignity. Although this may be the orthodox view, John Tasioulas, for instance, recognizes that 
foundationalism ―comes in both meta-ethical and normative versions.‖ According to him, what best 
epitomizes meta-ethical foundationalism ―is the naturalist thesis that the objective grounding of [moral] 
human rights consists in their being logically derivable exclusively from an array of value-neutral facts 
about human nature or a metaphysical human essence.‖28 On the other hand, ―[t]he normative version 
of foundationalism consists in the general idea that the values that ground human rights are somehow 
distinctive in character.‖29 Although normative foundationalism does not distinctively insist that the 
principle grounding human rights must reflect value-neutral facts, what unites both versions of 
foundationalism is the commitment to a dogmatic account of objectivity.  
Certainly, foundationalism has a strong philosophical appeal specifically in the discourse on human 
rights; for instance, it appeals to objective qualities when making vindicatory assertions and that it calls 
for a foundation that is not tentative but something that is capable of warranting the fundamental and 
non-derivative character of human rights. But, whatever the initial intuitive appeal of (particularly the 
normative sense of) foundationalism, its attraction is offset by the erroneous insistence that 
foundational considerations for rights must be distinctive, as it presumes that such considerations are 
not supposedly shared ―with many other standards of inter-personal morality.‖ If the status of the 
current discourse in moral philosophy can be of any guidance, foundationalism has proved to be an 
unpromising theoretical approach. Take autonomy and dignity, for instance, the two plausible 
candidates for the foundation of human rights. Both values do also serve as standards of behavior in a 
section of inter-personal morality that does not involve rights, say for example as virtue-ethical 
standards of uprightness of character and of self-possession, with the respective normative claim that it 
would be wrong to create an environment which, by design, off-balances individuals from an authentic 
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display of their sense of personal autonomy and dignity. In any case, it is not inconsistent to hold that 
the dignity of persons and/or autonomy are/is the foundation(s) of human rights, while at the same time 
granting that foundational concepts also play indispensable role in many other standards of inter-
personal morality.   
We must therefore eschew the requirement for foundational accounts to comport with 
foundationalism's foregoing appeal to exclusivism and, as John Tasioulas observes, we should be open 
to the idea that the ―considerations that ground human rights may themselves belong within the 
normative domain; for example, they may be inherently reason-giving considerations about the 
elements of a good human life [universal human interests] or the equal moral status of all humans [i.e., 
human dignity].‖30  
I do share Tasioulas' counsel for rigor, as he instructs us to not conflate something's being a foundation 
with the idea that it is the underlying ground. Moreover, foundationalism erroneously assumes that 
there is just one peculiar way in which one concept can be a said to ground another, i'e', merely as a 
source of its justification. As will be discussed in the following section of this chapter, there are 
basically four ways of conceiving 'a foundation', of which justification is but one.  
Nevertheless, Tasiouslas does not appear to heed his own counsel for rigor when he lumps 
foundationalism and essentialism together. Consider meta-ethical foundationalism, for example; he 
takes it as asserting that being a foundation involves logical derivation from premises about  
immutable, "human nature or a metaphysical essence". But that is not necessarily the case, for a sort of 
meta-ethical foundationalism without a companion provision about a certain metaphysical status can, 
and does indeed, figure in the human rights discourse. In what is probably his most influential 
contribution to the theory of human rights, Alan Gewirth puts forth a framework for logically deriving 
generic human rights from some value-neutral 'generic conditions for action'. He subsequently argues 
that a structurally similar account can be made for  dignity as the basis of generic human rights.31 The 
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  Tasioulas, “On the Foundations of Human Rights”,  46 Even if Tasioulas‘ own account of the foundation of human 
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point is, dignity foundationalism is not synonymous to dignity essentialism; the latter is based on the 
assumption that dignity designates an immutable human essence or metaphysical stature, while the 
former does not necessarily make such kind of assumption about human nature. One can appeal for 
deep foundations for human rights and venture on establishing human dignity as such a foundation, and 
can do so without having to assume that human dignity presupposes an intrinsic ontological status of 
being human in the natural order of things.   
It must be clear that, my intention is not to portray foundationalism as not a foundational project 
proper; it certainly is. In addition to that, I defer to foundationalists‘ insistence on the importance of 
looking for deep foundations (―not just something ‗foundation-ish‘‖) for a comprehensive defense of 
human rights. I only took issue with its suggestion that such deep foundations ought to be distinctive 
and must rest on innate and objective attributes that are supposedly shared by all humans.   
With regard to how one should approach the question what, if anything, grounds human rights claims, a 
few remarks suggest themselves. One simple lesson we take from a critique of foudationalism is that 
we must not conflate a defense of human dignity as a foundation of human rights with an appeal to 
dignity foudationalism. One should not, therefore, seek to defeat appeals to a dignitarian foundation of 
human rights by reducing them, by default, to an objectionable thesis of foundationalism: that would 
amount to making a category mistake and can easily lead to committing the fallacy of red herring. This 
is, however, not to deny that human dignity draws heavily on meta-ethical considerations such as the 
idea of moral personhood, but these considerations ought not prominently rest on an ontological basis 
of being human unless ―we have a suitably expansive understanding of the natural [ontological] realm, 
one that does not limit natural facts to those that do explanatory work within the natural sciences [or 
within the metaphysics of the intelligible world].‖32 The point is, if conceived with ‗an eye of a pedant‘, 
even in the context in which certain normative facts about being human such as having equal moral 
status figure as objective properties, ‗a non-foundationalist account of the grounds of human rights‘ can 
possibly come to light. This is therefore to say that both meta-ethical and normative considerations can 
be suitable candidates for the norms that ground human rights, and the jury is still out. Nonetheless, the 
gist of the matter is that we should be careful to not let those considerations regress into dogmatic 
foundationalism. I concur with Tasioulas (only) on that score.  
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2.3 What Does It Mean for Something to be a Foundation of (human) Rights? 
The defense of rights would be incomplete without a thorough articulation of the grounds on which 
rights are founded. But the challenge is that ―a foundation‖ is not an easily definable concept, as it can 
be understood in many distinct and meaningful ways. Part of the exploration of rights in morality 
involves an analysis of the various proposals for the foundation of rights, and that invites us asking 
―what is it, anyway, for something to be the foundation of rights?‖33  
In this exploration of the various ways of understanding the idea of foundations, I draw heavily on 
Jeremy Waldron‘s immensely informative analysis of ―four possible accounts of what it might mean to 
say that one concept, α, is a foundation of another concept, β.‖34 A foundational relation between α- 
human dignity and β- human rights could be understood as stating that (a) human rights derived or 
emanating from human dignity ―as a matter of history and genealogy‖, or (b) human dignity providing 
the legitimacy or being ―the source of the validity‖ of human rights claims, or (c) human rights being 
logically derivable from human dignity either by a deductively necessary argument or with additional 
empirical premises, or (d) the concept of human dignity fostering (shading indispensable light on) our 
understanding of human rights.  
2.3.1 Human Dignity as the Historical or Genealogical Basis 
When philosophers speak of normative foundations of a concept they seldom take seriously its 
historical genesis or how it has evolved into the shape and content of its contemporary use. In other 
words, the order of concepts in the history of ideas may not be principally what many philosophers 
have in mind when they speak of human dignity as the foundation of human rights. This is, however, 
not to deny that genealogy shades some light on the meaning of concepts for it does provide clarity on 
how we come about their current use; but foundational account of notions like human rights usually 
calls for something deeper than a defense of the respective place of human rights in the genealogical 
order of ideas.  
However, as Waldron aptly observes, as a matter of historical derivation it is more plausible to suppose 
that the discourse on human rights is a historical precursor to the contemporary discourse on human 
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dignity; he declares, "[o]ur modern dignity discourse owes more to the human rights discourse that has 
emerged since 1948 than the later owes to the former."35 And, on the other hand, it is more sensible to 
conceive the idea of human rights as the modern successor to the frequently derided Enlightenment 
doctrine of natural rights under the aegis of which Pico‘s Oration on the Dignity of Man or Kant‘s 
conception of dignity in the Groundwork could sensibly be related to the modern conception of human 
rights, though only indirectly.  
There are striking parallels between the natural rights tradition and the modern discourse on human 
rights, which seems to lend some evidence that the latter can be conceived to have grown or molded 
out of the first. If we follow the standard view of human rights as universal rights, that is, as rights 
possessed by all humans "not only in the state of nature but in all other "non-natural" conditions as 
well", we shall evidently arrive at the closest approximation of the notion of natural rights. Moreover, it 
is not uncommon to describe human rights as inherent to the human person (possessed simply in virtue 
of being human), also as rights that cannot be lost due to voluntary renunciation (inalienability) or by 
forfeiture due to wrongdoing, or by being rendered null and void due to a lapse of time without actual 
enforcement or through legal prescription.36 But this supposed relation need not be interpreted as 
endorsing the defense of human rights purely as natural rights; instead, my point is merely that the 
notion of universal human rights may have derived from the idea of natural rights.37  
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  John Simmons argues that a naturalistic account of human rights must fit the stated description. "Human Rights, Natural 
Rights and Human Dignity", 145 
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In any case, derivation "as a matter of history or genealogy" is not the most salient feature of a 
foundational account of human rights. Most importantly, the question whether human dignity is a 
foundation in this sense (to moral human rights) will have little bearing on the theoretical effort at 
producing a sound conception of moral human rights. Therefore, questions of genealogy and history are 
defeated long before they are actually posed.  
Dignity as the Source of Legitimacy 
Waldron's second sense of one concept being a foundation to another involves a comparison to how a 
Kelsenian grundnorm serves as a source of validity to other legal norms. On Hans Kelsen's view, in the 
dynamic sense of law, legal norms form a hierarchical structure whereby lower norms are progressively 
legitimized by higher positive norms38; for instance, the supreme law of the land that empowers a given 
legislative body to enact laws under pre-defined procedures ultimately legitimizes the validity of a 
legislative proclamation. But when we consider constitutional provisions themselves within which the 
very basic rights and duties of citizens are stipulated, there's no higher positive law that can underpin 
their legitimacy and validity. Basically, for this dynamic system of vindicating legal norms to make 
sense, argues Kelsen, we ought to have a supra-positive grounding norm upon which the entire positive 
legal system rests and be given coherence. This so called dynamics of a legal system, where norms at 
one level are legitimized by norms at a higher level in the legal system, must ultimately be tied together 
by a supra-positive norm- by what Kelsen calls a Grundnorm.   
The relationship between human dignity and human rights may, thus, be likened to how such 
(suprapositive) Grundnorm confers legitimacy to all other normative provisions of a positive law. In a 
similar vein, as a normative concept, human dignity may be conceived as the ultimate supra-positive, 
but not necessarily supra-legal, source of legitimacy for human rights norms. And Waldron recognizes 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
natural rights. The "deep foundations" of human rights theory would then be simply identical to the foundations of natural 
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   Kelsen distinguishes between the dynamic and the static sense of legal validity. In the dynamic sense, legal legitimacy or 
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73 
 
that legitimacy "can mean anything from legal validity through popular acceptance to moral appeal."39 
In particular, human rights thus understood as claims having universal appeal, human dignity's 
purported role as a source of their legitimacy may be understood in two principal senses: as an 
overarching legal principle which confers legal validity or as a norm that provides 'moral force' to 
positive law's recognition of human rights.  
If we suppose that the legitimizing force of human dignity is to be understood in terms of conferring 
legal validity, it goes without saying that we must also conceive human dignity in the first instance as a 
juridical idea. Similarly, Jeremy Waldron has suggested that: "Even as the ground of rights—as when 
we are told in the preamble to the CCPR that the rights contained in the covenant "derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person"—dignity need not be treated in the first instance as a moral idea. 
After all it is not just surface-level rules that are legal in character (as though anything deeper must be 
"moral")."40 To be clear, Waldron did not himself defend this particular notion of foundation, as he is 
merely insisting that the ultimate grounding doctrines of legal norms can be legal, and human dignity 
could be seen in a similar light; nevertheless, he defends the notion that human dignity can ground 
human rights in the sense different than the one being described here in this section. 
Waldron presents Klaus Dicke as someone who actually expounds human dignity in terms akin to the 
Kensenian grundnorm, wherein legitimacy is understood to mean legal validity.41 Dicke believes that 
any legal declaration "recognizes and proclaims" the rights humans already have, not that it generated 
them. Likewise, human dignity is invoked to confer a supra-positive explanation to the legitimacy of 
human rights claims; moreover, the dignitarian content of rights serves to emphasize that our insistence 
on their universal appeal "is not simply a matter of our having decided to create positive law in this 
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form".42 I am at a loss, and so is Waldron, as to how the presentation of human dignity as the supra-
positive element would eventually add up to a successful legal validation of human rights claims.  
If legitimacy is to mean legal validity, it then seems to be the case that positive law is better off 
validating the established human rights norms without invoking human dignity in such capacity; human 
rights theory would be better served by the idea of human dignity if the latter is conceived as a high but 
equal status encapsulating human rights, but not as a source of their validity.  
As stated earlier, to legitimize human rights claims could also mean to serve as the source of their 
moral appeal. Waldron favors this as a sensible interpretive framework for the idea of legitimacy in the 
context of exploring the relation between human dignity and human rights; evidently, he declares: "If it 
means "moral appeal," then, yes, we can say that the legitimacy of human rights ideas owes a lot to the 
legitimacy of dignitarian ideas (and vice versa)."43 In this sense, the rights stipulated in human rights 
covenants "represent themselves as positive law responses to suprapositive ideas."44 It implies,  as a 
source of moral appeal human dignity need not necessarily validate specific human rights claims. 
Waldron is in good company with Jürgen Haberms who seems to propound a similar idea; human 
rights, he proclaims, are positive law responses to "specific violations of human dignity [presumably 
referring to the Holocaust], and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity—their 
moral source."45  
In any case, Waldron does not consider the second type of foundational approach, whether interpreted 
as legal validity or as moral appeal, as the most plausible way of relating human dignity and human 
rights. His rejection of the second approach is consistent with his own professed view of human dignity 
as a status-concept; and, I believe, it is reasonable for Waldron to dismiss, as it would be equally 
consistent for Habermas to defend, the notion that human dignity legitimizes human rights claims by 
being their moral source. This is because, for Habermas the concept of a human right is a moral-legal 
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chimera wherein dignity furnishes the moral appeal for the international legal regime of human rights, 
whereas Waldron conceives the notion of a human right (for that matter, also of human dignity) 
principally as a legal idea.  
2.3.2 Dignity as a Normative Foundation 
Having thus discused the first two senses of a foundation, it appears that the third and the fourth senses 
are taken by Waldron in high regard—that is, as promising, while the third being precisely what many 
philosophers have in mind when claiming that human dignity is foundational to human rights claims. 
According to this third view, human dignity is a genuine basis of derivation for human rights claims. 
This is the sort of foundation customarily assumed to be reflected by the prominent preamble in the 
ICCPR according to which the rights stipulated under it ''derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person", although, and often with good reason, human rights scholars of Schachter‘s ilk prefer to 
interpret the preamble along different lines.  
The kind of derivation Waldron has in mind is a logical derivation, which effectively deploys analytic 
unpacking of propositions about human rights claims and then augment it with an empirical premise 
(possibly about the kind of conditions necessary for human beings to lead a truly dignified life). He 
takes James Griffin's conception of human rights as a perfect sample of this third approach. Griffin 
argues that the dignity of persons could be analytically unpacked in terms of the value of normative 
agency; he identifies three levels of universal rights that protect and promote the normative agency of 
persons, namely, autonomy, liberty and welfare rights. In such ordering, each level generates a set of 
particular human rights claims comprising an expansive or constrained list of right-claims fitting the 
specific social setting in which they may be put to work. From the value of autonomy, that is, from the 
ability to determine for oneself what it means to have a worthwhile life and actually lead one‘s life 
accordingly, we can infer that one ought to have minimal liberty over certain areas of one's life.  
Waldron summarizes the gist of Griffin's argumentative framework as: "All of this, I think, is supposed 
to be established more or less analytically, with dignity being constituted by normative agency, with 
normative agency being characterized definitionally by autonomy, and with various forms of negative 
and positive liberty being derived from what is necessary to protect autonomy."46 On the other hand, 
Griffin also suggests that not all the conditions needed for protecting and promoting autonomy are 
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established by a logically necessary argument, but some must be established by empirical observation 
of how autonomy operates ("flourishes or withers") in specific socio-cultural and political settings. 
That means, there are welfare rights that "are empirically necessary conditions of a person's being 
autonomous and free, but there are forms that are logically necessary."47 A number of human rights-
claims listed under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can be seen in 
light of necessary empirical conditions for the meaningful possession and exercise of normative 
agency, and the fact that some are phrased in vague terms to permit interpretations adept to specific 
contexts may suggest that drafters of the covenant had a similar idea in mind as Griffin.  
Regarded by Waldron as "the most robust kind of rights foundationalism," this third sense of what it 
means for human dignity to be a foundation of human rights also figures in purely analytical form, 
without the mediation of empirical premises. On such approach, one begins with human dignity as a 
normative concept and proceed to analytically unpack what would be entailed by "necessary ascriptions 
of dignity to all human beings qua actual, prospective, or potential moral agents."48 I am particularly 
referring to Alan Gewirth's dialectically necessary argument for the thesis that "human rights are based 
upon or derivative from human dignity." His argument for human dignity flows from his dialectically 
necessary argument for the worth of action and agency ―as a general context of all morality (and 
indeed of all action).‖49  
Let me explain. Gewirth asserts that every agency reflecting action is marked by two generic 
characteristics, voluntariness (freedom) and purposiveness. What that meant needs some elaboration, 
and so he explains: "By an action's being voluntary or free I mean that its performance is under the 
agents control in that he unforcedly chooses to act as he does, knowing the relevant proximate 
circumstances of his action. By an action being purposive or intentional I mean that the agent acts for 
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some end or purpose that constitutes his reason for acting; this purpose may consist in the action itself 
or in something to be achieved by the action."50 
Having thus established the two generic conditions for action, Gewirth then proceeds to establish two 
things. First, he argues that for (1) an agent to do X for and end or purpose E it is logically necessary 
that he believes- (2) "E is good". The goodness attributed to E need not be moral goodness; it can be 
established under any sensible prudential criterion, whether objectively justified or not. "But what it 
shows already is that", Gewirth argues, "in the context of action, the 'Fact-Value gap' is already 
bridged. For by the very fact of engaging in action, every agent must implicitly accept for himself a 
certain value-judgment about the value or goodness of the purposes for which he acts."51 Gewirth then 
infers that, for an agent to regard his acts as good in the relevant sense, he must accept the proposition: 
(3)"[m]y freedom and well-being are necessary goods"52without which his purposive action would 
either be impossible or an exercise in futility. Furthermore, "[s]ince the agent regards as necessary 
goods the freedom and well-being that constitute the generic features of his successful action, he 
logically must also hold that he has rights to these generic features, and he implicitly makes a 
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Dworkin's distinction, see his Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge M.A: Harvard University Press, 2011) esp. Part Three and 
Four 
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corresponding right-claim."53 At this stage of the argument, these generic rights to freedom and well-
being the agent must believe that he has, remain prudential instead of moral rights.  
Like Kant before him, Gewirth argues that what makes these generic right-claims different from mere 
emphatic demands, as a command voiced by a robber at gunpoint, is their universalizability. If the 
agent accepts that he has the right to freedom and well-being for no reason other than he is an actual or 
prospective purposive agent, he must then accept, at the pain of contradiction, that all prospective 
agents do also have those rights. Such is a fairly simplified articulation of Gewirth's dialectical 
necessary argument and the underlying Principle of Generic Consistency, a principal derivative of 
which commands us to "[a]ct in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of 
yourself."54  
It is now pertinent to ask, where does human dignity figure in Gewirth's principal argument for the 
generic right to freedom and well-being? We can begin to answer this question by revisiting what 
Gewirth had to say about the general structure of his dialectically necessary argument for human 
dignity: "The argument for human dignity that I shall present here", he declares, "is closely related to 
the argument for the existence of human rights that I have worked out in much detail elsewhere."55 
As already stated, "actions have two necessary constitutive conditions or generic features: freedom (or 
voluntariness) and well-being (which derives from purposiveness); these are, respectively, the 
procedural and the substantive necessary conditions of action."56 Having thus proclaimed that 
substantive conditions are already built in to the structure of purposive (or agency reflecting) action, 
Gewirth then proceeds to explain how human dignity or worth enters the discourse. In general, the 
context of value and worth enters the argument when we directly infer the goodness of the purpose the 
action is intended to accomplish from the mere fact that it was intended by the agent under conditions 
of freedom. Consequently, some element of worth is already presupposed when the agent assumes that 
the purpose for which his action is intended is good. And since the agent is the locus and source of the 
worth he does logically attribute to his actions, so must he also attribute to himself fundamental worth 
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or dignity. Moreover, the agent must also hold that, by universalization, all actual and prospective 
agents also have the same worth or dignity they must attribute to themselves, at the pain of 
contradiction. "It is not merely that he recognizes that other agents attribute dignity to themselves 
because of their purposiveness; in addition, he must attribute such dignity to each of them because of 
their own purposiveness, which is generically similar to his."57  
Therefore, on Gewirth's account, the existence of generic human rights follows dialectically, ie. 
analytically, from the dignity or worth every agent must attribute to himself and to others in virtue of 
being actual or prospective purposive agents. What is strikingly peculiar about Gewirth's conception, in 
contrast to other justificatory accounts of human dignity vis-à-vis human rights, is that he does not 
establish a substantive, or at any rate normative, level difference between dignity and human rights- but 
only ventures on establishing the logical progression of how generic conditions of action "provide the 
justifying grounds for the universal ascription of human dignity, and this in turn serves to justify the 
principle of human rights."58 In fact, the dialectically necessary method allows him to further proclaim 
that "the content of that dignity is in turn morally modified by the universal and equal human rights in 
which the argument eventuates."59  
Despite its obvious merit for taking seriously the significance of logical rigor in moral reasoning, there 
is still something rather troubling about Gewirth's purely logical account of "why be moral." Indeed as 
rational beings, the logical requirement not to contradict ourselves constrains our practical reason for 
action; one who contradicts himself is either willfully ignorant or is leading an unexamined life like a 
reckless sailor drifting in an open ocean without a compass. But, such a requirement not to contradict 
oneself does not sufficiently account for the normative reason for action and, for that matter, self-
contradiction is strictly speaking a logical not a moral defect.60 The point is, in order to provide a 
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compelling account of the foundation of human rights, one has to show more than simply 
demonstrating the logical necessity of accepting universal ascription of human dignity which in turn 
serves to justify the necessity of ascribing generic human rights to freedom and well-being, at the cost 
of self-contradiction.  
I just have discussed Waldron's third sense of what it means to say that human dignity is foundational 
to human rights. Gewirth's approach, in particular, is here considered with the attention to detail that it 
seems to deserve partly due to its deep philosophical relevance and partly because it will be difficult to 
give justice to his elaborate argument for dignity as the foundation for human rights through an exposé 
of just a paragraph or two.  
It is my contention that human dignity cannot be a normative foundation to moral human rights, as 
stated in the third sense of ''a foundation". My general objection to the third sense of dignity as a 
foundation has something to do with, what I believe to be, a fundamental idea of human dignity with 
which the stated foundational account does not comport. I think, human dignity relates to moral rights 
in two fundamental ways: as a general normative status for having rights, and as a content of some 
specific rights that are related to dignity in some specific ways. In the second specific sense, dignity is 
attached to basic rights that has to do with the prohibition of degrading and humiliating treatments, 
while at the same time, generally, human dignity is a normative status and rights can be seen as 
instances to that status. Foundational accounts of the above sort do not fit with the above considerations 
about human dignity, as they do not specifically account for dignity's deeper relationship to some basic 
rights than to others. Besides, appraising human dignity as the normative foundation for rights lends 
itself to an unwarranted consequence that every right-violation is at the same time a violation of human 
dignity.  
2.3.3 Dignity as an Exegetic Tool for Making Sense of Human Rights 
Making sense of human rights, what they are and why we have them, Waldron contends, need not 
necessarily involve being in possession of an account that outlines a linear derivation of rights from a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
there are also cases in which potential victims indeed are not prospective purposive agents such as people with severe and 
irreversible mental and physical disability (for instance, people in permanent vegetative state). For that matter, Gewirth's 
theory does not seem to adequately accommodate the case of non-agents or explain why they cannot have (at least some of 
the) generic human rights.  
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teleological basis "that would license the derivation of other rights from a statement of the telos."61 
There is but one other sense in which a foundation for moral/human rights may be understood, that 
which Waldron defends.  
The sort of foundation he has in mind works within the widely accepted list of human rights, and "it 
need not be conceived in a way that permits any expansion of the list of rights beyond what we start 
with."62 We could start from our most familiar and clearly established list of rights and look to see 
whether human dignity plays a key role in making sense of their point in morality. Basically what it 
says is that dignity sheds indispensable light on the interpretation of human rights provisions; and that 
is probably what Dworkin had in mind when he remarked that recourse to dignity is a necessary 
ingredient of taking rights seriously. Recognition of the dignitarian content of rights would 
undoubtedly help better understand the spirit with which right-claims are advanced as well as the spirit 
with which  such claims ought to be confronted or addressed. 
There is, however, one fundamental problem with the fourth foundational model. When we take dignity 
as a tool for interpretive understanding, the nature of such understanding that dignity supposedly brings 
to light appears to be contingent upon "how robust the conception of dignity was taken to be."63 
Contrast, for example, Trop v. Dulles Supreme Court case of 1958 with the familiar German Aviation 
Case. In the Trop v. Dulles case, Chief Justice Earl Warren opined that "[t]he basic concept underlying 
the Eighth Amendment [which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment] is nothing less than the dignity 
of man". Whilst in the Airliner case, the German Constitutional Court considered the constitutionality 
of a German legislation in the wake of 9/11 that would authorize the armed forces to shoot down a 
high-jacked plane that might be used as a weapon to destroy the lives of a greater number of people. 
After having interpreted the right to life in a strictly Kantian sense, The Court insisted that "with their 
lives being disposed of unilaterally by the state persons on board the aircraft, who, as victims, are 
themselves in need of protection, are denied the value which is due to the human being for his or her 
own sake." 64 It seems to me that interpreting the right not to be subjected to cruel and inhuman 
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treatment in dignitarian terms is more straightforward, and that it does not necessarily require a 
substantive conception of dignity as robust and as stringent as the Kantian view.  
While in Trop v. Dulles the dignitarian reading of the Eighth Amendment imports a familiar intuition 
about human dignity, the German Aviation Case relies on denser and more controversial conception of 
human dignity. That probably demonstrates why we need a more robust account of human dignity 
when thinking about its possible role as a foundation of human rights than Waldron would allow.  
On a more positive note, Waldron's preferred account highlights the need for human rights theorizing 
to attend to the fact that "human rights have a legal presence (in constitutional law or in human rights 
law)"; whereas his misgiving towards foundations of the third sort is directed at a particular aspect of it 
that "would license the derivation of other rights from the statement of the telos", which, he suspects, 
would lead to unruly proliferation of the talk of human rights. In light of his own contention that 
dignity is "a status concept, not a value concept", it is easy to see why Waldron is critical of the third 
foundational model- in the most familiar form in which it figures in the human rights discourse.  
Dignity as a status concept would, perhaps, resist expansion from the currently available list of human 
rights, only if human dignity is conceived narrowly as a legal status. But not all status conceptions of 
human dignity rule out derivation of human rights claims in addition to the ones already given by 
international legal instruments. For that matter, I think, considering some human rights as derivations 
of human dignity is not necessarily inconsistent with Waldron's preferred account of dignity as a status 
concept. It is possible to defend dignity (as a foundation) in the sense that it licenses "derivation" of 
other human rights- rights that do not yet have a legal presence, while still maintaining "that dignity is a 
status [albeit, a general normative status, or a moral status] that comprises a given set of rights."65  
 
2.4 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Laying the theoretical groundwork for establishing the deep foundations of human rights is a noble 
philosophical pursuit, although legal and political philosophers often find it rather distracting to their 
particular concern for political and legal praxis. It is this spirit that was precisely reflected in Waldron's 
account and more pointedly addressed by Charles Beitz.  
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However, deep foundations, specifically those foundations that license derivations of human rights 
claims from underlying values- ought not be viewed, by default, as teleological. As Tasioulas has 
suggested, foundational values for human rights can also be normative and therefore derivation is not 
necessarily a linear process of obtaining rights-claims directly from value propositions. That is 
precisely why, I believe, there is no inherent contradiction between Waldron's third foundational model 
and the supposition that dignity is a (normative) status-concept. This is as far as I can say about my 
response to the question whether and in what sense dignity can be foundational to human rights. My 
objection to the third foundational model is due to the fact that none of its representative accounts can 
adequately package the dualistic function that I believe human dignity plays in the constitution of 
rights.  
I do, however, share Waldron's main objection against a linear approach for deriving human rights. If 
we were to think that a foundational concept ought to produce or vindicate each specific human right-
claim, it is clear that human dignity is not that sort of foundation. That is particularly true because 
dignity is clearly germane to some human rights than to others. A dignitarian element is more evident 
in relation to a human right against forced enslavement or in relation to a right not to be subjected to 
torture and other cruel and inhumane treatments than in relation to liberty rights. Obviously, this does 
not imply that human dignity does not in any sense serve as a source of derivation to human rights-
claims. All human rights claims need not have a unified source of derivation, and that differences in 
provenance between specific human rights-claims merely disputes linear derivation from one 
overarching norm or value, but not the very idea of deriving human rights from other normative 
concepts.  
Having stressed the importance of recognizing human dignity's deep attachment with our familiar 
thoughts about the rights against cruel and inhuman treatments, it seems plausible to assert that rights-
claims pertaining to degradation and humiliation maybe derived directly from human dignity. Whereas, 
other basic rights could be related to human dignity in other distinctive ways. I believe there is truth to 
the claim that possession of human rights fosters our human dignity. It is also my contention that basic 
rights, such as liberty rights, and human dignity do intersect, sometimes directly and at other times only 
in the derivative sense. The possession of human dignity, if at all signifies anything, it signifies one's 
equality on some fundamental level with other human beings. It is the very fact of this equality that 
possession of rights, and of human rights in particular, is presumed to reflect. But there are contexts in 
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which a fight for one's fundamental rights strongly signifies a fight for one's human dignity, and 
contexts that do not.  
Take a denial or violation of liberty rights, for example: how and for what rationale this right is denied 
or violated makes a huge difference in determining whether there is a simultaneous (and 
straightforward) violation of human dignity. Whenever violation of liberty rights clearly signifies 
denial of the victim's fundamental moral status as a free and equal human being, we may then say that 
that straightforwardly constitutes a violation of dignity as well. A person whose liberty rights are 
violated just because he happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time has less of a dignity claim 
than a person whose liberty is violated because she's of the ''wrong'' gender, race, ethnicity, religion or 
of sexual identity.  
The notion that possession of rights reflect our fundamental equality as human beings does not mean 
every violation even of the most fundamental rights signifies a denial of one's fundamental equal moral 
status. But every single violation of one's dignity inherently implies some sense of denial of one's 
fundamental equal status as a human being, no exception. Wherefore, not all instances of human right 
violations are violations of human dignity. This has crucial implications on the nature of the relation 
between dignity and rights: to the very least one can infer that human dignity cannot be a genuine 
source of derivation for all basic moral rights; in addition, one may further conjecture that when 
violation of a basic right such as liberty signifies a violation of human dignity, it may be due to factors 
extraneous to the simple fact of a liberty-right violation, something that is constitutive to dignity but 
not liberty rights. One may defend this second implication without relinquishing the belief that the two 
concepts, i.e., human dignity and rights, are tied in some fundamental ways. 
Finally, I have alluded to the idea that having rights fosters human dignity; by that I mean, possession 
of rights does not merely reinforce a person's sense of dignity, it is also constitutive to leading a life 
worthy of human dignity. Human rights in particular are presumably fundamental to living a decent and 
meaningful life, hence a case of their violation is a serious moral breach. Take for example the civil 
rights movement, specifically the struggle for an equal right to vote and the right not to be denied 
service in a restaurant. A right to vote is perhaps a specific case of an individual's right to political self-
determination, while the latter maybe a specific instance of the too often elusive idea of equality. A 
black man claiming these rights in the United States, as recently as in the 1960s, may well have been 
fighting for securing respect to his dignity. The same cannot be easily said of a black man claiming his 
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established right to vote in 2015, although he might regard his right to vote as a fundamental right 
constitutive to his dignity. Of course, the contemporary reality in which voting rights are routinely 
protected does not diminish the status of the right to vote as a fundamental civil right; nevertheless, it 
does seem to diminish the importance of voting rights to one's dignity, even if specific cases of 
violation to this right are still a lived-reality to many people (for example, ex-offenders who have 
already served their time and have reintegrated into society are often unduly disenfranchised).  
In conclusion, if human dignity were 'the fountainhead through which human rights flow,' any case of 
their abridgment would entail a violation of dignity and vice-versa. On the contrary, I think the 
relationship between human dignity and basic moral rights is much more complex than a matter of the 
latter being derived or justified by the first.  
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Chapter 3 
Human Dignity and the Limits of Moral Rights 
 
One interesting feature of the current discourse on human dignity is a direct link many presume to exist 
between human dignity and moral rights. Much of the discussion in the discourse on human dignity has 
been devoted to the analysis of just how this connection amounts to. In the foregoing chapter, we 
discussed what it means to say that human dignity is foundational to (human) moral rights; in that we 
considered four ways of conceiving what it means for something as human dignity to be a foundation 
of another, namely human rights. Most of those who claim that dignity is foundational to rights take it 
to mean that dignity is a concept from which specific human rights-claims are derived. Such a 
foundational model, which licenses linear derivation of specific rights-claims from a statement of 
value, does not appear consistent with the idea that human dignity is a normative concept.  
Despite the controversy surrounding what precise relation obtains between these two important 
concepts, it seems clear that the possession and exercise of human rights is undeniably suited to the 
expression of our dignity. A normative space within which human rights operate also provides an 
appropriate platform for the respect and expression of human dignity. And, incidentally, in a society 
wherein the rights of men are routinely respected, there is also a strong companion tendency towards 
the recognition and respect for the dignity of persons. This can be asserted without entering into the 
debate as to how such a link between dignity and rights ought to be cashed in substantive terms.  
The question this chapter explores is slightly different from what has been customary for many to ask, 
in that it asks about the link between dignity and rights from the opposite direction of fit. It investigates 
whether the role human dignity presumably plays in shedding light or in grounding (taken in the looser 
sense) human rights captures everything that is morally significant about human dignity. Instead of 
asking what it is about human dignity that is particularly important to human rights, this chapter 
proceeds by asking the question in reverse We can then look to see if there's something significant 
about human dignity that would still be missing if dignity's presence in a normative system of a given 
society were constrained to just how it figures in its system of rights. In a society in which basic rights 
are usually respected and dignity's significance is widely acknowledged but only to the extent that 
respect for rights cultivates one's sense of dignity while encouraging an outward expression of dignity, 
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would there still be a missing element about human dignity the introduction of which would broaden or 
enhance the moral sphere of that given society?  
One suggesting account by Michael J. Meyer has it that "what we commonly regard as essential to 
human dignity would not be explained even if we were able to delineate all of the relevant rights and 
the particular ways in which each of them expresses or protects human dignity."1 The activity of 
claiming rights maybe "one very important way of expressing dignity" especially in circumstances in 
which claiming the rights one has is called for, when, for example, one is "under pressure of an external 
challenge".2 One can imagine a situation in which claiming one's rights is clearly unaffiliated with the 
expression of human dignity. And sometimes claiming one's rights could be straightforwardly 
disgraceful, essentially designating a lack of dignified self-bearing and self-presentation. In 
underscoring that, Meyer was not confusing one's expression of dignity with the very thing that one 
expresses, that is, dignity. To be clear, he acknowledges that there is an important distinction to be 
made on the one hand between a person's expression of dignity with her sense of dignity, and on the 
other between a person's sense of dignity and human dignity in the normative sense according to which 
every human person is entitled to a treatment consistent with a moral title (worth or status) one has 
simply by virtue of being human. Nevertheless, Meyer insists, "[d]ignity has a presentational aspect 
that not all terms of value possess" and in fact "there is something to the expression of dignity beyond 
the mere claiming of rights, or for that matter, the activity of claiming rights in protest."3  
It must be noted that, underscoring the presentational aspect of it is not a totally unfamiliar way of 
conceiving human dignity. Kant also has a notion of dignity as noble bearing, which envelops a duty to 
carry oneself with a bearing consistent with one's dignity, one that instructs rational beings to be ''no 
one's lackey", instead to stand upright and never prostrate before any man. He emphasizes the 
importance of a dignified self-bearing as a key element of a rational person's duty to oneself. Despite 
the emphasis he placed on the presentational aspect of a dignified life, I believe for Kant it is not 
central to, or distinctive about, his conception of dignity. Meyer seems to think that, on the contrary, a 
presentational aspect is a key to the understanding of what is distinctive about human dignity. If Meyer 
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is right in thinking that a person's expression of dignity is not just constitutive to human dignity but 
also the thing that distinctively signifies its moral significance, we then have to rethink the prevailing 
conceptual framework of philosophizing about human dignity since Pico's Oration on the Dignity of 
Man.  
On another approach, however, even respect for paradigmatic human rights does not necessarily protect 
human dignity, although it may reinforce the positive expression of dignity. Avishai Margalit offers 
one such account in his widely celebrated book The Decent Society. He tells us that dignity and rights 
occupy distinct, but sometimes overlapping, normative spaces and one way to understand their variance 
is by considering dignity violations that are at the same time accompanied by rights' violation. Margalit 
defends the thesis that dignity violation may begin with violation of a basic right but it does not arise 
on account of it. For instance, it is fairly uncontroversial that humiliating and degrading treatments are 
paradigmatic violations of human dignity and, at the same time, they are also regarded as human rights 
violations. "And what better reason can you have for feeling humiliated than the violation of your 
rights, especially those rights that are supposed to protect your dignity?"4 Margalit poses this rhetorical 
question to emphasize an "air of obviousness" that seems to follow the contention that the concept of 
dignity and that of rights are inextricably tied. Behind every situation that requires the strongest moral 
condemnation, a right violation is almost always presumed to be present; Margalit wishes to make a 
case against this presumption that a theory of rights provides a comprehensive interpretive framework 
for the explication of grave moral offenses. Margalit likens rights-centrism in moral thinking to 
Wittgenstein's metaphor of "being held in the grip of a picture," which symbolizes "a case in which a 
model of reality is perceived as reality itself, simply because we cannot imagine any alternative to that 
model."5 In particular, concerning the idea of human dignity and the paradigmatic ways in which 
dignity violations figure, he thinks that there is a sound alternative framework to possible answers than 
the ones provided by rights-based morality. For Margalit, the relation between dignity and rights is 
incidental in that respect for each fosters the self-respect of persons. But respect for persons and of self-
respect does not consist just in respecting their rights. On the other hand, one can have a sound reason 
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for her self-respect injured even in the absence of an accompanying violation of a right. And, by 
definition, injury to self-respect constitutes violation of the victim‘s dignity, so claims Margalit.  
It goes without saying that both Meyer and Margalit perceive with acute skepticism the prevailing 
framework of conceptualizing human dignity within the rights approach to morality, though their 
respective critique targets different elements of the rights-approach to human dignity. Meyer envisions 
an inverted, nonetheless direct, relationship between rights and dignity; whereas, Margalit undertakes a 
general critique of the overarching framework of envisioning a straightforward relationship between 
dignity and rights. I must say that I may have simplified the distinction between these two authors for 
the sake of clarity; but, as we enter into the full exposition of their respective views we shall be able to 
notice that, given the aim of this chapter, their similarities are discernible and much more informative 
than what the differences between them might suggest.  
This chapter proceeds first by laying out one prominent account of a direct relationship between dignity 
and rights by Joel Feinberg, as demonstrated in his celebrated thought experiment where he imagined a 
world without rights, and explored what, if anything, is morally lacking in that imaginary world. I shall 
then discuss Meyer and Margalit in light of the findings of Feinberg‘s thought experiment. Contrasting 
these authors seems appropriate because both Meyer and Margalit have in their own ways attempted to 
expand on Feinberg‘s thought experiment but wind up with conclusions contrary to, or at least critical 
of, that which Feinberg has advanced. I will discuss each thought experiment in parallel, with the view 
to see if something conclusive about the nature of things can be derived from a thought experiment that 
is designed to demonstrate the value of something by the contemplation of its absence.  
I consider Feinberg‘s thought experiment as a brilliant attempt at providing a unique perspective for 
understanding the nature and moral value of rights; it confers penetrating insight into the exploration of 
what moral difference possession of rights might make, hence informative as it is original. Nonetheless, 
I will argue that Feinberg‘s analysis came up short, for he does not follow up with the step he took 
when inducting the concept of human dignity into the discussion. That renders his theory incomplete at 
best, for he does not fully explicate the normative apparatus with which the concept of human dignity 
operates, and at worst misleading because it lends itself to misrepresentations by critics like Meyer.   
After having established that, I will examine Meyer‘s analysis of Feinberg and point out that he missed 
a few important points: It is my contention that he misread Feinberg as to what he meant by dignity as 
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―the recognizable capacity to assert claims‖, despite his best intention in taking Feinberg seriously; 
moreover, his critique of Feinberg relies heavily on a notion of dignity that appears to me normatively 
less significant and hence inadequate to be employed for resolving the issue at hand- namely, the 
question pertaining to whether  a deep normative connection obtains between dignity and rights. I shall 
return to this point later, but I leave it this way for now.  
It is worth noting that Meyer conceives human dignity primarily as a ―behavioral tendency‖ (also true 
of Margalit, albeit to a lesser extent), and by designating the presentational aspect of dignity as its core 
constituent he may therefore be accused of not doing justice to dignity as a normative concept. But to 
be fair, Margalit in particular seems to suggest a dualistic view of human dignity, one that encompasses 
both the dispositional or comportment sense and dignity in the normative sense. He asserted that 
dualistic meaning to dignity mainly in passing, and that makes it very difficult to link every single 
thought about human dignity that he espoused and construct a complete narrative, or conception if you 
will, of human dignity. Dignity is not a mere facade or presentation but a representation of self-respect, 
argues Margalit: considering dignity as a representation of self-respect may imply that whatever gives a 
sound reason for one to think that his self-respect is injured also gives a sound reason to believe that his 
dignity is also violated. Injury to self-respect, Margalit intuits, constitutes severe moral injury to the 
victim. This brings us to Margalit's point of departure from the views of others who are also critical of 
the mainstream understanding of dignity as it figures quite prominently in the human rights discourse. 
Many of those who found the mainstream view about human dignity untenable, and who contend that 
the falsification of dignity's supposed role in grounding human rights severely diminishes its overall 
significance in inter-personal morality, often tend to sweep it under the rug. But, unlike those critiques 
of the mainstream view, Margalit believes that human dignity does still rest at the foundations of inter-
personal morality even though it has a limited role to play in the grounding of human rights. 
 
3.1 Three Thought Experiments on the Nature and Value of Rights and Dignity 
I. Nowhersville. In my brief presentation of the problem that this chapter is to deal with, I emphasized 
that Feinberg's famous thought experiment will guide in structuring the debate on whether there can be 
normatively adequate conception of human dignity without any recourse to a theory of rights. In order 
to pinpoint the nature and value of rights, Feinberg asks us to imagine a world without them (he calls 
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"Nowheresville") and look to see what is prominently missing in such imaginary world without rights. 
He allows Nowheresville to be a fountainhead from which "benevolence, compassion, sympathy and 
pity" flow abundantly and that people routinely treat each other with a strong "sense of duty". We can 
make Nowheresville more pleasant as well as morally appealing to a Kantian by "letting the sense of 
duty be a sufficient motive for many beneficent and honorable actions."6 The duties introduced into 
Nowheresville must be understood "only in the sense of actions that are, or believed to be, morally 
mandatory, but not in the older sense of actions that are due to others and can be claimed by others as 
their right."7 Nowheresville can also have duties of the sort prescribed by positive law as long as it does 
not presuppose that the person in regard to whom duties are legally imposed on others has a claim to it. 
Subjects to the law may be said to "owe" obedience to the dictates of the law, "but they owe nothing to 
one another": it is something that they are required to do, under the pain of penalty or punishment; but 
when transgressions of duty occur, no one can be held accountable by the would be victims or third 
parties with no authority under the law. In addition, fellow Nowheresvillians have no right to complain 
even to the officer of the law, although they may alert him about possible transgressions. The situation 
is analogous to a kid who kicks his little brother but was forced to apologize to Daddy instead; a direct 
apology to his brother would entail an implicit recognition of the latter's status as a right holder, and 
this is precisely the only element lacking in their relationship. The point is that, in this imaginary world, 
people owe duties but only in an impersonal sense.  
The departure of rights in Nowheresville does not, however, eliminate some familiar notions that will 
make this imagined world resemble the real world in which we live: despite the absence of rights, 
Feinberg grants that, there still remain "notions of personal desert and what I call a sovereign 
monopoly of rights."8 In its contemporary usage, personal desert includes a certain understanding of 
entitlement that persons can demand as their due, not just the sheer presence of a certain propriety in 
our giving something to others in virtue of some sort of role that they play or more specifically in virtue 
of some specifically admirable thing that they have done. But the sort of desert Feinberg ascribes to 
Nowheresville is a weaker kind of propriety which is "simply a kind of fittingness between one party's 
                                                          
6
  Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights" in Feinberg, Joel. Rights, Justice and The Bounds of Liberty: Essays in 
Social Philosophy (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 143 
7
  Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights", 144 
8
   Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights", 145 emphasis in original. 
92 
 
character or action and another party's favorable response, much like that between humor and laughter, 
or good performance and applause."9 But an act performed out of mere fittingness is something like a 
''gratuity" than a discharge of obligation the recipient of which would have a justified claim to. 
Personal desert will ennoble Nowheresville in that it will allow its inhabitants to treat one another with 
more grace by honoring moral and intellectual excellence, but occasional lapses in according personal 
desert would do no harm for "there is no wrong in the omission of what is merely gratuitous."10 Since 
Nowheresvillians have no concept of rights, it wouldn't occur even to the proudest amongst them that 
others' withholding of the fitting response that they deserve would mean that they are being slighted, 
warranting resentment or other forms of Strawsonian reactive attitudes.  
Even with the introduction of personal desert, there is still room for improvement in Nowheresville. 
One might then ask: without the system of rights how are we to have fairly complex forms of socio-
economic structure in Nowheresville? Indeed, life would be severely lacking without important human 
endeavors such as ownership of property, promises and contracts, social institutions like marriages and 
partnerships and others dealing with basic security of the person. With that in mind, Feinberg 
introduces the notion of "sovereign right-monopoly." It is basically equivalent to having social and 
economic activities held on a trust fund whereby the beneficiaries would be totally dependent on the 
trustee on matters of rules governing these activities. Analogous to Hobbes' Leviathan, which stipulates 
that the sovereign could dictate obligations to his subjects on all matters of public interest and in turn 
has a certain duty to be just to his subjects, a duty not particularly owed to them but only to a God, 
Nowheresville can also sustain a similar status quo by taking positive law or some notion of the natural 
moral law as the ultimate authority and guarantor of order. As Hobbes has it, the only one that can be 
wronged by the sovereign's actions will be God, the ultimate source of authority to whom the sovereign 
may say "to thee only have I sinned!" Likewise, in Nowheresville one can only commit sins against the 
authority of the law, not to one another.  
There will, of course, be delegated authorities in Nowheresville involving persons who are empowered 
to enforce obligations in the name of the right-monopoly by imposing penalties on free riders. These 
delegates are the only persons to whom obligations are owed, but only due to their official capacity as 
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representatives of the rights-monopoly; but ultimately nobody owes anything except abstractly to the 
right-monopoly of the law. Even after such modifications, the activity of claiming rights and the 
correlated moral capacity to claim still remains foreign to this imaginary world. It takes, at least, three 
to create any meaningful moral relation: the ultimate authority and the other relating parties. But the 
other parties are not personally answerable to one another, which is precisely what Feinberg finds 
troubling with Nowheresville. So he claims:  
 "The most conspicuous difference...between the Nowheresvillians and ourselves has to do with 
the activity of claiming. Nowheresvillians, even when they are discriminated against invidiously, or left 
without the things they need, or otherwise badly treated, do not think to leap to their feet and make 
righteous demands against one another though they may not hesitate to resort to force and trickery to 
get what they want [in getting what  they want through brute force or trickery, no one would, in turn, 
is presumed to wrong  another fellow Nowheresvillian]...they do not have a notion of what is their due; 
hence they do not claim before they take."11 
A right is a kind of claim, declares Feinberg. One thing to be noted here is that defining rights in terms 
of claims and claiming, unless duly clarified, may lead to a confusion about the generic nature of rights. 
In some contexts, to make a claim means to submit or apply for the title itself; but on other occasions to 
make a claim is to exercise, that is demand as one's due, rights that one already has. One important 
distinctive feature of a right-claim is the following: "It is an important fact about rights (or claims), 
then, that they can be claimed only by those who have them....A right to which one could not make 
claim (i.e. not even for recognition) would be a very "imperfect" right."12 Of course "having rights... 
makes claiming possible; but the point Feinberg wishes to emphasize is that, "it is claiming that gives 
rights their special moral significance."13  
And, since "what is called 'human dignity' maybe the recognizable capacity to assert claims,"14 it goes 
without saying that the activity of claiming rights sets in motion one meaningful way of expressing our 
dignity. However, with the departure of rights in Nowheresville what is most clearly forfeited is that 
                                                          
11
   Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights", 148 
12
   Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights",  150 
13
   Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights",  151  
14
   Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights",  151   
94 
 
very potent way of expressing dignity. This loss certainly leaves the inhabitants of Nowheresville not 
only in a state of "rhetorical deficit" (as Meyer has framed it) but also and more importantly in a state 
of 'deficit of normative space'. The normative space made available by the introduction of rights to 
Nowheresville will, therefore, install a social sphere for genuine exercise of respect for persons. My 
reference to 'respect for persons' may appear to pop up out of the blue, but I deliberately pointed it out 
to underscore the fact that, for Feinberg, respect for the rights of persons makes up the normative core, 
if not the entirety, of respect for persons. "To respect a person...or to think of him as possessed of 
human dignity," he argues, "is to think of him as a potential maker of claims."15 At this juncture, 
Feinberg invites his readers to take caution that "[n]ot all of this [thought about respect for persons] can 
be packed into a definition of "rights"; but he selected what is in his mind the best description of their 
moral significance, which furthermore explains what is fundamentally wrong with Nowheresville. 
Although Feinberg emphasizes the importance of the activity of claiming rights in arguing about their 
supreme moral significance, he does not make a similar inference about the moral importance of being 
possessed of human dignity. In a postscript to "The Nature and Value of Rights," he made a number of 
supplementary points two of which are extremely significant in addressing some likely misconceptions 
about his main theses and subsequently help tie up some loose ends within his theory's discursive 
framework.  He noted:  
 "First, it appears in several places as though having rights is what is necessary for self-
 respect, dignity, and other things of value. Actually, it is not enough to have the rights; one 
 must know that one has rights. In fact, the poor benighted citizens of Nowheresville do have 
 various rights, whether they know it or not. They could not possibly know- or understand- 
 that they have rights, however, because they do not even have the concept of a personal right. 
 The inhabitants are consequently deficient in respect for self and others, even though, as 
 hypothetical human beings, they have dignity in the eye of our imaginations."16 
The knowing that one has rights is a necessary ingredient for thinking that, as a matter of fact, one does 
truly respect oneself and others. It makes possible for the conscientious claiming of one's moral due as 
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one can also conscientiously live up to his duties to others, in recognition to and respect for their rights; 
corollary to that, "consciousness of one's rights is necessary for the supererogatory virtues, for the latter 
cannot even be given a sense except by contrast with the disposition always to claim one's rights."17 
The idea is simply that, one cannot truly make a gift or gratuity by being generous, forgiving or self-
sacrificing unless one has done it with the understanding that he has rights and yet chooses to make 
sacrifices for others. The following analogy may shed light on the point under discussion. A sword of 
justice, not of vengeance, should neither be blunt nor too sharp: a blunt sword is dull and unworthy of 
the purpose for which one holds it, whereas a sword too sharp cuts very deep and no longer serves the 
purpose of self-defense. Possession of rights maybe likened to that: a person who never exercises his 
rights is a servile buffoon, a caricature of a self-respecting person; whereas, one who is always bent on 
claiming what is rightly his, never waves his claims nor voluntarily makes sacrifices above and beyond 
the call of duty, that person, in the words of Feinberg, is a "bloodless moral automaton."  
Nowheresville II (Wayward Rightsville). The above observation about supererogatory virtues takes us 
to Michael J. Meyer's analysis of what life would look like in Nowheresville II whose inhabitants do 
have a proper understanding of their new found rights but seem to lack some significant measure of the 
capacity to self-control. It seems clear that at times the expression of dignity manifests through the 
having and effective exercise of (human) rights. But it is imperative to explore whether the having and 
exercise of rights captures everything significant about human dignity in inter-personal morality.  
To help determine the value of claiming for the expression of dignity, and specifically for determining 
whether in all circumstances claiming their rights will lead right-holders directly to the expression of 
their dignity as human beings, Meyer conducts a further thought experiment. He asks us to reinstate to 
Nowheresville all the personal rights that Feinberg withheld from its inhabitants. In this new 
Nowheres-world-order, as Feinberg anticipated, Nowhersvillians would reclaim their lost dignity; 
Meyer also concedes that in such a world, when Nowheresvillians are confronted by others they now 
have one crucial way of expressing their dignity at their disposal. Now imagine that this new life 
abundant with individual rights is, however, ripe with the lack of the capacity to self-control.  
The average Nowheresvillian understands the value of his new found rights, but characteristically lacks 
this crucial capacity to self-control; he just can't help it but succumb to this inner drive, which 
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sometimes incites him to an overzealous rampage of demanding his rights even in situations where 
what is his is not clearly threatened by others, while at times it renders him docile, bowing his head in a 
servile manner in the face of abuse. At one instance he can be offensively self-assertive, while at 
another he refuses to stand up for himself (for the sake of simplicity, one can think of these polar 
characteristic traits as being held by two different persons, although that changes nothing with regard to 
the overall outcome of the thought experiment ).  
The first is the case of the "bumptious man" who is excessively impatient about his rights. He is 
overcome by the fear that others are about to renege on his rights and has a tendency to press for his 
rights too vehemently in circumstances in which such reaction is uncalled for. Cases like the second 
may also be motivated by fear, but instead of acting out his fear with obtrusive announcement of his 
standing to claim his due, the person is totally paralyzed by it, consequently puts on a servile posture 
and prostrate before others in order to get them to respect his rights. Meyer is specially emphatic about 
the implication these cases would have to the expression of dignity: 
 "Both cases point to the fact that there is something to the expression of dignity beyond the 
 mere claiming of rights, or for that matter, the activity of claiming rights in protest[...] In both 
 cases what seems particularly undignified is their near lack of self-control—their continuing 
 failure to quell their own ungoverned fears. The greatest challenge to their dignity comes not 
 from without but from within. Remarkably enough, it is just this way of expressing dignity—
 through some form of self-control—that Feinberg, among others, seems to ignore."18 
Meyer's point is that, the act of claiming one's rights is not always expressive of dignity. A loss of self-
control can even turn claiming rights undignified, as illustrated in the case of a bumptious man. On the 
other hand, possession of rights does not always lead to a dignified exercise of it unless one has self-
control; in the case of the servile person, self-control may entail vehement but restrained protest. In 
addition to that, Meyer asserts that sometimes the only appropriate response is refusing to dignify 
something with a response. This strategy may work against the town's idiot who went on shouting 
racial slurs while being completely drunk.  
Here is the upshot: "First, the activity of claiming one's rights is sometimes, but not always, expressive 
of dignity; at times it might be unrelated to an expression of dignity or even be undignified. Second, in 
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some cases, lacking self-control might well lead one to an undignified expression; such a loss of self-
control can even render the activity of claiming rights undignified."19 Self-control does not always 
means self-restraint; sometimes it manifests in the form of curbing one's fear, standup for oneself and 
confront an abuser with a dignified self-bearing and presentation. In some situations, it might be asked 
of us to follow Kant's mantra: "Be no man's lackey." 
This is therefore to say that there is no single act based definition of what is it for human beings to 
express their dignity, and that there are several roads to reach it of which the activity of claiming is but 
one. But this is merely part of the story that Meyer would like to convey. Admittedly, he is merely 
scratching the surface of the many senses in which a person can be said to have dignity: "In fact a 
person maybe said to have human dignity even if he fails to express his dignity, indeed even if he has 
been proven to be prone to quite undignified outbursts"; for "to say a person has dignity goes beyond 
an observation about his sense of self-worth to an observation about his ultimate value as a human 
being."20 This distinction drives a wedge between the normative  core of human dignity and its rather 
virtue-ethical crest, with the normative meaning presumed to trump comportment dignity. Moreover, 
such distinction comports well with the intuition that an undignified behavior of a person does not give 
us the moral license to treat him as if he lacks or has lost his dignity.  
This is why, proclaims Meyer, "it is correct [for Feinberg] to focus on the capacity to claim rights and 
not simply the activity of claiming rights (or one's sense of self-worth) as one mark of the possession of 
human dignity."21 It now seems clear that by capacity Feinberg was referring to the permanent moral 
standing of right holders, but not the characteristic feature of these potential makers of claims; for that 
reason, I might have to reconsider my initial recoil towards Feinberg's account. Therefore, it is crucial 
to note that Feinberg's identification of having human dignity with the capacity to claim rights means 
this sense of possessing human dignity is not directly linked with the activity of claiming rights per se 
(for that would be a category mistake): If it were, and since each context of right violation presents a 
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potent possibility to assert claims, every case of right violation would present as equally, if not more, 
dignified moment as in every case in which rights are generally respected.  
It, thus, begs the question why Meyer critiques Feinberg on the assumption that the capacity to claim 
signifies comportment abilities. Besides, the only time Meyer's question—"does someone who has the 
capacity to claim rights thereby have all the characteristics essential to human dignity?"22—would be 
appropriate is if one conceives the capacity to claim as a behavioral tendency or characteristic of 
persons. Meyer's emphasis on comportment dignity, that is, on the characteristics of persons that would 
render them worthy custodians of their human dignity, implies that his concern is categorically 
different from the one Feinberg is concerned with.  As I have suggested a while ago, in general or in 
the context of Finberg's thought experiment, by 'capacity to claim' we mean the moral standing to assert 
claims. Therefore, it is not far from evident that "the capacity to claim rights is not the only or even the 
principal capacity relevant to the possession of human dignity."23 It turns out that Meyer's thought 
experiment is not suited for exploring the question whether there can be possession of human dignity 
(in the normative sense) that does not include the capacity, i.e., the standing, to claim rights. This is 
because Meyer sought to investigate whether the activity of claiming rights is always expressive of 
dignity, and his conclusions, although quite plausible answers to the matter he sought out to investigate, 
are by design inapplicable to questions about the normative standing to claim rights. In the end, he 
overstretched his premises to apply to the problem that they are unwarranted to settle. We must, 
therefore, devise a thought experiment quite differently from what was attempted by Meyer, 
specifically a sort of thought experiment that, par force, seeks to show an alternative framework for 
explicating the normative content of human dignity that makes no recourse to the rights approach to 
morality. This takes us to Avishai Margalit who advances an alternative framework to Feinberg's.   
Before introducing another fierce critique of Feinberg, I would like to take a moment to underscore the 
following: In this chapter, my taking him as the focal point of discussion will likely give the impression 
that Feinberg is taking all the brunt of criticism; it might sound as if I portrayed him as  setting himself 
up for an easy target by making bold claims about a topic as fundamental and controversial as the 
nature and value of rights. Far from that, I think he is fundamentally right in thinking that dignity is a 
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normative status/standing and would like to defend him from some of his fiercest critics. Some 
objections to Feinberg sprung from misrepresentation of his view, as in the case of Meyer. But Margalit 
presents a different problem, because his challenge goes beyond a mere disagreement with Feinberg's 
specific arguments pertaining to the value of claiming (and the standing to claim) for the possession of 
rights. Instead, Margalit disputes the overarching conceptual framework or model within which 
Feinberg conceptualizes moral rights and human dignity. In particular, he charges against the 
presumption that there can be no idea of respect for persons or of self-respect which is detached from 
the concept of rights. He wants to demonstrate that there can, indeed, be a plausible conception of self-
respect and of the dignity of persons, independently of the conception of rights.  
I reiterate the point I made earlier to the effect that Feinberg has explicitly conceded that having rights 
is not enough "for self-respect, dignity and other things of value." In all fairness to Feinberg, it would 
thus be inaccurate to suggest as if he is a right centrist with respect to what constitutes the ideas of self-
respect and dignity: although he thinks of human dignity as best protected through the regime of rights, 
certainly, he does not believe that possession and exercise of rights exhaust all what is morally 
significant about self-respect and dignity. To be clear, even this modest proposition is under threat from 
the seismic change in conceptualizing about self-respect and dignity brought forth by Avishai Margalit. 
For his thought experiment is designed to show that a theory of rights is not even necessary for making 
sense of self-respect and of human dignity.  
Decentville (The Decent Society: Self-Respect and Human Dignity). If I were asked to condense 
Feinberg's main thesis into one single phrase, I would rejoin with Avishai Margalit and say: "he 
believes that without the concept of rights there can be no idea of self-respect which we would deem 
justified".24 With this thought provoking claim, one can read Feinberg as implicitly challenging us to 
consider whether a society with a humanistic conception of morality is capable of having the concepts 
of self-respect, human dignity and humiliation without at the same time having a concept of rights. 
Margalit replies with a resounding yes; but for the affirmative answer to be evident we must first 
conceive self-respect and its cognates within the framework of the decent society as opposed to within 
a conception of the just society.  
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Let me explain. Rights are central to a conception of a just society, whereas self-respect and dignity 
figure most prominently as marks of decency. Of course, "rights are 'symptoms'- in the context of a 
morality of rights [in correlation to which a conception of justice is to be structured]- for identifying 
human dignity."25 But, that does not mean a morality of rights is the single most important context 
within which we ought to conceptualize human dignity. Human dignity is closely related to the concept 
of self-respect, but the latter is better conceptualized in a system of morality that makes no direct 
recourse to the concept of rights. By conceiving self-respect in ways that supersede the talk of rights, 
we can cast indispensable light on the most distinctive feature of self-respect and of human dignity, so 
claims Margalit. Hence, what better way to begin than by contemplating injury to self-respect or 
humiliation and look to see if it can figure in a system of morality without a concept of rights!  
There are two possible candidates for a system of morality that can explain injury to self-respect 
without making any recourse to rights: one is a society based on a strict notion of duty but without the 
notion of rights, henceforth duty-based society and the other alternative is to picture a society founded 
on the morality of ends, that is, on "the vision of the place of creatures in the chain of being" where 
man is regarded as "the 'crown of creation', that is, a creature who must be treated in a special way 
because of what he is."26  
In order to decide whether a society without a clear notion of rights can have the concepts of self-
respect, humiliation and human dignity required for a decent society, we must first imagine a case that 
is clearly humiliating in the context of a morality of rights and consider if the content of that 
humiliating situation can be imported to a morality that does not contain rights and still retain a 
humiliating effect akin to the one that figures due to a right violation. Let us take the case of Uncle 
Tom, a classic example of a servile person. From the context of the morality of rights, it is easy to see 
that the violation of his fundamental rights to freedom constitutes injury to his self-respect, regardless 
of the fact that he does not subjectively bring himself to comprehend the true nature of his relationship 
with the slave-master. His devotion to his faith, and his subsequent duty to God, has blinded him from 
looking the slave-master relationship and his subservience for what it truly is. One can, therefore, say 
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that his situation is humiliating despite the fact that Tom has not subjectively felt all the indignities of 
being a slave, in the way a self-respecting person is expected to do so .  
An insight into Uncle Tom's problem invites us to ask "whether Tom...can have a reason for feeling 
humiliated which we consider sound" or to ask in general "how people can have self-respect if they are 
unconcerned about issues which they ought to be concerned about."27 Some insight into the 
psychological state of victims of humiliation reveals that servility often postpones the possibility of 
one's awareness into humiliation. As one commentary into the moral psychology of victims has put it: 
―Humiliation is most effective when it is so deep and pervasive that it is no longer recognized for what 
it is, but that does not gainsay its reality.... Humiliation in such a society [is] an integral part of its 
system of domination. Established practices and forms of relationship embody disrespect bordering on 
contempt for subordinate groups, and not relentlessly assault their self-respect but even seek to prevent 
them from developing it.‖28 For that reason, Tom would have a sound reason for thinking that his self-
respect is injured even if he actually does not tend to think that way and even if his condition has in 
turn strangled him from developing a sound sense of self-respect.  
The point we should explore next is whether Tom would have a sound reason to consider his self-
respect injured were it not for the contextual normative space of the morality of rights. Tom's situation 
is bewildering to us because we see it through the magnifying glass of a moral system that contains 
basic rights and freedoms of the human person. Uncle Tom's story also reinforces our tendency to 
interpret it within the context of the morality of rights, such that we can make sense of our outrage 
towards the humiliation that typifies the institution of slavery, which is so "deep and pervasive that it is 
no longer recognized for what it is" by countless Toms. Clearly, Tom does not have a concept of rights; 
it, thus, never occur to him to question or defy the established order but instead meekly accepts 
whatever his master requires of him, which to his mind is a reflection of the will of God. He probably 
considers his unwavering obedience to his masters instead as a mark of purity of heart or as a splendid 
display of obedience to the will of the creator himself and consequently honouring Him. In light of that, 
one can underscore the obvious wrongness of Tom's worldview and of the status quo that breeds 
servility by rendering Tom incapable of developing a sense of self-respect which we consider sound. It 
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must be clear that Tom's inability to claim his rights and thereby express his self-respect is merely 
psychological, not a conceptual impossibility.  
Such approach touches on the heart of the problem, but our concern with the story of Uncle Tom is 
slightly different: "The really difficult question...is whether Tom, in spite of lacking a concept of rights, 
can have a reason for feeling humiliated which we would consider sound"29 from the vantage point of 
normative systems other than the morality of rights. In other words, can a duty-based morality or a 
morality of ends underpin the notion that Tom has a sound reason for considering his self-respect 
injured? For this exploration, whether Tom would actually feel humiliated is beside the point; instead, 
what is important is whether there is a normative space within which Tom would have a sound reason 
for considering his self-respect injured. Would we, then, run out of a fitting normative space for Uncle 
Tom to have that requisite sound reason in the absence of the moral system of rights? Margalit would 
reply with a resounding no. He insists that "[b]oth a duty morality and a morality of ends can provide 
the ground for cultivating the concepts of self-respect and humiliation."30 I reiterate that by "duty 
morality" he meant a system of morality wherein "the concept of duty is the only moral concept at its 
disposal", and by the "morality of ends" he meant a system of morality that excludes concepts of rights 
and duties but based exclusively on an ontological order of beings.31 
Although "duty morality" stresses the notion that the primary victim does not have a special standing 
with respect to compelling the person responsible for causing the moral injury to make amends for his 
actions, that does not diminish the fact that violation of duty is a serious affair. In the case of Tom, as 
long as a moral system includes a "duty not to humiliate", a justified reason for him to feel humiliated 
need not involve an implicit assumption about Tom's would be rights. With the absence of a recourse to 
rights, while the society governed purely by the regime of duties, the only thing that is missing would 
be Tom's special standing to demand that he not be humiliated. But some might still think that a full 
commitment to duty morality inevitably leads to an implicit "smuggling... [of] the concept of rights 
through the back door."32 The injunction- "thou shalt not humiliate"-makes little sense unless one also 
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presupposes that Tom has an interest in not being humiliated, which would in turn require vindication 
of why respect or defer to his interests. This all leads back to the language of rights, so they might 
claim. But Margalit thinks he has good reason to resist these would be critics. He replies: "duty 
morality maybe based on the idea that the thing which is good in itself is the absence of humiliation, 
while fulfilling the victim's interests is only a means to an end."33 One does not therefore need to 
independently justify why respect for the victim's interests in not being humiliated, which in turn 
obviates the danger of sliding back to the language of rights.  
A similar thing can be said about basing the argument for humiliation in a society based on "a morality 
of ends". This system of morality suggests that beings should be treated in terms that accord with their 
place in the ontological order of things. Presuming that Tom epitomizes the category of men (human 
beings), it would be humiliating to accord him a treatment only fitting to a lesser being. Tom would, 
therefore, have a justified reason to consider himself humiliated for the reason that he was accorded a 
treatment beneath his dignified place as a member of the human family. Moreover, Margalit envisions 
that in this society those who humiliate others "are reproved for not having acted the way the 
exemplary person would have done."34 In the end, the argument for Tom having a sound reason to have 
his self respect injured in a society based on a morality of ends runs parallel to a similar argument 
based on duty morality.  
A Critical Response to Margalit. Although one can have a sound reason for feeling humiliated in duty 
based society as well as in a society based on the morality of ends,  I do not however think that 
Margalit made a successful defense of the claim—we can have an adequate conception of dignity and 
of self-respect independently of the morality of rights. Even if we grant that some notion of humiliation 
may figure within duty morality or within the morality of ends, it would be implausible to maintain that 
the idea of humiliation so conceived meshes with the prevailing normative idea of human dignity.  
My critique of Margalit has two aspects: on the one hand, I believe his alleged vindication of a sound 
conception of humiliation outside the morality of rights does not obviate conceptualizing humiliation 
within the framework of the latter, and, on the other hand, in excluding rights' morality from his 
conception of humiliation Margalit shifts the meaning of the latter, which subsequently weakens its 
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moral appeal. I think Feinberg is right in thinking that the lack of normative standing to claim would 
make any moral duty, or any end in the case of morality of ends, less stringent and less compelling no 
matter how strongly it is construed within the given moral system. The idea is simply that, if one also 
has a claim to the thing another has a duty to, it then goes without saying that the directional element to 
the duty supplies extra moral constraint on the duty holder. This holds true regardless of the substantive 
content of the duty under consideration, say a duty not to humiliate.  
Consider an example given by Margalit: he imagined a society whose duty based morality commands 
young people to respect old people by giving them a sit on a bus, in which the old "are not considered 
to have the right to a seat, but the young have the duty to give them their seat", whereas the bus driver 
is tasked to "make sure that the behavior on his bus conforms with the society's norms."35 In this 
context, an old man who has been refused a seat by a teenager would not have a preferred status over 
any other passenger in asking the driver for intervention. But interestingly enough, say an old woman 
who already has secured a seat happened to feel strongly about the state of affair, considering it as an 
affront to her too. Margalit reminded us that "[h]umiliation, like embarrassment, is contagious." But the 
question is, is the old woman justified to feel humiliated in the same way as the old man would be 
justified to think as he is the direct victim of the humiliating act? Margalit replies with the qualified 
"if", as he suggests: "If we identify with the victim in that we share the characteristic for which he is 
being humiliated, then we also have a justified reason for feeling ourselves humiliated."36 But, that 
changes nothing with respect to the normative status of 'being justified to feel humiliated', that it would 
still be less stringent than when the sound reason for feeling humiliated also confers a claim to demand 
that one not be humiliated. Even if the whole world is justified in feeling humiliated when one is 
humiliated, unless someone has a claim to it he is not said to have the most rigorous moral protection at 
his disposal. The same point can be illustrated negatively as: having a claim is inversely related to 
moral wronging. If in virtue of having a claim one can exclaim "you owe me", it is equally the case that 
one is wronged when the addressed refuses to fulfill his duties towards one. And the notion that a 
person has been wronged epitomizes the stringency or gravity of the moral violence brought forth when 
the duty-holder reneges on his duties to the right-holder. In other words, wronging is perhaps the most 
robust kind of moral wrong which Margalit seem to overlook.    
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Moreover, Margalit evidently relies on one key feature of humiliation in order to underpin his assertion 
that the connection between violation of a right and dignity violation is merely incidental. When a 
single action signifies both a right violation and humiliation (due to a violation of dignity) at the same 
time, Margalit insists that the later is partly due to humiliating gestures that are not naturally connected 
to rights. I think what Margalit has in mind is a case in which an ordinary right violation is transformed 
into a violation of dignity due to humiliating gestures that are embedded in, though not constitutive to, 
the right violation. This indeed speaks in favor of delineating the component of dignity violation from 
that particular instance of right violation, nevertheless it hardly speaks against humiliating gestures 
being naturally related to rights. It is one thing to say that humiliating gestures signify the manner in 
which a right is violated but not the violation of the right per se, and quite another to suggest that 
humiliating gestures are naturally unrelated to rights.  
In my view human dignity is the moral status/standing for having rights, which also implies that certain 
rights are perforce devised to protect the very moral status for making right-claims. The rights that 
protect dignity prominently include rights that protect persons from humiliating and degrading 
treatments; and since humiliating gestures are part of the reason why certain forms of treatment are 
humiliating, the indicated right must therefore protect persons from humiliating gestures. For that 
reason, I believe Margalit's assertion to the effect that humiliating gestures are unrelated to rights is 
unwarranted.  
That being said, on a separate note, one could also resist Margalit's main thesis by critiquing his 
reliance on a negative definition of self-respect. I suspect, he gave up prematurely on the possibility of 
a positive account of respect for persons. The question is, how can he rely on a negative account (i.e., 
an account about sound reasons for thinking that one is humiliated) in order to advance a positive view 
about self-respect and its cognates such as human dignity? As Daniel Statman succinctly summarizes 
this critical point: ―sound reasons for thinking that one‘s self-respect is injured exist only if sound 
reasons exist to think that such respect is warranted in the first place. If there is nothing to respect in 
human beings qua human beings, then there is no room for self-respect either, and thus no room (i.e. no 
conceptual room) for injuring it.‖37 
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This may in turn prompt us to ask: what is dignity, for Margalit, anyway? He describes dignity as "the 
external aspect of self-respect" consisting of "the behavioral tendencies that attest to the fact that one's 
attitude toward oneself is an attitude of self-respect."38 Whether we take the universal or particular 
dimension to self-respect its connection to our intuitions about dignity seems pretty obvious to discern. 
For instance, we tend to think that conferring dignity to persons involves according respect, "due 
honor" and regard to them as fellow members of the human commonwealth. The concept of honor can 
encapsulate what we mean by dignity, but "[i]f we want to base the decent society on the concept of the 
honor that everyone deserves in equal measure," he declares, "we must move from social honor to 
human dignity."39 The talk of respect for persons and dignity figure as two points of view in a single 
conversation, i.e., "[f]rom the viewpoint of those conferring such honor we speak of respect for 
humans, while from the viewpoint of those honored we speak of dignity."40 I intended to close this 
section with a positive note, and the above description signifies one of the few things Margalit has to 
say that I consider plausible.  
3.1.1 Putting the Three Thought Experiments in Perspective 
Here's a concise recap of the implications obtained from each of the three thought experiments 
regarding the nature of the relationship between human dignity and rights. Feinberg was intent on 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
One can think of two closely related, though conceptually distinct, notions of self-respect. In respecting the person‘s unique 
identity one thereby promotes self-respect as a human being. Recognizing the person as a bearer of a unique identity implies 
recognizing the humanity in that person. If humanity is marked by the potential for individuals to sketch a portrait of 
themselves that is uniquely personal in accordance with their ideals of life, we must then say that respecting the particularity 
of the individual entails respect for the humanity embedded in it. To appreciate our common humanity, to acknowledge our 
equal worth and to give everyone‘s interests and feelings equal weight in our deliberations about what is due to them, we 
must first presuppose that individuals bear certain kind of distinct identities in the way they conceive their lives and in the 
way they express them thorough the lives they created for themselves. However, ―the difference between the two is also 
evident in the way people respond when the two forms of self-respect are violated. When treated in a manner that outrages 
one‘s dignity [as a human being], one would say, ‗What do you think I am? An animal? A vegetable? I am a human being 
like you and will not be treated in this way‘. When one‘s status as a distinct person is violated, one is merely likely to rejoin, 
‗Who do you think I am? Your clone? A nobody?‖ Parekh, "Logic of Humiliation", 37 
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demonstrating the value of rights by contemplating their absence; in so doing, he sought on identifying 
what is crucially missing with the departure of rights the reintroduction of which would crucially 
improve the moral sphere of Nowheresville. He came to the conclusion that, the activity of claiming 
and more importantly the capacity, i.e. the moral standing, to assert claims is what transforms 
Nowheresville into Rightsville: citizens of this new moral realm do now have the moral authority at 
their disposal to stand up for themselves and declare "in some fundamental way the equal of anyone." 
In Nowheresville, they used to be somehow alienated from the acts of others that directly affect them, 
unable or unauthorized to do something about it, in effect having little normative control over how 
others treat them. But with the introduction of rights, they now have normative control over essential 
aspect of their lives. It is this new found moral status/standing that Feinberg identifies as 'the dignity of 
persons'.   
Feinberg's account of the dignity of persons is, I submit, more promising than its detractors are 
prepared to grant. Take, for instance, one of Margalit's reasons for resisting the sort of intimate relation 
Feinberg argued to have existed between having rights and the possession of dignity: he reasoned that 
Feinberg's thesis is untenable because "humiliation [violation of dignity] does not mean that one's 
rights are violated, but rather that one is incapable of demanding them" or that one suffers "humiliating 
gestures that are not naturally related to rights."41 Margalit presumes that that could undermine the 
basic premise on which Feinberg's argument rests. On the contrary, I think Feinberg's main thesis and 
the above seemingly critical response are not inconsistent. Evidently, for Feinberg, what is tragic about 
Nowheresville is not the violation of rights (for technically one can neither respect nor violate 
something that doesn't exist) but the very absence of the moral standing, the restitution of which would 
otherwise make possession of rights possible. In other words, the incapacity to demand is exactly what 
Feinberg has lamented about Nowheresville. It should be noted that, Feinberg was simply asserting that 
the idea of human dignity is indispensable for the defense of rights, but to my mind he did not contend 
that the other way round also holds true in every conceivable circumstance. Instead, Feinberg was 
explicit in acknowledging that possession of rights does not exhaust all that is important about "self-
respect, dignity and other things of value." I believe, Feinberg succeeds precisely where his critics 
expected him to fail. Besides, his thoughts accord with some of our established beliefs about violations 
of human dignity.  
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He does not seem to assert that all violations of rights are by definition dignity violations; also his 
account supports the idea that certain violations of rights are characterized by the denial of the very 
capacity to assert claims, and, thus, are violations of human dignity. My quarrel with him is only that 
his conceptual framework does not make these points explicit. Here in this chapter, I used Feinberg as a 
point of departure as I proceed to formulating one of the central claims I shall be advancing at the later 
stage of this dissertation. In the following chapters I will take up the discussion on my preferred 
conception of human dignity from where we left off here, and for now, I leave it as it is.  
With respect to Michael J. Meyer's thought experiment, I shall add nothing of significance that hasn't 
been said earlier in this chapter. As the foregoing discussions reveal, he took up a different idea of 
human dignity, in particular as a behavioral tendency or comportment ability as opposed to dignity in 
the normative-moral sense. He wanted to demonstrate that the having and exercise of rights is of any 
use only to beings who are capable of self-control. Of course, that is true; I might add, having what we 
call rights of persons is useless unless the right-holder is capable of self-consciousness, as well as of the 
capacity to compassion, love and other emotions necessary for forming human relationships. Should 
we therefore say that the dignity of persons rests on all those? I believe, that would be stretching the 
argument, which is exactly the trap Meyer could readily fall into. The problem with Meyer has to do 
with trying to answer a question he did not yet figure out how to ask.  
As far as Margalit's thought experiment is concerned, I think a couple of points deserve restating. One 
minor point to be considered is an internal inconsistency with Margalit's account which, I think, 
manifests when he delineates dignity from self-respect. He puts the distinction thus: "Self-respect is 
tested negatively; dignity is tested positively. This means that self-respect is typically revealed when a 
person's honor is violated, that is, when he is humiliated...A person with dignity, in contrast, 
demonstrates her self-respect through positive acts which are not responses to provocations."42 This 
leads to an obvious consequence that "one [say a prickly person without saving-grace] may have self-
respect without possessing dignity."43 Whether this distinction between a dignified bearing and a 
demonstration of self-respect proves adequate, or not, it does not square with Margalit's other view 
about the relation between humiliation and human dignity. "Humiliation", he writes, "is a concept 
based on contrast, and the opposite of humiliation is the concept of respect for humans"; Margalit 
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continues "[i]f there is no concept of human dignity, then there is no concept of humiliation either."44 If 
Margalit's concept of humiliation cannot function without the notion of human dignity, how does it, 
then makes sense to suppose that one can have self-respect without possessing dignity?  
Furthermore, according to Margalit, there are three interrelated senses of humiliation. One can have a 
sound reason for thinking that his self-respect is injured when (a) he is treated as sub-human, (b) when 
rejected from the human family, or (c) when one is deprived of his basic sense of self-control when one 
is forced to acquiesce into or assist his own humiliation (victims of torture are often made to 
unwittingly acquiesce to their own debasement).45 This probably demonstrates that some violations of 
human rights (as opposed to the violation of other rights) are paradigmatic examples of humiliation—a 
violation of human dignity. But such an outcome is precisely what Margalit sought to refute: he did not 
wish to suggest that some rights are in some fundamental way related to human dignity, and yet simply 
following his own argumentative framework suggests otherwise. Consequently, it seems to me that 
Margalit's conception of the decent society is the case of 'a just society on steroids': Decentville is 
crooked because it is inadequately built or conceived. It was formulated to serve the same purpose as 
the just society, but is founded on wrong grounds.   
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Chapter 4 
Human Dignity as Moral Status: Part I, The Concept of Moral Status 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the current discourse on human dignity, there is one distinctive conception which defends the view 
that dignity is a moral status. However, moral status is a very contested concept, and it is particularly 
difficult to unpack what it means when one speaks of human dignity as moral status. In the literature, 
there is no unified view on what moral status is meant to convey when human dignity is defined in 
terms of it. One obvious reason why it is commonplace to have dissenting opinions about moral status 
is that, to the extent that moral philosophers espouse diverse substantive moral theories and so does 
moral status shift its meaning. For that reason, the disagreement about how to understand moral status 
would ultimately boil down to questions about the nature of moral obligations and the grounds why we 
have them. However, that is not a serious objection to any attempt at understanding moral status that its 
meaning may be deeply embedded in a particular understanding of morality.  
Secondly, in its more familiar sense, moral status appears to mimic the structure of social status, for the 
term ‗status‘ has aristocratic underpinnings that, perforce, seem to reflect hierarchy. If moral status 
retains some traces of the past, primarily it would be the rank and hierarchy that modern moral 
philosophy has largely discarded.  
Whereas, human dignity, in the sense relevant to contemporary moral thinking, is a concept implying 
an entitlement or claim that is egalitarian in distribution. We are told that dignity is inherent in the 
human person, which is a sort of birth right to members of the human family, not something acquired 
through lineage or by virtue of the quality of one's character. The notion of equal dignity is also 
pervasive in the egalitarian framework of human rights. It does not, however, appear to square with 
connotations of rank and hierarchy that seems to inform the idea of (socially constituted) status. Indeed, 
high rank and uprightness of character, as conceived for example in virtue ethics of classical 
philosophy, conflict with the presumption of equality that human dignity underlies. A concept of moral 
status must, therefore, be consistent with the egalitarian underpinning attached to the idea of human 
dignity. In this chapter, I explore differing ideas of moral status and identify one that is compatible with 
bedrock intuitions about human dignity.  
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I can think of, at least, two general intuitions about human dignity that may serve as adequacy 
conditions for a concept of moral status capable of defining human dignity. The notion of human 
dignity I have in mind is egalitarian in distribution, that is, every human being is possessed of it in 
virtue of being human, regardless of differences in intellectual and moral-psychological capacities. 
Moreover, human dignity is not merely a sort of property every person is equally endowed with, it is 
also a claim or entitlement in virtue of which one can demand respect from every other human being. 
In other words, having dignity entails directed duties—duties that are owed to the bearers of dignity 
who would be wronged if the duties entailed by the principle of dignity were violated . If we were, 
then, to define dignity as moral status then the latter must reflect the above-described intuitions about 
human dignity.  
Incidentally, the view of dignity as  (high) status has traditionally been tied to aristocracy, epitomized 
in the Roman concept of dignitas, and to a certain extent it is attached to the Stoic notion of 
virtuous/dignified bearing and character. But, modern moral thinking has abandoned this traditional tie 
between dignity and ranking status and instead champions the discernment of dignity in terms of an 
inherent, incomparable worth of the human person. Dignity as worth has gained currency of late partly 
because it appears to mirror human dignity‘s egalitarian creed. The philosophical discourse on human 
rights, enriched by human rights declarations of the last century, has adopted the view that human 
dignity is an inherent value grounding inalienable human rights. Many of the human rights declarations 
include in their preambles the declaration that rights emanate from the inherent dignity of the human 
person.  
But if status inherently sanctions hierarchy, why bother about a status conception of human dignity that 
seems to run contrary to bed-rock intuitions about morality in general and to human dignity in 
particular?  I would caution against dismissing the view of dignity as moral status simply because it 
seems to retain some ties with inegalitarian views about the moral worth of human beings. Status in this 
classical-hierarchical sense reflects excellence, whether it be due to naturally endowed capacities or 
otherwise acquired by one's efforts (which itself is strongly influenced by the accident of birth to a 
given set of circumstances). To that extent, it appears to legitimize the flukes of natural lottery. And 
that clearly conflicts with the logic of morality, both in spirit and in letter. But there is another way of 
looking at it, specifically from the point of view of a perfectionist moral project. It judges people in 
terms of noble standards of moral and intellectual excellence, which, furthermore, aspires to achieve a 
virtuous social order wherein dignified bearing and self-control are displayed by the greatest number of 
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people. But dignity as noble bearing and uprightness of character is a slightly different concept of 
dignity that should not be confused with the notion of dignity as a claim by which human beings 
demand respect. We can still retain the idea of dignity as noble bearing, as it has an important 
normative function to play in morality, while at the same time maintaining that human dignity is 
principally a normative concept that reflects equal moral standing. Each of the above ideas obtain from 
the interpretation of dignity as moral status are that they are not inconsistent with each other.  
On the other hand, contemporary philosophers have taken seriously the idea of inherent worth, having 
been influenced by prominent formulations of dignity in Kant‘s moral philosophy which seems to 
confer philosophical vindication to this contemporary paradigm and reinforce the recognition that 
dignity is an ‗unconditional, inner worth‘ of the human person. Kant's influence in rekindling human 
dignity into the modern moral lexicon is beyond doubt, and contrary to the popular reading of Kant 
what might now be called status conception of human dignity is inspired by his moral theory. 
Nonetheless, given his formidable place in influencing modern moral philosophy, it is very tempting to 
take Kant‘s finely phrased assertions about dignity as a particular instance of the inherent value 
conception of human dignity. Despite appearances to the contrary, what I believe to be the most 
plausible interpretation of Kant‘s view on human dignity has it that human dignity cannot be 
adequately characterized by a simple idea of inherently valuable property.  
The purpose of this two-chapter exposé is to explore different attempts at anchoring dignity in moral 
status. To that end, it is crucial to clarify the notion of moral status and define the conceptual terrains 
that it probably shares with other closely aligned concepts such as rank and moral worth. Once an 
adequate concept of moral status is established, we need to test it against shared basic presumptions 
about human dignity.   
This discourse on moral status is organized in two, interconnected but fairly autonomous, chapters. In 
the first part, I shall exclusively discuss the concept of moral status as it figures in the literature, 
delineate different meanings that it might designate, and identify the most adequate sense in which 
moral status can be predicated to human dignity. Moral status maybe deployed in four distinct senses 
only one of which appears to be compatible with uncontroversial intuitions about human dignity that I 
have sketched earlier. And in the second part, i.e., in the chapter that follows this, I shall consider 
competing conceptions of human dignity as moral status. In it, substantive theories of three principal 
figures in the discourse will be presented and carefully analyzed: I shall lay a platform for Kant, 
Stephen Darwall and Jeremy Waldron to engage in virtual conversation with one another in relation to 
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the question what, if anything, normative implications follow from the assertion that human beings are 
endowed with equal dignity.  
When two persons or entities are said to be equal in dignity, it simply means that they stand on equal 
moral footing to the effect that both are granted equitable moral consideration, whatever sort of moral 
consideration and corresponding moral obligations presumably follow from being possessed of dignity. 
If dignity were to be considered as an equal moral status, then moral status must eventually be spelled 
out in terms of moral obligations, which takes us to some of the interesting questions that follow: If 
moral status can be exhaustively spelled out in terms of moral obligations, what does, then, recourse to 
moral status add to the discourse? Do we really need the concept of moral status simply because it can 
deliver the linguistic convenience of condensing a set of moral obligations? But, if moral status adds 
substance to the discourse on moral obligations, could that be in the form of justifying them? However, 
a concept that is claimed to justify another must not itself be defined in terms of what it allegedly 
justifies. Should we, therefore, have an alternative account of moral status that does not make any 
recourse to moral obligations? Or can a normatively significant notion of moral status explain moral 
obligations without justifying them? If that is indeed the case, how can we then explain that some 
assertions of moral status appear to play a justificatory role?  
Once it is settled that moral status is a significant notion in morality, these further questions also seem 
appropriate: should we uphold the presumption that moral status is a matter of all-or-nothing‘ polarity, 
or does moral status admit of degrees? Can one endorse degrees of moral status (in general) and at the 
same time consistently defend the notion that human dignity grants all human beings equal moral 
status? If yes, what explanatory model validly explicates distinctions of moral status but maintain equal 
human dignity?  
 
4.2 Skepticism On the Concept of Moral Status  
Moral status may be defined bluntly as whatever status assigned to a certain entity by a moral 
argument. Elementary survey of the literature reveals that the following meanings are routinely 
conferred to the concept of moral status. Some vaguely say, an entity has moral status if it can be a 
member of the moral community. Whereas others assert that ―[t]he moral status of…beings determines 
how it is morally justified to treat them, or what is morally permissible to do to [them].‖1 Sometimes, it 
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has also been proclaimed that something has a moral status if it is an object of moral concern. These are 
some of the most general characterizations of moral status; and since they do not appear to contain 
distinct substantive content, they have the advantage of being applicable across different moral 
traditions.  
Skeptics might, however, proclaim that the above prevailing accounts of moral status are either 
needlessly formal,  rely on vague terms such as ‗the moral community‘, ‗object of moral concern‘ and 
the metaphor of ‗moral counting‘, or depend on a reasoning that begs the question. 
The charge of circular reasoning is distinctively potent, and we must, therefore, address it first before 
proceeding to a detailed discussion on the nature of moral status. Assertions of moral status often entail 
recognition of obligations towards certain beings that are purportedly possessed of moral status; and 
yet, the very idea of moral status is cashed in terms of those obligations that were, in the first place, 
claimed to follow from moral status. This is, therefore, to say that invoking moral status in order to 
expound our obligations regarding a certain entity is frustrated by the very attempt to define moral 
status exclusively in terms of notions that can be explained through the general idea of moral 
obligations. Incidentally, the attempt to explicate moral status in terms of specific moral obligations 
often takes a justificatory form, that is, moral status is posited as a ground for having those obligations. 
Consequently, circular reasoning abounds a justificatory account of moral status vis-à-vis moral 
obligations. It may, however, be argued that the problem is not in relating moral status with the notion 
of moral obligation, since appeal to moral status ―summarizes claims about obligations without 
justifying them‖, but it is in thinking that possession of moral status vindicates why we have 
obligations to certain beings.  
Whereas, the question regarding which specific moral obligations we owe to certain beings ―must be 
determined on the basis of normative and theoretical considerations that make no prior assumptions 
about moral status.‖2 Hence, exploring moral status from a non-justificatory framework clearly defeats 
the challenge of circular reasoning; it does so by placing the task of clarifying the concept of moral 
status and that of grounding moral obligations into separate theoretical realms. But this cracks open 
another fault line, which is that, placing the clarification of moral status and the grounding of moral 
obligations into two conceptual realms that never converge runs the risk of rendering the first 
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superfluous. If moral status ―summarizes claims about moral obligations without justifying them‖, what 
significance does it then has in normative moral theory? If the use of moral status was merely for 
abbreviating claims about moral obligations, then that would severely undercut the concept's moral 
significance and consequently reinforce the suspicion that the talk of moral status may be redundant.  
To have a complete picture of what constitutes moral status, we need to first establish that there is more 
substance to moral status than simply being an organizing concept. Roughly, the idea is that moral 
status must contain more substance than the familiar metaphors it appears to reflect, that it is an 
independent concept of its own augmenting ethical and moral theory than just being a convenient way 
of condensing the complex language of moral prescriptions, permissions, rights, and obligations. In a 
slightly different context, but equally applicable here, Benjamin Sachs suggested that one who takes the 
concept of moral status seriously must prescribe to a ‗further-fact-view‘ of moral status.3 It holds that 
moral status provides a further (moral) fact than simply being a tool for condensing a bundle of moral 
obligations that it allegedly encapsulates.  
Consider the following example. Suppose a doctor routinely uses, or more precisely abuses, patients in 
permanent vegetative state as guinea pigs for the clinical trial of experimental drugs (drugs that have 
little to do with their respective medical condition). One may, then, confront him with a stern warning: 
'You ought to stop that now. They are not things to do with whatever you so desire; they have moral 
status!' In this context, moral status is deployed not merely to convey the notion that people in 
permanent vegetative state are owed certain obligations but also to underscore that our obligation to 
them is based on the notion that they are beings of the relevant sort that have moral status (perhaps, 
entailing that they have a good of their own that requires us to treat them as ends). In that regard, moral 
status seems to be invoked  to justify the assertion that we have moral obligations. Evidently, the 
apparent justification conferred by assertions of moral status is modelled on the specific form of speech 
act, extrapolated from the discursive context as well as from the manners in which it was addressed. It 
may thus appear as a linguistic convenience, but not indicative of a substantive connection between the 
two notions. I do, however, think that certain obligations directly follow from moral status. Some 
actions are essentially characterized by a blanket denial of moral status, and moral prohibitions against 
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them must directly flow from the affirmation of moral status.4 In this sense, certain moral obligations 
maybe described as direct instances of moral status.   
To return to the above example, moral outrages against such blatant disrespect to human beings who 
happen to be in condition of absolute vulnerability may be conveyed and asserted in ways that do not 
suggest that our obligations are derived from assertions of moral status. One may alternatively remind 
the wicked doctor in our example using the language of rights—by exclaiming: 'you must not treat 
them that way because they have rights.' One may then proceed to enumerate the list of rights that are 
violated by the doctor‘s act. But at the moral base we find moral status as an organizing concept that 
consists in the normative core of those rights, which are allegedly violated by that doctor. As a 
normative core to the most basic obligations that we owe to persons in vegetative state, what it means 
to have moral status maybe captured by the generic claim that they not be treated as if they count for 
nothing. Specific rights may, then, be understood as instances to their moral status. But this relationship 
does not hinge on a principled belief that all obligations to certain entities are justified by the ascription 
of moral status. In responding this way, we can steer clear of circular reasoning and at the same time 
the paradox of justifying obligations by assertions of moral status (wherein moral status is in turn 
defined in terms of obligations owed to certain entities).   
Since moral status conveys the idea that its possessor counts for something, we can reasonably 
conclude that things with moral status should not be treated as if they count for nothing; although this 
thought alone does not tell us about the scope and precise normative function of moral status, it is 
nonetheless sufficient to eliminate the challenge that we should eschew the talk of moral status 
altogether. We can, therefore, establish the moral relevance of the concept without having to 
substantively determine what is it exactly that things with moral status count for. In other words, one 
can advance a plausible argument for a "further-fact view of moral status" merely at the level of 
conceptual analysis. 
 
4.3 Four Distinct Senses of Moral Status: Who or What Counts? 
                                                          
4
   History is replete with plenty of examples; one can mention Japanese soldiers' treatment of prisoners of war, the Russian 
Gulags, or go way back in time to the Spanish inquisition and its characteristic practice of burning people at the stake. It is 
often said that 'civilized man' has short memory, that in his perpetual obsession for the future he relegated history to a 
distant relic divorced from the present. For a brilliant exploration of this human psychosis through the lens of history, see 
Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral history of the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) 
117 
 
What does it, then, mean for something to have moral status? Many writers, including Wayne Sumner 
reminded us that ―[e]very physical object has some status or other; it makes no sense to say that a thing 
lacks moral status than to say that it lacks shape or color…. To count for nothing is to have no moral 
standing.‖5 Whereas, some with Alan Buchanan argue that being possessed of moral status determines 
who or what morally counts. Buchanan writes: ―A being‘s moral status can make a difference as to 
whether its behavior is subject to moral evaluation, how it ought to be treated, whether it has rights, and 
perhaps what kind of rights it has.‖6 
My exploration doesn't take seriously Sumner's expansive definition of moral status, for it is not 
sufficiently informative. Whereas, when asking ‗what does it mean for something to have moral 
status?‘, I take it that having moral status, or moral standing as Sumner and others would prefer to call 
it, makes a moral difference. And the gist of my question relates to what that positive difference might 
be. There are four important senses in which an entity maybe said to have moral status. To think that X 
has moral status is to say one of the following:   
 (a) how moral agents treat X is morally important or X matters from a moral point of view;  
 (b) X counts morally in its own right;  
 (c) "In its own right and for its own sake" X gives us reason to constrain our actions and 
 behaviour towards it, or X is a direct object of moral obligation; and  
 (d) X is owed duties.  
Each of the four ways of defining moral status correlate to a unique set of moral prescriptions regarding 
entities (such as, respect, assist, protect, promote or defer to its interests, consider in our moral 
deliberations, or refrain from harm). 
According to (a), our obligations regarding X may either be based on X‘s interests or on the interests of 
others who might otherwise be affected by how we treat X. In this sense, having recognizable interests 
is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for X to be said to have moral status. This is simply 
because how we treat these things is morally important, even though, in and of themselves and absent 
other considerations, some things may have little or no moral significance. A vase-full of ashes would 
                                                          
5
  L. W. Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981),  26. In Morris, 
Christopher W. ―The Idea of Moral Standing‖ in Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Animal Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 255-275 supranote. 3 
6  Buchanan, Allen ―Moral Status and Human Enhancement‖ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 37: 4 (2009): 346-381 , at p. 346  
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mean little in and of itself, but would require enormous moral restraint on what to do with it if we were 
told that the ashes are in fact a cremated body of someone's loved one. Sometimes it is not about our 
actions towards an entity per se that is morally impermissible, but because our action is likely to cause 
adverse effects on the interests of other human beings, by putting a strain on their value systems or on 
their life projects or simply by offending them. This characterization of moral status, however, will not 
be of much significance, for instance, when it comes to the issue of differentiating the moral status of 
human beings from that of nonhuman animals on the one hand, and the moral status of sentient beings 
from the status of inanimate objects on the other.  
Moral importance is a rather broad category within which any entity of little significance (in itself) may 
nevertheless fall under due to its relation to other beings with direct moral significance. To make that 
distinction clear, David DeGrazia and Bonnie Steinbock proposed a modified version of (a), henceforth 
a*. DeGrazia, for instance, stated that ―to have moral status is to bear direct and independent moral 
importance‖ wherein, for entities, bearing direct and independent moral importance is closely tied to 
their interests or welfare.
7
 Steinbock writes forcefully about the connection between a thing's direct 
moral importance and it's being possessed of interests; he claims, ―[t]o have moral status is to be the 
sort of being whose interests must be considered from the moral point of view.‖8 Although describing 
moral status in terms of interests has been a familiar way to go about for many, non-Kantian, moral 
thinkers, the insertion of ―the moral point of view‖, however, imports an unnecessary complication.9 In 
any case, clearly this modified version of (a) is very different from moral status according to (b).  
Analytically speaking, bearing a direct and independent moral importance (b) is not necessarily tied to 
having interests. When one declares that something matters morally in itself, that amounts to saying 
that it matters in a non-relational sense such that sufficient unto itself it gives us reason to constrain our 
actions towards it. It is precisely in this sense that we speak of works of art, music and nature as 
                                                          
7
  According to DeGrazia, an action-type may have independent moral significance- as for example destroying the Grand 
Canyon or The Pyramids of Giza, for example- but an action-type cannot be related to the moral status of the thing, if the 
thing lacks interests. DeGrazia “Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?”, 183 
8
  Bonnie Steinbock, Life Before Death: the Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982) ,  9. See also Morris, “The Idea of Moral Standing”,  supranote. 4 
9
  The talk of moral significance as a matter of ―a point of view‖ begets profound confusion, since morality seeks to eschew 
the subjectivism implied by 'a point of view'. However, the talk of 'a point of view' is sensible when merely used to 
underscore that interests matter from distinct normative points of view and morality is but one. I invite the reader to take 
that the latter meaning is what is intended by "the moral point of view".  
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counting in their own right. Certainly works of art and nature have a morally protected use beyond 
themselves; but if it is true that they count morally in their own right, then, regardless and 
independently of their use value, they possess a special sort of moral significance.
10
 In contrast to (a) 
according to which simply being morally important endows moral status to the thing, (b) appears to be 
more refined since it qualifies moral importance with a proviso that the thing should matter morally in 
and of itself. Nevertheless, at this level, no distinction is to be made between sentient and non-sentient 
entities or among distinct members of each category. Distinctions of that sort may nevertheless figure 
in (b), but only as articulations of degrees of moral status.  
Suppose morality prescribes that we act for some entity's sake. It then goes without saying that that 
entity counts morally in its own right. But the other way round does not hold. Something may count 
morally in its own right but lack interests or a good of its own. Kamm highlighted this distinction with 
striking clarity, but she observes that usually it is (c) ―that people have in mind when they ordinarily 
attribute moral status to an entity.‖11 For that matter, Mary Anne Warren and Christopher Morris have 
also defended moral status according to (c).
12
  
It is reasonable to say that (c) circumscribes (b), but is substantively identical to a*—unless by any 
stretch of the imagination one could sensibly say that an entity's interests may have a direct and 
independent moral significance but morality does not then prescribe that we ought to act for the sake of 
its interests. That would, however, make little sense. On the other hand, I believe there is a direct 
correlation between a being‘s interests having independent moral importance and our prima facie 
obligations to act for the sake of preserving and protecting its interests. All things considered, in any 
given situation it may be morally permissible or even required to disregard the interests of some entities 
with moral status; but that is beside the point.  
                                                          
10
 In general, those who prescribe to the thesis that moral significance has a categorical grip (or Kantians to be precise) must 
by definition also assume that instrumental value, if anything, has a normative power to govern our actions only outside the 
purview of morality. For something's instrumental value is relative to real or perceived expediency and such value will 
cease to exist whenever the relationship of expediency is no longer viable. On the other end of the spectrum, there are those 
who contend that moral significance is nothing but a series of instrumental ends. A thing's moral importance is always 
traceable to how it is related to something else, and that there is no such thing as morally counting in "its own right". This 
debate goes way back to Hume and Kant, but it is not of central importance to our discussion since our purpose is to zoom 
in on plausible ways of  conceiving human dignity as moral status.  
11
  Kamm, ―Moral Status― in  Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm, 229 
12
 See Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things (Oxford: OUP Clarendon Press, 
1997); ―On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion― The Monist, 57: 4, pp. 43-61  
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Finally, there is another distinction to be made within the sort of entities whose interests have an 
independent moral importance, i.e., ―between those who are benefited or protected by duties and those 
to whom duties are owed.‖13 This understanding of moral status (d) cuts across the distinction between 
duties simpliciter and directed duties. A duty owed to an entity is a ‗directed duty‘; it entails not only 
that the corresponding moral obligations are to be performed for the good of that being, but also the 
recognition that it is the sort of being to be reckoned with. That is to say, the moral agent is directly 
answerable for how she acts, or otherwise disinclines to act, in certain ways toward that being: ―a duty 
owed to a being is correlative to a claim-right held by the being.‖14 In addition, the distinction between 
simple duties and directional duties bears a familiar correlation with the dichotomy between doing the 
wrong thing and wronging some entity. Directed duties are correlated to moral wronging. On the flip 
side, one cannot be said to wrong some entity unless the duty that one violates are owed directly to that 
entity.15  
With respect to (d), there is but one important disclaimer to consider, which is the controversy 
surrounding the issue whether duties owed to an entity necessarily correlate to a specific interest of that 
entity. For instance, duties of forbearance (or non-interference) that are particularly owed to persons 
correspond to their liberty rights, which in turn may not essentially reflect a specific interest. Some 
think of liberty rights as defined essentially in stark contrast with interests, while others prefer to speak 
of a morally protected interest in liberty. Nevertheless, for liberty rights to be of any good they must be 
accorded to entities with recognizable interests. The notion of liberty rights of an inanimate object of 
moral concern, or of a sentient being with no recognizable conception of the self and of the good life, is 
a meaningless concept.16 To be sure, it may also be said that persons have a general interest in their 
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   Morris “The Idea of Moral Standing”, 4 
14
  For a detailed discussion of moral status, directional duties and moral rights, see Kamm Intricate Ethics,  chs. 7 and 8 
15
 Wronging ought not to be confused with harming. Harm is a broader concept, it involves trampling over the interests of 
others. In contrast, wronging is a distinct moral category;  it may involve infringing upon the interests of others or their 
morally protected interest in liberty, but the corresponding duties must be owed directly to those entities whose interests 
such duties are meant to protect.  
16
 To a livestock or poultry, for example, being allowed to roam freely outdoors, rather than being confined in an enclosure 
24 hours of the day, is more of an interest than a liberty,  in the strict sense of the term.  
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liberty, even though liberties and interests are conceptually distinct: it is not inconsistent to subscribe to 
both claims at the same time.
17
 
 
4.3.1 Moral Status and Moral Standing: Are they Conjoined Twins? 
It is worth noting that some disagreements about how to understand moral status comes down to one 
crucial terminological dispute, namely between the notion of moral status and that of moral standing. 
Much of the philosophical literature blurs the two, as many writers prefer to talk only of ―moral status‖, 
while few tend to employ ‗moral status‘ and ‗moral standing‘ interchangeably. Alternatively, others 
profess to advance ―an innovative distinction between the notion of status and that of standing.‖18  
It is not always the case that those who believe in the distinction between status and standing 
(henceforth dualists) are necessarily at odds with others who prefer to talk only of moral status 
(henceforth monists). Some monists made moral status applicable both to a broader category of entities 
as well as to beings with respect to whom dualists speaks of moral standing. Despite their misgivings 
about making a conceptual distinction between status and standing, some monists, nevertheless, speak 
of a broad and narrow sense distinction of moral status, while a few others alternatively speak of moral 
status as a matter of degree below a certain threshold. In the broader sense, or below a certain threshold 
in the latter case, we may inscribe a morally protected status to a broader consortium of beings; 
whereas, moral status narrowly defined to mean the specific status possessed by beings such as 
ourselves bears the exact mark of what proponents of the ‗innovative distinction‘ define as ―moral 
standing‘‘. Analogously, in “The Idea of Moral Standing”, Christopher Morris distinguishes between 
moral status and moral standing, conceiving the latter simply as a specific kind of moral status. 
According to Frances Kamm, who espoused the broader sense and narrow sense distinction within the 
notion of moral status, moral status may broadly ―be defined as what it is morally permissible or 
                                                          
17
 We need not enter into the debate over what rights might constitute, i.e., whether rights are protected interests or protected 
choices. It is argued by many that even liberty rights are possessed by beings with recognizable interests-precisely to those 
beings to whom liberties could be of any good/use.  
18
 Christopher W. Morris ―The Idea of Moral Standing‖ in Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook 
of Animal Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2011) reprinted in Oxford Handbooks Online, May 2012. For a similar distinction between 
status and standing, see Allen Buchanan ―Moral Status and Human Enhancement‖, Philosophy and  Public Affairs 37: 4 
(2009): 346-381 Both think, moral status is a comparative notion. Yet moral standing mean different things to each: For 
Buchanan, moral standing is a basic mode of moral counting but for Morris moral standing connotes high moral status, and 
hence, in respect to that, Morris flips Buchannan‘s distinction on its head.  
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impermissible to do to some entity‖.19 On this usage, there are entities whose moral status has it that we 
have no moral obligation whatsoever regarding them; and, there are entities such that certain ways of 
treating them is morally impermissible. In other words, moral status does not necessarily signify the 
presence of moral obligations. Even in relation to things whose moral status imply positive obligations, 
according to the broader understanding, there can be no status regarding distinction between different 
ways of moral counting.  
For instance, when some environmental ethicists claim that we have duties to the ecosystem they rarely 
mean that those duties are owed to the ecosystem as such. It is rather plausible to think that not every 
life form count morally as strongly as to justify that I owe direct obligations to each of them. To 
reiterate, there is an established tradition in moral philosophy of distinguishing wrongful acts from acts 
that are merely wrong; however, the broader understanding of moral status does not appear to account 
for such a significant distinction in morality. Since moral status in the broad sense does not explain 
why we have disparate obligations towards dissimilar entities of moral concern, I think the concept will 
serve moral theory better  if we rather adopt a more restricted employment of moral status.   
This takes us to moral status in the narrow sense, which, following Morris, I shall alternatively call 
―moral standing‖. As Kamm defines it, in the narrow sense it may be said that ―an entity has a moral 
status when, in its own right and for its own sake, it gives us reason to do things such as not destroy it 
or help it.‖20 Two distinctive features characterize moral status in this limited sense: the attribute of 
being valuable in its own right and the behavior of moral agents towards it, precisely, they ought to act 
for the sake of the thing with moral status. Kamm then underscore that there is a distinction to be made 
―within the class of entities that count in their own right‖, such that there is a subset of which that give 
us reason to act for ‗their own sake‘. This distinction cuts across moral status according to (b) and 
according to (c).  
 A thing, say a work of art, may count morally ‗in its own right‘ in the sense that there are non-
instrumental reasons to constrain our actions towards it in ways that preserve and maintain its 
continued existence. ―But this is still to be distinguished from constraining ourselves for the sake of the 
work of art…‖, which would make sense only if the work of art itself could get some benefit out of 
continuing to exist; but, clearly a work of art does not accrue anything out of our behavior towards it 
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 Kamm  Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities and Permissible Harm, 227  
20  
 Kamm, ―Moral Status― in Intricate Ethics,  229  
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nor incur any cost/harm if we were otherwise unwilling to perform our respective obligations, for 
instance, if we were to gratuitously destroy it. In other words, the concept of benefit is hardly 
applicable to things of that sort, for they have no end of their own. These things can be damaged or 
destroyed, but since they have no ‗experiential welfare‘ they never get benefited nor be harmed by our 
actions. Therefore, moral status in the narrow sense excludes things that count in themselves but not for 
their own sake.  
Expanding on Kamm, further analysis, yet again, reveals that there is another distinction to be made 
within the category of beings that have moral standing. Consider, for example, a few adorable rabbits 
who found their way into your kitchen after having been playfully chased by a toddler who wandered 
away from a family camping site in a nearby animal sanctuary. For the sake of argument, let‘s assume 
that the only exit-door was accidentally slammed shut having effectively locked the toddler and those 
hapless rabbits inside the kitchen. Furthermore, both the child and the rabbits are total strangers to you; 
hence, the moral pull of special relationships bears no leverage in this circumstance. After a lot of 
chasing and running around, the kitchen is now defiled with stuff from cupboards and the refrigerator, 
resulting in a mix of spilled flour, cereals and pastries, emptied pack of juice and spilled milk  and a 
couple of smashed eggs spread all over the kitchen. And by the time you happen to arrive the situation 
had eventually deescalated into a friendly play with food; by each passing minute the rabbits and the 
toddler have grown fond of each other, although your kitchen has turned into a pile of mess.  
Suddenly, you recalled a recent warning from health officials about confirmed cases of Hepatitis E 
virus infection suspected to be spreading fast among the rabbit population. And, you are aware that 
rabbits often bite when they get excited. Consequently, alarmed by a deep concern for the toddler's 
welfare, you snapped, pulled out a shotgun and gunned down the rabbits. Your reaction might be 
extreme, but appears to be justified by an overriding prudential concern for the child's welfare. Had 
there been no danger to the toddler, the whole saga would have had a different moral spin; that is to 
mean, your action would be vulnerable to a strong criticism or, to the very least, there would be 
profound skepticism over the moral justifiability of your shooting rampage. 
I take it that, both the child and the rabbits have morally protected interests for the sake of which we 
ought to constrain our actions and behavior. Hence, both can be said to have a moral standing. Our 
preferential treatment to the human offspring, however, implies that we are making a distinction within 
the category of beings that have moral standing. But, why think the toddler's welfare overrides that of 
the rabbits'? One predictable answer could be that a human child possesses a higher moral 
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status/standing than a rabbit. For the purpose of this section, what is important is not whether a human 
child is indeed of higher moral status than an adult offspring of the so-called 'lower animals', but the 
important thing is rather the analytic distinction that such a claim brings into perspective. Both are 
arguably 'direct objects of moral obligation' in so far as 'in their own right and for their own sake' they 
give us reason to not do things that severely undermines their welfare. But the distinction comes down 
to whether the obligation we have is one that we owe it to them. Even the most conservative moral 
thinkers do often accept the idea that we have strong moral obligations towards other animals, but 
many reject the hypothesis that we owe it to them.  
The gist of the matter is that, not every moral obligation performed for an entity‘s sake necessarily 
implies that the obligation is owed to that entity in question. Analogously, being a ‗direct object of 
moral obligation‘ does not imply we ought to act for the entity's sake- which, in turn, is not 
synonymous with being the kind of entity an obligation is owed to.  
 
4.3.2 Contrasting the Four Senses to Moral Status 
The four senses to moral status can be contrasted along three dimensions: scope, distribution, and 
grip.
21
 I believe by contrasting these different meanings, we can distinguish the specific sense/s in 
which moral status can plausibly be predicated to human dignity.  
Scope: The scope of moral status narrows down as we go along from (a) to (d). Moral status according 
to (a) is expansive in scope; in principle, any entity whether sentient or inanimate may, at a certain 
point in its existence, qualify as a thing such that how moral agents treat it is morally important. 
Whereas, (b)‘s scope is limited than (a)‘s since fewer things count morally in their own right. At the 
level of substantive moral theory, controversy abides concerning what criterion of adequacy is 
reasonable to impose for distinguishing things that hold a direct and independent moral importance; but 
the gist of the idea of "counting in its own right" resembles what is aptly described by the notion of 
inherent value. Only entities with recognizable interests can be said to have moral status according to 
(c); and only a subset of what (c) denotes are the sort of entities that can be owed duties (d). 
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 Meir Dan-Cohen contrasted honor and worth along four dimensions: origin, scope, distribution, and grip.  I must say that 
the contrast I shall lay down between the four different senses of moral status is inspired by Dan-Cohen‘s brilliant analysis 
of the distinction between honor and worth. See his ―Introduction: Dignity and Its (Dis) content― in Waldron, Jeremy. 
Dignity, Rank, and Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2012): 3-10 
125 
 
Distribution: Adopting (a) is compatible with the notion that moral status maybe a matter of degree, 
hence distribution of moral status may be uneven or inegalitarian. However, within the category of 
things that are direct objects of moral obligation (b), moral status is evenly distributed; likewise (c) 
entails egalitarian distribution but may admit distinction in degrees depending on the substantive moral 
theory within which (c) is adopted. But (d) implies egalitarian distribution, and admits no distinction 
between high and low degrees of moral status. This is consistent with suggesting that (d) emerges as 
the highest end of a distinction in degrees of moral status according to (c).  
Moral Grip: (A) allows the distinction between high and low moral statuses, and therefore, reflects 
either a stronger or weaker moral grip respectively. For some entities whose moral status maybe 
derived from their use or symbolic value, and since symbolic significance may be granted or withdrawn 
over time, their moral force will be contingent upon their continued expediency. An object of value to 
humanity will have its moral importance diminished when its assigned meaning and significance has 
waned or gets redefined over time. Pursuant to (b), moral status is seem to be conferred to things based 
on what is constitutive to the sort of entities they are; consequently, the grip that this sense of moral 
status has on its possessors must be categorical.  
Moreover, moral status according to (d) clearly implies a categorical grip; but it is far from clear 
whether, according to (c), the moral prescription that require us to act for the sake of an entity with 
moral status would by definition have a categorical moral command. Unless one defends a radical view 
according to which all interests count equally and demand the strongest moral protection, which to my 
recollection not even advanced by the most liberal voices in the debate about the moral status of 
animals, there is little reason to believe that interest based account of moral status confers a categorical 
moral grip.  
Many believe that it is plausible to explain why some interests matter more than others by simply 
asking whose interests they are.
22
 Likewise, the toddler-rabbits example is precisely intended to show 
that our intuitions converge with regard to granting a relatively strong moral weight for an interest 
possessed by a certain being (say, a being with capacities for self-consciousness and rationality) in 
contrast to the self same-interest possessed by another entity (that is, a being devoid of those 
capacities).  
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 The obvious ordering of different interests aside, the most important issue here is whether assertion of degrees of moral 
status between two things A and B can be explained in terms of, and despite, comparable interests that both share.  
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Following David DeGrazia, one can think of two possible explanatory models that can illustrate why 
having comparable interests is compatible with a stronger moral presumption against harming a toddler 
than harming the rabbits: the two models are, the unequal consideration model (UC) and the unequal 
interests model (UI). For any given two entities A and B, UC denies that “we should grant roughly 
equal moral weight or importance to A’s and B’s (prudentially) comparable interests.”23 It is fair to 
say that not every pair of, nominally identical, interests are comparable in the relevant sense. For some 
interests have greater prudential significance to one sort of entity than to another from the standpoint of 
the entity‘s overall wellbeing, hence it is not appropriate to confer identical prudential value to a given 
interest in every conceivable situation. So to clarify UC, what we need is a prudentially comparable 
interest shared by humans and other sentient animals so that we can explain the case for granting 
differential moral weight to otherwise prudentially comparable interests of both. Consider experiential 
wellbeing: all things considered equal, experiential wellbeing can serve as a comparable interest shared 
across species. Probably the best example is an interest in the avoidance of suffering, which roughly 
speaking seems to be equally important to humans and other sentient animals alike. For the sake of 
simplicity, ignore the cognitive and psychological makeup of the sentient being which may profoundly 
affect the intensity and duration of the experience of suffering— precisely what Jeremy Bentham called 
'felicific conditions'.24 Also ignore the fact that no two entities have identical cognitive and 
psychological capacities; and furthermore, disregard the indirect effects the suffering of humans and 
rabbits may have on other individuals, such as families, rabbit lovers, and the moral community as a 
whole.  
Let us now modify our child-rabbits example: say you can avoid killing those rabbits but temporarily 
incapacitate them with a stun gun, causing them agonizing but momentary suffering. Whereas the 
alternative would be to leave them be but run the risk of letting the child catch Hepatitis while also 
having one of its finger slightly bitten by an overexcited rabbit, curable yet at the cost of painful 
overnight hospitalization. And assume that the nature of experiential harm in both cases is comparable. 
In spite of the presumption of comparable interests in not suffering, according to UC, there still is a 
stronger moral presumption for intervention in favour of a suffering child at the expense of the welfare 
of the rabbits i.e., the interest of the child trumps the self same interest of the rabbits. From the premise 
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  DeGrazia “Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?”, 187 (emphasis in original) 
24
   Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907; original 
1789) 
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that having comparable interests is compatible with differential moral weight, the Unequal 
Consideration model can underly that human beings have higher moral status than rabbits.  
The other explanatory model for proclaiming that (c) is compatible with the notion of degrees of moral 
status is called the Unequal Interest model or UI. It begins with the premise that, no two interests, of 
the same sort, are comparable in the relevant (prudential) sense. Unlike UC, the Unequal Interest 
model declares that comparable interests require equal consideration but prudentially unequal interests 
must warrant unequal consideration. As with UC, with UI a stronger moral presumption obtains against 
killing a human being than killing a rabbit, but for different reasons: the fact that rabbits do have 
recognizable interest in life notwithstanding, it is quite plausible to think that human beings have a 
greater stake in life in ways that justify significantly stringent moral protection. From a naive point of 
view, an interest in life is fairly comparable amongst sentient beings. But, when we contemplate about 
killing we think of the harm that death brings about instrumentally in terms of the opportunities it 
forecloses. So, we may ask ourselves: does an entity has long-term projects and relationships? Does it 
has a concept of the self and of the good life? Is it temporally self-aware? Does it has the capacity for 
morality? These are some of the central questions that we can ask, the answers to which may tip the 
balance for determining whose interest in life matters most. 
I think, both models for understanding degrees of moral status are likely to share a number of moral 
judgments, although each appeals to contrasting reasons for the moral judgments that they share. For 
instance, both confer higher moral status to human beings although many of our interests are also held 
in common with other sentient beings—some might even say, including our interests in liberty.25 On 
the assumption that what we want to do with our lives is objectively more valuable, on both models 
―equal consideration [of comparable generic interests] is consistent with a stronger moral presumption 
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  Similarly, it may be argued that not all of our interests are strictly instrumental (in the most technical sense of the term): 
our interest in liberty is a case in point. And I am inclined to agree with that. Nevertheless, restrictions placed on our liberty 
are more harmful than placed on rabbits or mice (if there is such a thing as mice's liberty), given the sort of (self-conscious 
and temporary self-aware) creatures that we are. This is also to say that liberty is more central to our, without having to 
espouse a strictly instrumental account of liberty per se. One may draw a thought provoking parallel with Ronald Dworkin's 
distinction between "well-being" and 'living-well". Our well-being is defined by the goods life has to offer or by what is 
denoted by the notion of the good life, writes Dworkin. Whereas, living-well designates the performance value, rather than 
the product that is the "completed narrative" of a life. Dworkin's "well-being"-"living-well" distinction is striking for putting 
into perspective a conceptual distinction between liberty and interests. If protected interests reflect well-being, so does 
liberty reflect living-well. Liberty attests to the notion that the "final value of our lives is adverbial, not adjectival. It [is] the 
value of the performance, not anything that is left when the performance is subtracted. " Ronald Dworkin, Justice for 
Hedgehogs, 197; emphasis mine. 
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against restricting persons' liberty than that against restricting mice's liberty.‖26 What this means is 
partly that, moral status according to (c) does not necessarily entail a categorical grip, nor does it imply 
egalitarian distribution.  
There is but a thin line that separates the Unequal Consideration model from the Unequal Interests 
model of (c). UC takes into account other morally relevant factors that may be triggered differently in 
each violation of independently identifiable comparable interests, whereas UI maintains that no two 
nominally identical interests are alike. For UI, the individual entity's stake in a certain interest is built in 
to the very concept of that specific interest; they are inseparable as for example, my interest in life 
includes all the opportunities a distinctly human life supposedly offers. My life and what I could do 
with my life are inseparable components to my interest in life, according to UI.  
I believe, UI obscures an important distinction between an interest per se and whose interest it is. By 
adopting UI one must also be ready to accept problematic normative consequences: for instance, since 
they have a greater stake in life children would have higher moral status over elderly people, a healthy 
person over severely disable person, a research scientist who may potentially discover a cure for cancer 
over a subsistence farmer, a man of thousand talents over a man with no worthwhile talent.   
UC, on the other hand, confronts a logical challenge, which is that it seems contradictory to declare two 
interests prudentially equivalent then confer stronger moral presumption for one over the other by 
appealing to moral status constituting reasons, whilst moral status is in turn defined solely in terms of 
interests. Besides, we have earlier established that, according to (c), being possessed of interests with 
independent moral significance is the sole ground for possessing moral status. Therefore, given how (c) 
is defined, we cannot have a consistent basis for distinctions in moral status using UC as an explanatory 
model.  
Nonetheless, I think that in itself UC is not as such a defective model for elucidating degrees of moral 
status; but it is rather the meaning of moral status in (c) that proves especially limiting for UC to 
operate. From that observation, two things follow: either we deny the purchase of (c) as a plausible 
account of moral status while retaining UC as an adequate interpretive model for distinctions in moral 
status or, following UI, simply consider those interests unequal in the first place while retaining (c) as 
an adequate sense of moral status. It goes without saying that, in the context of (c), UI appears to be a 
more attractive model for elucidating unequal consideration of roughly comparable interests.  
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  DeGrazia “Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?”,  190 
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I would, however, like to argue that (c) is not the most plausible sense of moral status that can 
adequately define human dignity and, furthermore, insist that differences in moral status which could 
help demarcate human dignity must be explained through Unequal Consideration model. One of the 
salient features of being endowed with dignity is the idea that dignity confers unequal, i.e., higher, 
consideration for the interests of its possessors as opposed to the self-same interests of entities without 
dignity. This presumption about human dignity sets the stage for the fourth sense of moral status. 
Finally, the fourth sense (d) states that an entity has moral status if it is owed duties. And, the question 
is: what sort of entity can be owed duties? Aren‘t all beings whose interests have independent moral 
importance owed duties? My view is that, being owed duties is inseparably tied to discretional 
authority or mandate, or moral footing if you will, to exact what one is morally owed to.
27
 It does not 
appear to be just a terminological convenience that this peculiar sense of having moral status is called 
moral standing. To say, then, that something is owed duties correlates to saying that it has rights, which 
in turn implies that it is regarded as a sort of being to be reckoned with.28 If someone owes me duties, 
that means he's answerable to me within the purview of whatever is contained in those duties. On the 
other hand, because of the duties he owes me, I am related to him as a person who has a standing to 
address him. 
Then again, some lingering question still remains: what sort of entity is owed duties? Morris and 
Warren argue that all beings whose interests have independent moral importance are owed duties, but I 
dispute that. To declare that an entity‘s interests command direct moral obligation is merely to claim 
that the primary reason we have for protecting its interests is for whatever the entity will presumably 
benefit from our morally constrained actions. However, this does not mean that since we have a reason 
to act for an entity‘s sake, our corresponding duty is owed to the entity itself-which would have in turn 
entailed that it has rights against us. I think, there is a sense in which a being's interests could be a 
direct object of moral obligations, but it is not owed duties nonetheless. For instance, anti-whaling 
organizations purport to vindicate their aggressive campaign against commercial whaling partly due to 
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 In a slightly different context, Peter Schaber introduced an interesting disctinction between ―normative authority― and 
―normative agency―- in the sense James Griffin understands it. Unlike normative agency, Schaber argues that normative 
authority is not strictly a capacity concept. It can be well understood analogous to legal authority or mandate, only that in 
our case the authority is conferred by moral principles instead of legal precepts. See Schaber, Peter ―Human Rights and 
Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder― Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17 (2014): 155-161, at p. 160 supranote 
4 
28
  On the relation between directional duties and moral rights, see Kamm, Intricate Ethics, Chs. 7 and 8 
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concern for the wellbeing of whales, believing that 'in their own right and for their own sake they give 
us reason to do things such as not destroy them.' I do not imagine that any intellectually sophisticated 
activist would reason from having an obligation to act for the whales' sake to the conviction that we 
owe it to them. That would amount to anthropomorphizing animal welfare. I believe it is more 
plausible to think that acting for the sake of an entity is meaningfully separable from thinking that the 
obligations to act are owed to that entity in question.  
 
4.4 High Moral Status and Directional Duties 
Earlier I alluded to the notion that UC can plausibly model degrees of moral status but only in the 
context of (d). But, since (d) supports a framework of moral status that is egalitarian in distribution, it 
appears to be inconsistent to talk of degrees of moral status within the category of beings that have 
moral standing according to (d). I also have indicated that prescribing to (d) does not preclude (c), that 
it is not inconsistent to think that (d) obtains as a natural progression from (c). In this sense, 
considerations of degrees of moral status and the process of discerning (d) from (c) are part of the same 
package. In fact, it makes more sense to say that all things with recognizable interests have moral status 
but only those with moral standing can be owed duties. That implies, the interests of those with moral 
standing sway unequal consideration over the self-same interests of others. It is precisely in this context 
that UC becomes a useful tool for modelling distinctions in moral status.  
Prominent writers who preserve the ascription of high moral status/moral standing to beings who can 
be owed duties  include Kant, Stephen Darwall and Jeremy Waldron (with one familiar reservation).
29
 I 
take it that being owed duties and having rights are, both intensionally and extensionally, equivalent.  
But, it is easy to confuse moral standing and the normative authority that it implies with another closely 
related concept- moral agency. Some insist that moral standing essentially presupposes moral agency, 
while others argue that one does not necessarily imply the other ; in any case, the position one is likely 
to take is regulated by one's understanding of the nature of moral rights.  
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 In Dignity, Rank and Rights, as well as in at least half a dozen articles he wrote about human dignity, Jeremy Waldron 
consistently advocates the idea that dignity is a ranking status and it is a legal concept primarily. In the aforementioned 
book, he noted, ―... moral philosophers tell us that dignity is a matter of status. But status is a legal conception and not a 
simple one.‖ (p. 14) But he is also suggested that the moral concept of dignity can be modeled on the way dignity figures in 
law. My slight reservation from placing Waldron‘s conception of moral status (and of dignity) on a par with that of Kant 
and Darwall owes to his strictly legal approach to the analysis of dignity as ranking status.  
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In very simplistic terms, being a moral agent implies that one's behavior is subject to moral evaluation. 
In a nutshell, it involves two things: the first is that moral agents are potential authors of actions that 
can be considered as appropriate objects of moral evaluation; and secondly, moral agents can be held 
accountable for those actions by imposing normative standards such as right and wrong, permissible 
and impermissible, or good and evil. A person can be outcome responsible without being morally 
responsible.30 Moral agency consists not just in the capacity to be the author of a certain outcome, an 
outcome that could be subject to moral evaluation, but more importantly it involves the intellectual and 
psychological capacity to make moral judgments about one's own actions.  
Certainly, all moral agents are the sort of entities who can be owed duties. Although not all human 
beings are moral agents, all human beings are owed certain duties nonetheless. Presumably, toddlers 
and clinically insane people possess high moral status as human beings, along with the respect and 
difference that it entails, regardless of the fact that their respective condition have ruled them out of 
moral responsibility. This supposed difference between moral agency and moral authority is pertinent 
in explaining the inalienability of human rights as well as in highlighting the inherence of human 
dignity.   
Kant and Darwall, for instance, seem to consider moral agency and being owed duties as two sides of 
the same coin. Both champion the view that moral standing can make a difference as to whether a 
being‘s behavior is subject to moral evaluation. For Kant in particular, whether a being can be owed 
duties and whether it is capable of morality are essentially two senses of the same question. In other 
words, moral authority and moral agency presuppose one another. Darwall seems to follow a similar 
pattern of reasoning as Kant.  
In any case, despite the dispute concerning the substance of moral standing, one uncontroversial point 
stands out: if having moral standing means being owed duties, it then goes without saying that failure 
to discharge duties implied by one's moral standing amounts to wronging him. It means a moral injury 
has taken place and that the moral injury is personal. In other words, injury to moral standing can serve 
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 Actions performed by a clinically insane person, a child or a sleep walker qualify as outcome responsible but not morally 
culpable. These are not actions performed by a moral agent (in the case of a sleep walker her moral agency is temporarily 
suspended), although the persons are causally responsible for the outcomes their actions have brought about- whether good 
or bad. A child is causally capable of bringing about a morally regrettable outcome without being morally responsible; for 
example, recently a news came from the U.S. that a mother has been shot dead by her two-year-old son who found a gun in 
her handbag. For the relevant distinction between outcome responsibility and moral responsibility, see David Miller, 
National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Ch. 4. Two Concepts of Responsibility.  
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as a coercion-legitimizing principle because it takes us beyond ordinary judgments of right and wrong 
to what is vaguely referred to as the morality of 'harmful wrongdoing' (which I prefer to call simply as 
"wrongful action").
31   
For the purpose of understanding the meaning of moral status according to (d), I identified two formal 
structures of 'wronging'. More precisely, ―A wrongs  B‖ can mean either one of the following: 
  . A violates B's rights, or A fails to perform his directed duties vis-à-vis B. 
  . A violates B's rights and in so doing adversely affects B's interests.  
The first does not require commitment towards a specific content of directed duties. But the second 
embodies a disquieting prospect of being partisan towards one side of the debate between choice and 
interest theories of rights. As I have earlier alluded to, not every instance of a frustrated interest is 
occasioned by moral wrongdoing. Neither, for that matter, a deliberate dereliction of one's directed 
duties necessarily involves adversely affecting a specific interest of the right holder and thereby 
harming him. For sure, failure to discharge one's duties to the other constitutes wronging that person, 
even in the context in which none of his interests are significantly frustrated. In this case, moral 
wronging is equivalent in meaning to the notion of moral offense. Some forms of humiliation that are 
merely symbolic expressions of contempt, but constituting insignificant or no foreseeable harm to their 
victims, fit this bill. Obviously, a simple violation of the right to liberty is the most striking example of 
what I'd like to call "harmless but wrongful action". The crux of the matter is that, by introducing the 
notion of 'harmless wronging' I can disentangle the notion of harm from that of wronging. One may act 
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  Harm is a tricky concept to pin down; it occupies a porous conceptual terrain. In ordinary usage, it is often entangled, and 
sometimes confused, with other concepts, such as ―wrong‖, ―wronging‖, ―offense‖ and ―injury‖. In the ordinary sense, harm 
is defined as ―the state of adversely affected interests caused by the other party.‖ There is but a broader sense to the concept 
of ―harm‖, which does not depend on  the nature of its cause. In this broad sense, it seems sensible to talk of a ―wrongless 
harm‖ in case adverse effects to one's interests are justified by a prior consent or if caused by non-moral-agents (like natural 
incidents or beings that cannot be held morally accountable). But in the deceptively ordinary, albeit normative, sense of the 
term, ―harm‖ refers to adverse effects to a person's interests or her liberty caused by wrongful actions. So, we have a 
broader, prudential sense and a narrow, normative, sense of the concept of harm. For an in depth discussion on the 'harm 
principle', see Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: (Vol. One) Harm to Others; and (Vol. Four) Harmless 
Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, 1988 respectively)  
Wrongdoing is another concept that also needs unpacking. Simply, moral wrongdoing constitutes doing something that is 
morally wrong. In this sense, doing whatever is morally prohibited falls within the purview of wrongdoing. But not every 
moral prohibition relates to 'harm to others', also not every wrong action is occasioned by violation of a 'directed duty', for it 
sometimes occurs due to violation of 'indirect duties' or duties simpliciter. Violation of a 'directed duty' is a subset of moral 
wrongdoing we may call "wrongful action  (moral wronging)"; and not all harmful actions are wrongful, (as the rabbit 
example aptly illustrates). Neither does every wrongful action involve harming others.      
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wrongfully towards someone who's in persistent vegetative state, but given what we know about this 
medical condition it does appear that in this state one's capacity for self-consciousness is severely 
diminished and thus it is unlikely that the victim would suffer.   
In as much as there are actions that are wrongful but harmless (in the technical sense of harm), so in the 
same way there are actions that are harmful, hence morally wrong, but not wrongful.
32
 It is important to 
note that the idea of personal moral injury is embedded in the very idea of being owed duties, but moral 
injury and harm do not necessarily correlate.  
This is therefore to say that it is more accurate to correlate (d) with wrongful actions than with the 
notion of harmful wrongdoing. It implies that (d) is compatible with one of the two most basic 
intuitions about human dignity—namely the notion that indignities are epitomes of wrongful action.  
First of all, being endowed with human dignity is not conditional upon any particular display of 
character or excellence; that is, dignity is not something that can be earned, lost or forfeited. It is rather 
a state of being (as opposed to a condition), as expressed by the catchy phrase- ―dignity is inherent to 
the human person.‖ It cannot be lost or forfeited, thus has a categorical grip on its possessor. Similarly, 
moral status is something that cannot be granted, lost or diminished over time. ―For example, if one's 
moral status makes it impermissible for someone to kill you, you do not lose that moral status merely 
because you are impermissibly killed.‖33 
Secondly, possessing human dignity entails a moral prescription for a distinctive form of treatment to 
humans. Analogously in ordinary language, a presumption for treating someone as a human being is 
sometimes used interchangeably with treating her with dignity; for instance, in the face of treatment 
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 Suicide, for instance, epitomizes a harmful action—for it leaves sustained and lingering distress on the loved ones, but 
perhaps  not wrongful. Under certain conditions, whereby the act of suicide is unprovoked by unbearable mental distress or 
a loss of any sense of meaning to one's life, but merely signifies a reckless act by a fully rational person, it is reasonable to 
say that that act of suicide is morally wrong. In response to such a wanton act of suicide, a stark moral condemnation maybe 
warranted. One can be harmed by someone else's act of suicide, but, all things remain equal, no one can be wronged by it. 
Certainly, suicide can be prohibited on the basis that it is harmful. And yet, provided that no one owes his life to another, it 
would be absurd if one were to claim that he was wronged by another person's suicide, notwithstanding how severely his 
emotional and mental wellbeing was battered by it. Suicide may, therefore, not count as a wrongful action. The point I am 
making is merely conceptual in that it proceeds from what we can logically derive (and must accept) from the notion of 
"moral wronging", on pain of contradiction.  
33
  Kamm, Intricate Ethics, 227. This distinction explains away Jeremy Bentham‘s polemic against Rousseau's famous 
declaration- ―man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.‖ Rousseau‘s claim makes perfect sense when paraphrased 
as: ‗man is born free, as a matter of status, but everywhere he is found in chains.‘ Man doesn‘t lose his status as a free being 
simply because he is unjustifiably placed in chains or in the state of servitude.  
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perceived to be unworthy of a human being, one might express her outrage with a memorable tirade 
from the 1976 movie called 'Network' exclaiming- ―I am a human being, God damn it! My life has 
value!‖ Here, two points are worth mentioning for: on the first place, there is such a thing as a violation 
of human dignity, and secondly, such a violation constitutes personal injury and therefore belong to 
what was earlier marked as "wrongful action". Obviously, controversy abounds the nature and moral 
stringency of prohibitions against injury to the dignity of persons. However, there is a strong 
presumption that violation of dignity is a subset of moral wronging that may not readily be ascribed to 
minor moral misdemeanours like lying or deception. Therefore, there is a strong moral presumption 
against  
My contention is that, absent a correlation between dignity violations and moral wronging, appeals to 
dignity merely signify a platitude with negligible significance in normative ethics. Corollary to that, a 
violation of dignity makes sense only if the victim is a sort of entity with a recognizable interest of its 
own. However, my assertion to the effect that a being with dignity must have a recognizable good of its 
own does not necessarily imply that every act of dignity violation must be aimed at undermining a 
specific interest of that being. For that matter, dignity violations often figure as severe interferences to 
one‘s liberty.  
To reiterate, I remarked that trying to explain degrees of moral status within the framework of (c) 
necessarily requires us to adopt UI, because only the presumption of unequal interests can justify 
differences in moral status where the idea of moral status itself is defined in terms of interests. 
However, UI is an inadequate model for delineating dignity constituting status from a lower moral 
status. If one were to adequately explain human dignity within the framework of degrees of moral 
status, one must employ UC as the fitting explanatory model. This is because, UC perfectly illustrates 
the essential moral difference that the possession of dignity presumably makes. Having dignity 
essentially tips the balance on whose interests count more than the self-same interests possessed by 
another. I think, the fact that differences in moral status in (c) cannot be modelled via UC indirectly 
vindicates why (c) is not an adequate description of human dignity as moral status. I would like to, 
therefore, reiterate my contention that only (d) appears to be consistent with uncontroversial intuitions 
about the concept of human dignity.34  
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  It may now be asked how do the other three senses of moral status fair when contrasted against  bedrock intuitions about 
human dignity? It, seems clear that (a) is immediately ruled out for the obvious reason that it is too broad to isolate entities 
that have dignity from those that do not, even if we withdraw the "human" out of "human dignity". Moral status according 
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4.5 Degrees of Moral Status and Human Dignity: Three Concerns  
In this chapter, I sought to make a case for two claims. First, I argued that (d) is the most adequate 
reading of human dignity as moral status. I also ventured on explicating human dignity within the 
framework of degrees of moral status wherein having dignity implies occupying a higher moral status 
without, at the same time, denying other beings from having some sort of morally recognizable status. I 
maintain that appeal to dignity is the most potent and stringent claim of moral status. This would 
simply mean, for instance, that claims of moral status according to (c) have weaker moral force when 
pitted against dignity claims. In connection to this, there are two reasonable concerns I should like to 
consider.  
The explication of human dignity within the framework of degrees of moral status may be resisted for 
at least three reasons. Some may fear that the talk of dignity as high moral status may have a 
disquieting prospect of reinforcing the dogma of Speciesism. This fear stems from a well documented 
human susceptibility for injustice, racism, bigotry and other forms of moral corruption; nonetheless, I 
do not see the trouble in ascribing dignity to entities other than humans as long as those non-human 
entities are of the sort that can be owed duties. Moral personhood is not an exclusively human trait, it is 
a normative concept not a biological taxonomy. Any entity can be owed duties in so far as it is capable 
of morality. Of course moral capacity is a loaded concept; we measure it, and correctly so, in terms of 
humanistic characteristics. It is often asked if an entity has a conception of the self, a minimally 
reasonable conception of the good life, psychologically capable of forming complex relationships, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
to (b) meshes well with the first intuition that dignity is inherent, i.e., constitutive to the sort of entity its possessor is, as 
opposed to being an acquired property of moral significance. But (b) lies flat when contrasted against subsequent intuitions 
about the nature of human dignity, particularly the one which states that dignity entails a set of moral entitlements and 
prohibitions owed to those who have it. I reiterate that, we should take seriously the distinction between an entity ‗counting 
in its own right‘ and it giving us (duty-generating) reasons to act for its own sake. I am inclined to think that (c) does not 
precisely capture the most distinctive feature of being possessed of (human) dignity, precisely the notion that dignified 
treatment is owed to those who are endowed with it. Since (c) merely stipulates that a being‘s moral status gives us a reason 
to do things for its own sake, in which case one may be duty bound to act solely for the good of that entity without having to 
owe the duty to it. An appeal to human dignity, on the other hand, presupposes that one is owed duties on account of being 
human; therefore, the notion of moral status consistent with dignity must contain a provision about duties owed to others.  
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if it is capable of a moral interpretation of events. These are humanistic, though nor exclusively human-
Speciesist, characteristics.35 
The second reason is the suspicion that, the talk of degrees of moral status may further obscure than 
illuminate the meaning of human dignity by stripping dignity off its egalitarian foundation. The 
difficulty is not in mapping where distinction in moral status begins but where it ends. One might ask, 
by admitting degrees of moral status don't we then, at the same time, unwittingly smuggle the notion of 
degrees of dignity?36 Consider the following alternative way of explaining away this concern: One may 
deploy a sufficientarian framework of degrees in moral status, and proclaim that above a certain 
threshold stands a high (but equal) moral status called dignity. Varying degrees of moral status may 
figure below a defined threshold based on purely prudential considerations, where as no distinction is 
relevant above and beyond the threshold requirement of respect for dignity. It must be underscored that 
dignity represents the (basic) minimal, not the optimal, moral protection. Accordingly, we can maintain 
an egalitarian notion of dignity without, at the same time, abandoning the parameters of high and low 
moral status.  
And thirdly, in determining whether moral status has a particular purchase to the understanding of 
human dignity, the adequacy conditions I deployed effectively narrowed down to one from four 
possible senses of moral status. In a way, it settles some disputes about the appropriate content of 
human dignity. For instance, it excludes (inherent) value conceptions of human dignity. 
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 It would be unreasonable, not to mention the arrogance of it, to assume that humanity is the only species (beings) in all 
possible worlds who are capable of morality. If intelligent and morally capable beings from another universe show up, we 
would not be justified to withhold moral status-hood from them. Moreover, some of our closest biological cousins do have a 
concept of the self. They probably are capable of a moral interpretation of events, for they seem to have a complex notion of 
fairness judging by their capacity to form and display what P.F. Strawson calls "participant reactive attitudes"; and they are 
capable of forming complex relationships, for some do possess a sophisticated moral-psychological makeup as evidenced in 
their responses to loss and separation. These ingredients are sufficient conditions for the capacity for morality. In the same 
vein, it is plausible to say that children are capable of morality. What is particularly astonishing is that children can have a 
deep sense of fairness with a tenacious predisposition and competence for a moral interpretation of events, although they are 
not (yet) moral agents in the strict sense of the term.  
36
 What if extra-terrestrial beings, with higher intellectual and moral capacity than us, set foot on earth. Would that mean, 
we ought to treat each as morally subordinate to them or grant that whatever their distinctive moral system may prescribe 
holds a firm moral grip on us even if it requires sacrificing humanity for the sake of these supposedly highly evolved 
beings? Doesn't that create a situation analogous to my rabbits-child example? However alarming the danger of being 
denigrated to a state of servitude by inter-galactic overlords may appear, if we assume that they have a higher moral 
capacity then the moral order they would establish cannot fall short of the minimal requirement for respect that our 
supposedly less enlightened morality upholds. If anything, a higher moral order should enhance and complement ours, not 
obliterate it.  
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Methodologically, some may have serious reservations with respect to how one can validly settle 
substantive differences merely on the basis of formal considerations. Clearly, deriving substantive 
arguments purely from formal considerations is a tall order. But I think that narrowing the meaning of 
moral status still leaves key substantive questions unanswered. There are at least three competing status 
conceptions of human dignity within the fourth sense of moral status (d). For now I leave the 
discussion at that because it is not within the scope of this chapter to discuss the different conceptions 
of dignity as moral status.  
Having shown that the above concerns do not pose a serious threat to an idea of human dignity 
conceived within the system of degrees of moral status, it seems to me that status conception is 
probably the most promising account of human dignity. In the forthcoming chapter, I shall explore 
different ways of conceiving human dignity as moral status while, at the same time, put forward the 
grounds for believing that status conception might be the most promising account of human dignity.  
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks  
This chapter was tasked to identify an adequate concept of moral status that reflects our settled 
intuitions about the concept of human dignity. At its very core is found the idea that dignity is a sort of 
entitlement the possessor of which does have a claim to. One of the basic entitlements that human 
dignity confers is that the interests of the being with dignity has unequal, i.e., higher, consideration than 
the self-same interests of others. This is a basic feature of human dignity that is far too often 
overlooked by scholars who unduly focused solely on dignity's egalitarian appeal. 
But when we turn our attention to the immunities it grants and the unique moral purchase that human 
dignity has, we get to have a better understanding of the need to interpret dignity as moral status. I 
repeat, dignity's unique purchase rests in the unequal and higher consideration it grants. The dignity of 
persons is reflected not only in the equal moral footing that each individual stands but also in the 
loftiness and high regard it affords those which have it as oppose to those which do not. That does not 
mean human dignity can be an instrument for inequity and oppression. Far from that, the point I am 
making is, the dignity of one's person is characteristically expressed when used to emphasize that 
certain things about the person are non-comparable. For example, a person's interest in life may have 
unequal or higher consideration than a rabbit's interest in life; but analogously, his interest in life and 
another person's interest in life have equal consideration in the sense that they are incomparable. In a 
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morally benign situation, sacrificing one's life cannot be outweighed by consequentially saving the 
lives of many others. By morally benign, I mean the person whose life to be sacrificed is not in any 
sense involved in the potential loss of the lives of many others whose lives cannot foreseeable be 
spared unless he is stopped by any means necessary. The point is, human dignity affords one the 
immunity for his core rights to life, liberty and basic interests from being weighed against another's. 
This is perhaps what is essentially conveyed by the talk of moral standing, i.e., to understand the moral 
standing of persons is to underscore their objectivity.  
The distinction between in-group incomparability and out-group priority is made sensible by 
acknowledging that distinctions in degrees of moral status ought to be explained via the Unequal 
Consideration model.  
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Chapter 5 
Human Dignity as Moral Status: Part II, Two Conceptions of Dignity as Moral Status 
 
In this chapter, I focus on two principal approaches at conceptualizing human dignity as moral status. 
In fact, there are three conceivable approaches: the traditional, contemporary and the archaic 
approaches. According to the currently prominent contemporary conception, human dignity is a sort of 
value peculiarly attributed to human beings and ―it is typically described with adjectives as ‗inherent‘, 
‗intrinsic‘, ‗inner‘, ‗absolute‘ or ‗incomparable‘.‖1 Whereas, the traditional framework is anchored in 
the familiar idea of honor as it was developed from the aristocratic conception of dignity as rank, yet it 
is invariably distinct from a very restricted virtue-ethical sense of dignity championed by the ―archaic 
paradigm‖. As its name indicates, the ‗archaic paradigm‘ is antiquated and is therefore largely 
abandoned in contemporary theorizing about human dignity, because it mainstreams, what Jeremy 
Waldron calls, condition-statuses into the moral baseline as if there were different sorts of human 
beings characterized by their relative conditions and positions in a hierarchical scheme of moral and 
intellectual excellence.  
Yet, moral status invariably presupposes the moral state of individuals in virtue of ―the sort of person 
they are than on the basis of conditions they have undertaken or fallen into. One's sortal-status defines 
the baseline from which condition-status might seem a lapse, change or deviation [or enhancement].‖2 
And human dignity designates an equal sortal-status, that is, it speaks of our permanent situation and 
destiny as human beings.
 
The archaic conception, however, advances the belief that there are sortal 
differences between persons based on certain conditions they happen to be in. Consequently, it reflects 
precisely what human dignity is not.  
                                                          
1 
 Toscano, Mauel ―Human Dignity as High Moral Status‘‘, The Ethics Forum, 6: 2 (2011): 4-25, at p. 11 
2
 Waldron, ―Does ‗Equal Status‘ Add Anything to Right Reason‖ New York University, School of Law, Public Law & 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series; Working Paper No. 11-52 (Aug. 2011) at p.10. I follow Jeremy Waldon‘s distinction 
between sortal and condition status. There is a sense of status ―that apply to individuals in virtue of certain conditions they 
are in‖ as a result of choice or happenstance, and there is a sense of general status in virtue of the sort of persons they are. 
―Sortal status represents a person‘s permanent situation and destiny‖ and it ―is not acquired or lost depending on actions, 
growth, circumstaces or vicissitudes.‖ That is roughly the distinction between condition status and sortal status. According 
to Waldron, against the traditional current of understanding, honor/rank when universalized can be a currency for sortal 
status; and I am inclined to agree with him. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank and Rights; p. 57 ff.   
140 
 
We must, therefore, discount the archaic understanding of dignity as implausible, and instead give our 
undivided attention to the other two, namely the traditional and contemporary paradigms. For 
simplicity, the contemporary view that dignity is inherently valuable status may be termed 'dignity as 
worth' and the traditional view according to which dignity is a high-ranking status may simply be 
called 'dignity as honor'.  
Some may, however, doubt the salience of worth as an adequate interpretive notion for moral status. 
According to Jeremy Waldron, for example, honor and worth have contrasting origins and, for that 
reason, they inhabit disparate normative settings; he declares that status is synonymous with rank and is 
primarily a legal concept while worth/value naturally dwells in a normative habitat naturally attuned to 
morality. Rank and honor have social origins, and their normative function is often codified in social 
and legal norms of a given society. Worth owes its genesis to conceptual frameworks that aspire to 
generate universally valid normative principles. Waldron is weary of a conception of human dignity 
that is anchored in value or worth, for he suspects that arguing abstractly from the value of humanity to 
specific normative moral principles governing how we ought to treat one another would unwittingly 
import questionable metaphysical view of the world or some doctrine of natural (moral) law.3  
                                                          
3
  Some attempts at justifing dignity as rank also draws on an ontological notion of stature. Human dignity is said to connote 
an elevated stature of the human species in the natural order of things wherein each entity possesses a distinct standing 
(dignity) befitting its nature. George Kateb‘s Human Dignity is a textbook example of a defense of equal dignity of persons 
on the basis of human stature; according to this understanding equal status of individuals is underwritten by human 
uniqueness. He writes, ―[t]he core idea of human dignity is that on earth, humanity is the greatest type of beings – or what 
we call species … and that every member deserves to be treated in a manner consonant with the high worth of species.‖ 
George Kateb Human Dignity (Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press, 2011): 3. Kateb argues that humanity is  unique 
in that it is the only species that can cultivate "inwardness". In human beings, self-awareness is a very complex process; we 
have the capacity for abstract thinking and we often inject our conceptualization of who we are into the perceptual frame of 
the world around us. Furthermore, a fully developed inwardness requires the capacity for language through the medium of 
which we can articulate and make accessible our otherwise parochial inner 'self-awareness' to one another, and make way 
for collective endorsement of some conception of the good life. 
But, equal moral status of humanity need not rest on the idea of human uniqueness. If beings from another galaxy show up 
with all the relevant traits for moral personhood, although biologically different from us, should we then assign them a 
dignity lower than we normally grant to human persons? I think, according to the status conception, it would be 
preposterous to do so. Of course, to say that 'all men have equal dignity in virtue of being human' is not a mere platitude. 
Being human is not morally trivial. For example, with Bernard Williams, one may say that being human involves the 
possession of characteristics that are morally relevant, without being concerned with uniquely human characteristics. In any 
case, status conception of human dignity is not parforce required to adopt a background notion of human stature, which 
usually, though not inevitably, lead to objectionable versions of speciesism. For more on speciesism and equality, see 
Bonnie Steinbock, "Spieciesism and the Idea of Equality"  Philosophy, 53:204, pp. 247-256; Bernard Williams, "The Idea 
of Equality" in Joel Feinberg (ed.) Moral Concepts (Oxford: OUP, 1970): 153-171  
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Meir Dan-Cohen highlights a companion point when he suggests, in his introductory remarks to 
Waldron‘s recent book which he edited, that differences in philosophical origins of distinct concepts 
gestures towards significant substantive dissimilarities. However, he contends that orienting the 
discussion of value in contrast with honor/rank yields a satisfactory analysis of the conception of 
dignity that each concept respectively reflects.
4
 He thinks of worth/value as a more specialized term 
whose philosophical usage departs significantly from what might be conveyed by its ordinary meaning; 
whereas, honor is employed for the most part in line with the its conventional meaning. Consequently, 
―[t]his difference in provenance of the two terms signals a more substantive difference in the 
conception of dignity they each designate.‖5  
In contrast to Dan-Cohen, Waldron suggests that honor or rank can be conceived in manners consistent 
with human dignity's egalitarian foundation. Despite the difference in origin between honor and worth, 
the dignity of persons that each designate can be rendered consistent with the egalitarian discourse of 
rights; nevertheless, honor or ranking status is more attuned to dignity's normative resonance in the 
human rights' discourse wherein both dignity and rights are conceived principally as legal concepts. In 
any case, Waldron does not rule out that there can be a moral analogue to the legal conception of 
‗dignity as rank‘; in fact, he challenges moral philosophers to seriously consider modelling their 
conception of dignity on the way it figures in law.  
Whilst Waldron does not want to fortify the standard view that, on the broader picture, there is an inner 
morality of law, he remarks that ―[m]aybe every legal idea has a moral underpinning of some sort; but 
it would be a mistake to think that the moral underpinning has to have the same shape or content as the 
legal ground.‖6 But if philosophers were to think of dignity as a status, it must take the shape and 
content other than what obtains by the ordinary usage of worth/value ―so that we do not have too 
simple a picture of dignity as a foundation.‖7 But on the other hand, he recognizes that the conception 
                                                          
4
 Although the parameters with which he contrasts worth and honor displays striking similarities with Waldron's  own effort  
at contrasting the two, Dan-Cohen deploys the distinction to challenge Waldron's preferred conception of dignity as rank. 
5 
 Meir Dan-Cohen ―Introduction: Dignity and Its (Dis)content― in Waldron, J. Dignity, Rank and Rights, 4 
6
  Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, 19-20 
7
 Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, 21 Waldron has gained notoriety for asserting that status is a legal conception. He 
contends, ―[…the moral philosophers tell us that dignity is a matter of status. But status is a legal conception and not a 
simple one…. So this is the point I want to begin with: it is probably not a good idea to treat dignity as a moral conception 
in the first instance or assume that a philosophical explication of dignity must begin as moral philosophy.‖ (Ibid, 14-15) On 
the contrary, I think, we should not assume that a philosophical analysis of moral status must be structured in the same way 
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of dignity as worth need not take up the ordinary-language meaning to value; he concedes, if value can 
effectively be conceived outside of its ordinary usage, it may accord with the idea of dignity as a 
ranking status.  
Elizabeth Anderson captures one facet of the distinction in value when she put forth a promising 
interpretation of Kant‘s Groundwork definition of dignity as 'value beyond price'. She employs the 
notion of ―commanding value‖ that seems to bridge the perceived gap between dignity as worth beyond 
price and dignity as honor or ranking status. Echoing Anderson and Oliver Sensen,8 I shall dispute 
Waldron's claim (which he later seems to retract) that it is conceptually erroneous to conceive of 
dignity as a status anchored in the notion of value or worth. Although traditionally the value conception 
is approached independently of, and often times in contrast to, the status conception, against that 
current, I think certain interpretations of ‗dignity as value‘ envelope basic ideas of what it means to 
have a moral status, such as the notion that one‘s value potentially generates directional duties.  
I must concede, though, that a sharp contrast between rank and value may figure in the legal discourse 
on human dignity and Waldron may be right on that score; but it is notoriously unclear as to what 
moral status precisely implies in normative terms and whether it should be modelled after the legal 
conception of status as rank or whether it is more plausible if conceived as value beyond price. It is 
towards that end of settling substantive issues that this chapter will be put to task.  
Initially, I was inclined to be more sympathetic to viewing the value conception of dignity rather in 
contrast with status conception per se; but I now should instead like to argue that some ascriptions of 
value essentially reflect the basic constituent of moral status, in that being inherently valuable generates 
directional duties. Moreover, both rank and worth can be fitted into morality‘s egalitarian framework 
within which the notion of dignity is to be found. 
After having established the salience of both rank and worth as adequate interpretive frameworks for 
dignity as moral status, I shall further explore whether there is a feature of ‗dignity as rank/honor‘ that 
peculiarly illuminates our understanding of dignity in ways that the value conception does not. Simply 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
as the legal analysis of status is structured. Similarly, simply because the legal conception of dignity as status is tied up with 
rank we must not be led into thinking that the moral conception of dignity as status makes sense if only moral status is also 
interpreted as rank. But there may be other compelling reasons to think that dignity as moral status and the legal conception 
of dignity as rank share profound commonalities that ought not be overlooked.  
8
  See Elizabeth Anderson ―Emotions in Kant‘s Later Philosophy: Honour and The Phenomenology of Moral Value― in 
Monika Betzler (ed.) Kant’s Ethics of Virtue (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008): 123–145; Oliver Sensen Kant on Human Dignity 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011) 
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put, the question is: does rank/honor confer a distinctly dignitarian content to some stringent moral 
prescriptions?  
I contend that dignity as rank is a more promising conception for it better accounts for the dualistic 
employment of dignity in the morality of rights, both as a status for having rights and as the content of 
some rights. Accordingly, some rights could be direct incidents to our dignity while as their content 
dignity is also a claim by which we exact respect from other fellow human beings. In respect to that, 
one may ask how do rank and worth relate to rights: does either way of interpreting dignity generate the 
same dualistic relation I presume to exist between dignity and moral rights?  
It has been argued that dignity serves as a ground/foundation for rights, as a telos or purpose for having 
rights, as a content of rights, a ground for directed duties (either to the self or others), or simply as 
constituting rights. Evidently, ‗dignity as rank‘ and ‗dignity as worth‘ relate to rights in quite peculiar 
and distinct ways; but when we ask which of the above represent a valid and which ones objectionable 
relation, the judgment is essentially a matter of substantive argument. We must enter into these 
troubled waters of substantive theory which we have left untested so far; to that effect, I take it that 
what Waldron calls ‗the retail use of dignity‘ may be of vital significance.  
To signal at the direction towards which we are heading concerning the stated substantive issues, I 
should say that my view gravitates towards the idea that connotations of honor and rank resonate with 
‗the retail use of dignity‘ both in rights morality as well as in humanitarian law. For example, ideas of 
high rank and noble bearing underscore particular norms that prohibit degrading and humiliating 
treatments. It is fair to say that what the ban on degradation is meant to bring about is treatment 
comparable or befitting to the rank of nobility- ―that conveys things like authority and deference.‖ This 
describes, in a nutshell, the view defended by the conception of ―dignity as rank‖.  
Some might see this as too simplistic a view, or perhaps reactionary in the most unflattering sense of 
the term, and may instead suggest that making sense of particular prohibitions on degrading treatment 
is incomplete unless we adopt a foundationalist approach which asserts that rights ―derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person.‖ Moral outrages against degrading and humiliating treatments 
presumably take the form of ―I am a human being, god damn it; my life has value!‖, implying that our 
essential value as human beings justifies, or nullifies as impermissible, certain distinctive ways in 
which we treat one other.  
Claims for a dignified treatment can sometimes be simplified in terms of the 'right's talk': "I am a 
human being (i.e., a being with dignity), therefore I have fundamental rights." The activity of claiming 
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rights, as a speech act, takes various forms and the above format maybe the most commonly used. But 
it proves no more than human dignity being a source of practical reason in the same way having a right 
is. The expression, 'you ought not treat me this way because my life inherently has value', is logically 
equivalent to saying 'you ought not do X to me because I have a right that X not be done unto me'; 
neither of the two indicate that rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.  
I would, however, like to state my deference to the view that prohibitions against degradation and 
humiliation are not strictly justified by, but rather constitutive to, our status as beings with dignity. This 
idea of "constitutiveness" explains the incident-content dualistic relationship between some rights and 
dignity while at the same time vindicates why status conception accords with basic intuitions about the 
notion of dignity than alternative conceptions do. I shall attempt at a consorted defence of the non-
justificatory view at the later stage of this chapter but for now it suffices to register my view on the 
matter.  
To dignify, in the ordinary sense, is to honor or to confer high regard and deference. There is more 
substance to the accord between the ordinary meaning of the expression ―to dignify‖, which is to honor, 
elevate or defer to, with status conception of human dignity. I, therefore, maintain that both the idea of 
status and the modern notion of dignity retain their shared traditional precursor- honor; but here, the 
status we refer to is moral in its constitution, not conventional. 
In the same vein, some proponents of the status conception sought to delineate status and value, 
suggesting that our conceptualization of moral status will be exact only if we preserve its conceptual 
alignment with honor, rank  or elevation. Following Waldron, they may argue that worth/value does not 
fit neatly into the categories of moral status. On the contrary, I believe this view is grossly misguided; 
as I have outlined in this as well as in the preceding chapter, moral status does not preclude value 
conceptions. Moral status may figure as value or worth, there is no conceptual barrier to that affect. 
Specifically, if conceived in the Kantian sense, dignity as worth accords with the basic idea of rank and 
honor. I am, therefore, skeptical only of the overall plausibility of a substantive conception of dignity 
as moral status wherein status is equated with value or worth in the ordinary sense, effectively 
excluding Kant's view of dignity from the reach of such skepticism. Nevertheless, I do also resist 
Kant's conception of dignity on other grounds. 
In the following, I explore the conception of dignity as worth as it figures prominently in Kant's moral 
philosophy. The upshot is that, both the Groundwork definition of dignity and the restatement in the 
Metaphysics of Morals share a common currency with the idea of dignity as a ranking status, sharing 
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striking commonalities than meets the eye to the point of rendering the worth-rank distinction a false 
dichotomy. But, despite meaningful resemblances, each conception still retains some feature distinctive 
to itself, which cannot be reduced to the other.  
 
5.1 Dignity as Moral Value 
Many scholars who propounded disparate substantive theories of human dignity nevertheless grant that 
to say that something has dignity means it has some sort of value. Value takes different forms and 
shapes admitting of plurality of meanings, and the question is: what sort of value is entailed by the 
possession of dignity?9 
It is important to distinguish the sort of value that dignity is from other kinds of value. To begin with, 
dignity represents a value attributed to a thing in virtue of itself, but there are lots of things morally 
valuable in and of themselves but will be absurd to attribute dignity to them in the same sense as we 
speak of the dignity of persons. Claiming that something has a moral value in virtue of itself is, at least, 
to say that it gives us reason for moral deliberation and action. In other words, (―any concrete 
dimension of‖) value generates practical reason (see Raz 1999 & 2011).  
Two points are worth highlighting for: first, the above description should not be viewed as suggesting 
that ―being a value‖ is an exclusive provenance of practical reason; there are other salient sources of 
practical reason such as interests, entitlements, rights and utility, each of which does perform a moral 
function. In other words, there can be ―demands of practical reason that do not have their source in the 
values that may be promoted [protected or, at any rate, treasured] by human action.‖10  
                                                          
9
 A difficulty more acute than plurality of meanings is the fact that a concept of value is deeply entangled with the 
substantive moral theory within which it is espoused, whereas an attempt to define value in terms untouched by substantive 
theoretical considerations will be undermined by lack of content therefore does not seem to be a promising starting point for 
a helpful analysis of the conception of dignity as worth/value. But there is another, better, way of making sense of dignity as 
value, that is, by doing away with the quest for a razor-sharp analysis of value and instead develop a preliminary account of 
the concept of dignity as value with which we can assess different views about its nature, grounds, content and normative 
implications. 
10
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/#ConValMorRea See  Korsgaard, C. The Sources of Normativity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Nagel, T. The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978); Nozick, R. The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); O‘Neill, O. Constructions 
of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Raz, J.  Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999); From Normativity to Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
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Practical reason, as a broader domain of what one ought to do, involves thinking about the desirable 
including the normative domain of the permissible. Both evaluative and normative reflections about 
what one ought to do respectively occupy the realm of the desirable and the permissible, each 
functioning within the purview of practical reason. Moral reasoning, as a subset of practical reason, 
predominantly pivots around actions governed by genuine normative constraints, presumably cashed in 
terms of ideas of permissibility, duties, entitlements, claim rights, powers and privileges. Moral ‗ought‘ 
is a function of norms generated in tandem with, yet vindicated independently of, a broader evaluative 
platform of the desirable (the good). It goes without saying that to live in a world governed by morality 
is indeed a very desirable state of affair; and yet, not every desirable course of action is required by 
morality, nor does morality sanction every undesirable state of affair as impermissible. Morality is 
often contrasted with prudential reasons for action the dictates of which undeniably have some 
normative force. Although moral 'ought' is not the only normative enterprise in practical reasoning, 
other things being equal, it certainly is overriding over other competing systems for regulating human 
action and behavior.  
This takes us to our second point, precisely that it is not immediately apparent as to what specific 
normative consequences do follow straightforwardly from the recognition of value. As a generic term, 
value/worth is not strictly speaking a normative concept, although it may signal the specific norms that 
aim to protect and promote it. Incidentally, declaring that something is of 'moral value' is an act of 
imbuing 'reason' for regulating our relationship with it. Propositions of value generate reason; that is to 
mean, declaration of value has indispensable explanatory power for laying out our reasons for action, 
as, for instance, the moral value of a sentient being supposedly explaining why one does or (should) 
incline to promote its welfare, including not causing gratuitous harm to it. Particularly, it is difficult to 
distinguish whether the normative consequence of recognizing something as a value is to protect, 
promote, treasure or respect it.  
However, there is a widely recognized sentiment that we can effectively insulate normative 
consequences warranted by statements of value in light of the source from which worth/value derives 
its meaning. In other words, satisfactory discussions about value conceptions of human dignity must 
touch on issues pertinent to how a declaration of the value of humanity derive its meaning from.   
Consider the following questions. What makes something, such as dignity, a value?  Does worth offer a 
sound interpretive framework for the conception of dignity that is universal in scope, egalitarian in 
distribution and stringent in its normative force? If defined as value, does dignity generate directed 
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duties? If it does, what sort of relationship obtains between dignity and the moral rights presupposed 
by, and correlated to, directed duties? Does the resulting relationship adequately reflect what is 
distinctive about dignity, specifically its ―retail use‖ in rights morality?  
By far the most promising analysis of value in general, and of the value of humanity in particular, 
comes from two distinguished scholars of Kant, which is not surprising provided that much of the 
recent discourse on human dignity draws heavily on Kant‘s ethical theory. These two authoritative 
readers of Kant, namely Christine Korsgaard and Elizabeth Anderson, wrote extensively about the 
structure of value in Kant's practical philosophy. It should, therefore, be noted that their analysis of 
value in Kant's moral theory sets the prevailing mood for our conceptualization of value in this chapter. 
So long as value conception of dignity remains inescapably entangled with its supposedly Kantian 
origin, I believe, drawing from these two authoritative readers of Kant is indispensable.  
In a nutshell, what they are telling us is that, if Kant is ever to be considered for a value theorist, then 
the notion of value must bear a very distinctive and technical meaning displaying little resemblance to 
our conventional thinking about value.  
Korsgaard introduced two analytic distinctions in value, which would help explain Kant's thoughts on 
'the value of humanity'. Anderson's work, on the other hand, sheds light on the role of emotions in 
Kant's moral theory with a specific emphasis on Kant's peculiar view of moral motives and how it 
figures in his conceptualization of the value of humanity. In the following, I will briefly discuss 
relevant passages from both authors, only to the extent that their respective expositions illuminate our 
attempt at understanding the nature of moral value and its specific exploits in the discourse on human 
dignity.  
According to Korsgaard, discussions of value frequently miss the point because they generally 
overlook fairly distinct conceptual terrains. She observes that value judgments come in two fairly 
distinct layers; from the perspective of the source of goodness (either internal/inherent or external to 
the object of value) and from the way we value the thing regardless of the source of its goodness. The 
source of something‘s goodness is either inherent, that is to mean constitutive, to the thing itself or 
extrinsic if conditional upon its relation to other things; but the way we consider it valuable, i.e., how it 
engages our will, is conceptually distinct from the source of its goodness. Question of the latter sort 
invites two possible answers: either the value something has is for its own sake (as ―final value‖ or as 
an end in itself) or the value it has for the sake of another thing with which it is related (―instrumental 
value‖). 
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In her essay- “Two Distinctions in Goodness”, Korsgaard sought to conceptually delineate the contrast 
between intrinsic and extrinsic goodness on the one hand and between final ends and instrumental ends 
on the other. These two pairs of distinction reside at two distinct levels of the ethical theory, although, 
incidentally, there's a tendency for each category of value at one level to correlate with another at the 
other level of distinction. For instance, intrinsic value often correlates to final value and extrinsic value 
with instrumental value. But such correlation merely signals a convenience of thought than a 
conceptually necessary connection. Correlation does not engender causation. Indeed, it is natural to 
think that a value inherent to an object commands us to treat it as a final end; but, beyond a convention 
of thinking that makes it appear evident to mind, inherence has no direct bearing on how something 
ought to be valued (whether instrumentally or as a final end).  Instrumental value is not necessarily 
correlated to extrinsic value; and, on the flip side, not all intrinsic values generate final ends (for 
instance, the value of money is intrinsically instrumental).  
―To say that something is intrinsically good‖, declares Korsgaard, ―is not by definition to say that it is 
valued for its own sake: it is [merely] to say that it has its goodness in itself.‖11 To illustrate this point, 
we may draw analogy with aesthetic value, which I believe takes up a similar structure to moral value. 
Here, one should not conflate the assertion that the value of art is essentially relational to how it is 
made with a recognition that its value is extrinsic. On the contrary, I believe art's relational nature is 
constitutive or intrinsic to itself in the same way the value of friendship is inherently relational.12 
But, how we value a work of art is entirely a different matter. We marvel at bewitchingly beautiful 
works of art, as there are purely aesthetic reasons for appreciating them. Yet, it is not utterly outlandish 
if we were to think that works of art enrich the advancement of some perceived human goods like 
happiness, mental health, or perhaps for some sort of desirable political or spiritual awareness, or 
maybe valued as a mark of civilization and of high culture.  
It is one thing to claim the source of art‘s value is internal/inherent to itself but it is entirely another 
thing to prescribe that art ought be valued ―for its own sake‖. One can value and treasure art as a 
vocation, and thereby engage in artistic creation for no end other than for the creative endeavor itself. It 
is exactly in this sense that one may declare: ―if you make art solely for the sake of money, it isn‘t art‖, 
                                                          
11
 Korsgaard, Christine ―Two Distinctions in Goodness‖ The Philosophical Review, 92: 2 (Apr. 1983): 169-195 
12
  I can consider someone, even an inanimate object such as a book, as a friend without him reciprocally considering me as 
a friend. But I cannot thereby claim to have a friendship with him unless there is a mutual recognition of the relationship. I 
must come to know that he thinks we are friends and that he knows that I know, and vice-versa.  
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or mildly put ‗the value of art transcends its market price‘. This may describe the appropriate motive 
that presumably animates the creative impulse of the vast majority of artists, but each individual work 
of art has no end of its own- that it does not benefit from its existence or in its preservation; thus we 
cannot value it for its own sake.
13
 Such a distinction aptly illustrates the absurdity behind this 
seemingly self-evident adage- ‗art for art‘s own sake‘. Despite its obvious appeal in romanticizing art 
as a noble pursuit, there is little substance to the adage that one ought value art for its own sake.14  
The point is, to say that art has its goodness in itself is not the same thing as saying that it must be 
valued for its own sake (as if it has the power to set ends for itself). A similar distinction also applies to 
moral values.  
Analogous, Elizabeth Anderson captures one facet of Korsgaard's two distinctions in value in her 
insightful analysis of value, its basis, and how propositions of value engage us. ―This is the fact that‖, 
claims Anderson, ―values appear to us in two dramatically different forms, as appeal and as command 
[MM6:379–80]. Appealing values constitute the domain of the good, commanding values the domain 
of the right.‖15 Appealing values engage our desire to want to fulfil or preserve them, whereas 
commanding values engage our will in a certain peculiar way, i.e., they constrain us. We act upon 
commanding values because we feel we must, in accordance with the authority of the normative 
principles governing them, whether we found them appealing or happen to feel like it, or whether we 
could psychologically bring ourselves to value them.  
Appealing values do not confer a fundamental motivation to be moral for they lack a constraining 
authority over us, although they can be objects of our inclination, needs or desires, and thus are 
                                                          
13
 We must not conflate art as a vocation, discipline, or at any rate as a human endeavor, with concrete (individual) works of 
art themselves, as if what holds true for the one would equally apply for the other. By ´concrete‘ I do not mean ―existing in 
a material or physical form‘‘; otherwise, I would have to exclude poetry, music and dancing from the household of art. The 
notion of ''purposeless purpose'' that Kant famously dubbed aesthetic experience in his Critique of Judgement, invariably 
serves to describe the aesthete. He may think of the value of aesthetic experience as the experience itself, therefore final as 
opposed to instrumental.  
14
 This is not to contradict the prevailing view amongst artists, nor to diminish their noble thoughts and aspirations about 
this fascinating vocation, to the effect that art‘s value is essentially a function of the interplay between the creative 
performance and the aesthetic worth of the final product, i.e., the work of art, in contrast to its market value. This sentiment 
is vindicated by the fact that a digital copy of Van Gogh‘s The Starry Night or a 3-D printed sculpture of Leonardo‘s David 
would have little or no aesthetic value. 
15
 Elizabeth Anderson ―Emotions in Kant‘s Later Philosophy: Honour and The Phenomenology of Moral Value― in Monika 
Betzler (ed.) Kant’s Ethics of Virtue (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008): 123–145, at p. 123 
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appropriate objects of what Kant aptly described as hypothetical imperatives. Commanding values, 
however, reflect the essential nature of moral obligations, as for instance articulated in terms of the 
demand to respect the dignity and autonomy of every rational being (GMS 4:428 ff).  
Now the question is: if dignity is a value, then what sort of value it is? Kant understands value in binary 
terms; a case in point is his assertion that ―[i]n the kingdom of ends, everything has either a price or a 
dignity. If it has a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is exalter above all 
price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity....‖ Price designates the value things have for 
us, based on our judgment of  how meaningful it is to pursue them, according to reason; whereas 
dignity represents the value of things beyond measure, i.e., the incomparability and inviolability, of for 
instance our own value.
16
 Things with price (or market value) can be measured, contrasted and can 
possibly be traded-off, as they constitute the things that make up the good life. Dignity, on the other 
hand, is something that cannot be quantified or swapped with an equivalent, that it is incomparable, 
therefore occupying a normative realm quite distinct from the familiar understanding of value in 
prudential terms, as a goal that's worth pursuing. In the passages where Kant defines dignity as 
incomparable value, the notion of value is redefined to connote a peculiar meaning compatible with his 
unique way of conceptualizing about morality.  
Price is attributed to things that are appropriate objects of our desire or inclination, and it corresponds 
to what Anderson calls "appealing values". This sense of value is strictly prudential, or it designates 
what Korsgaard calls instrumental goodness. For that reason, things with price do not generate 
categorical but hypothetical imperatives. Dignity, on the other hand, constrains our action in some 
distinctive ways towards those possessed of it. It is a sort of value that is an appropriate object of 
respect, that it is incomparable, therefore trumps all other things with mere price. In Korsgaard's 
lexicon, to be possessed of dignity implies being a final end as opposed to having an instrumental 
value.  It is, therefore, not without reason that one of Kant‘s formulations of dignity has it that 
humanity is an end.  
 
5.1.1 The Value of Humanity (a): Humanity as an End 
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 Things can be valuable for us in two different ways: prudential values that serve our interests, needs or desires, on the one 
hand and things we deem valuable (that we admire and appreciate) on the other- which Kant subsequently distinguished as 
market price and fancy price respectively. Consequently, Kant speaks of three kids of values, prudential (pragmatic), 
aesthetic and moral.  
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Consider the following passage from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals:  
 "[every] human being regarded as a person, that is, as a subject of morally practical 
 reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person...he is not to be valued merely as a 
 means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in itself, that is, he 
 possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from 
 all other rational beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this 
 kind and values himself on a footing of equality with them." (TL 6: 434-435) 
In the above passage, it seems evident that Kant's reference to dignity (as an absolute inner worth) is 
cashed in terms of two familiar ideas: One such idea is that, regarded as a person, every human being is 
a final end and must not be treated merely as a means; and secondly, possessing dignity is synonymous 
to the familiar idea that the moral law confers every rational person moral self-determination, 
encompassing the 'normative authority' by which ―one exacts respect for himself from all other rational 
beings in the world‖.  
Meir Dan-Cohen observed that one of ―Kant's great moral insights is the idea that moral content can be 
derived from purely formal considerations.‖17 For that matter, another fascinating attribute that imbues 
Kant's moral philosophy with unrivaled originality is his ability to embed peculiar meaning to moral 
concepts in ways that reflect a radical shift of perspective- quite comparable to his Copernican 
Revolution in epistemology. A case in point is what Kant says about "ends" when describing the sense 
in which humanity (menschheit) can be regarded as an end, which he evidently described not as end to 
be sought or generated but a "self-existent" end.  
In general, for Kant, an end is anything that "serves the will as the (subjective) ground of its self-
determination" (GMS 4:427). In practical life, each person forges a distinctive identity for herself in 
virtue of the values she thinks worthwhile to pursue, the goals she seeks to achieve, and through the 
guiding principles, norms and ideals that she deems constitutive to her personality. In this sense, an end 
would, for example, encompass the things in the pursuit of which one does by trade or inclination. 
Recognition of ends of this sort may lend itself to a normative requirement that any good that produces 
a perceived worthwhile life ought to be permitted, promoted and protected, to the extent that doing so 
would not involve harming others or obstructing them from the pursuit of their respective worthwhile 
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goals. And this very fact of having any ends at all presupposes "the power to set an end...any end 
whatsoever" (GMS 4:392), and ―quite apart from their content, attests to our own value, and so 
provides a foothold for a system of moral values designed to acknowledge this value and gives 
substance to this acknowledgment.‖18 Our value does not as such depend on the specific content of the 
ends we seek, or on the content of our personality essentially presupposed for the creation of any 
desired state of affair; our value must, therefore, be independent, objective and universal.  
Humanity is not a sort of end to be pursued; it is but, in Kantian terminology, a "self-existent" end. In 
considering, that is in treating, humanity as an end, Kant is not attributing to humanity the ordinary 
connotations of "end" but had in mind something akin to being a "self-originating source of reason for 
action." Humanity itself is not a goal to be achieved, notwithstanding the fact that Kant has cashed the 
'humanity in the person' essentially in terms of certain generic capacities for reason, both theoretical 
and practical. The core of our humanity is our rational nature, declares Kant. It encapsulates the 
capacity to set [intelligible] ends and the capacity to be governed by maxims or principles which would 
be recognized by all rational beings (universalizable maxims), ―that is, as a subject of morally practical 
reason.‖ 
The following excerpt  from Kant underscores the primacy of morals (value as an end in virtue of 
which one can exact respect) over axiology (the philosophical study of value as an end to be pursued 
and promoted). He writes, it is ―the moral law that first determines and makes possible the concept of 
the good, insofar as it deserves this name absolutely‖ (KpV 5:64). Moreover, the groundwork passage 
on the same topic highlights the same point, where Kant declares: 
 ―For nothing can have worth other than that which the law determines for it. But the 
 lawgiving itself, which determines all worth, must for that very reason have a dignity, that 
 is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the word respect alone provides a becoming 
 expression for the estimate of it that a rational person must give‖ (GMS 4:435-436) 
In his description of the ''kingdom of ends'' where he distinguishes a relative worth, that is, a price, in 
contrast to an inner worth, that is, dignity, Kant attributes the latter to various but interrelated things. 
For Kant, dignity refers to (1) humanity or rational nature (at GMS 4:435-436); (2) morality or the 
moral law (at GMS 4:425 & 435-436; KpV. 152; (3) persons as rational beings (GMS 4:433-34); (4) 
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persons as law-making members in the kingdom of ends (GMS 4:434 & 439-40); and (5) moral 
disposition or a 'moral cast of mind', as reflected by the will to act for duty's sake (GMS 4:435).
19
  
First, the Formula of Humanity prescribes that you ought to ―act in such a way that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means.‖ Then, in the Doctrine of Virtue (Tugendlehre), Kant reasoned: ―[F]or a human 
being can not be used merely as a means by any human being but must always be used as an end. It is 
just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in 
the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all things.‖ (TL 6:462; Sensen 
2012: 175) If, as Kant says, the dignity of persons consists just in the injunction to treat persons always 
as an end, then the justification for respecting the dignity of humanity must converge with the 
justification for the Formula of Humanity.  
As I have indicated earlier, there are two elements to Kant's argument for the dignity of persons; one 
that underlies the idea of humanity as an end, and the other establishing the normative authority of 
rational beings to exact respect from all other rational beings in the world. To that effect, Kant puts 
forward a number of arguments that are characteristically intertwined that it would be difficult to tell 
which argument pertains to the justification of humanity as a final end and which ones to humanity as 
normative authority.20 And it is for that reason that any critical appraisal of Kant's conception of the 
dignity of persons must take a holistic approach.  
That being said, there is but one notable argument attributed to Kant where he appears to put forth a 
specific argument for the idea of humanity as a final end. Korsgaard subsequently calls it the regress 
argument. According to her reconstruction of Kant‘s defense of 'humanity as an end':  
―[Kant‘s] idea is that rational choice has what I will call a value-conferring status. When Kant 
says: ―rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily thinks of his own existence in 
this way; thus far it is a subjective principle of human actions‖ (G429), I read him as claiming 
that in our private rational choices and in general in our actions we view ourselves as having a 
value-conferring status in virtue of our rational nature. We act as if our own choice were a 
sufficient condition of the goodness of its object…If you view yourself as having a value-
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conferring status in virtue of your power of rational choice, you must view anyone who has the 
power of rational choice as having, in virtue of that power, a value-conferring status…Thus, 
regressing upon the conditions, we find that unconditioned condition of the goodness of 
anything is rational nature, or the power of rational choice. To play this role, however, rational 
nature must itself be something of unconditional value–an end in itself. This means, however, 
that you must treat rational nature wherever you find it (in your own person or in that of 
another) as an end.‖21 
Two types of objective value emerge from the elucidation of the "regress argument": one relates to the 
objective value attributed to our subjective aims due to the power of rational choice, and the other to 
the unconditional, absolute worth of our rational nature itself. The most interesting point that the 
regress argument makes is that, whilst the formula of humanity regulates the pursuit of ends by 
identifying ends consistent with it as objectively valuable hence morally permissible to pursue, the 
formula does, in turn, emerge within the theory of values (ends).  
Furthermore, one can imagine broader implications of the "regress argument." For instance, it helps 
explain two defining features of morality as Kant understands it; these are the presumptions that 
morality is pervasive and that it is overriding. Morality is pervasive, that is to mean, ―[f]or nothing can 
have worth other than that which the [moral] law determines for it‖, there is no sphere in practical life 
wherein moral norms do not apply; and it is overriding in the sense that mandatory moral prescriptions, 
such as the requirement to treat humanity as an end, cannot be defeated by any amount of goods that 
may otherwise be realized by refusing to perform the action prescribed by the moral law.  
 
5.1.2 The Value of Humanity (b): Dignity as Normative Authority 
Stephen Darwall states that, for Kant, normative authority is a key presupposition for having any set of 
moral obligations at all. The notion of normative authority has two facets: on the one hand, it expresses 
the prerogative each person has to self-legislate and self-impose duties upon himself, which I shall call 
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'moral self-determination', and, on the other hand, it expresses the authority or moral jurisdiction one 
possesses in order to hold others to account for how they treat him. Moral self-determination and the 
'authority to demand' are two sides of the same coin, as Kant construed them.  
―I am under obligation to others", argues Kant, "only insofar as I at the same time put myself under 
obligation, since the law by virtue of which I regard myself as being under obligation proceeds in every 
case from my own practical reason‖ (TL 6:417- 418). Similarly, each person must regard himself "as a 
person who has duties that his own reason lays upon him" (TL 6: 435) He adds, "[b]ut the self-
imposition seems to be the result of the fact that the [moral] law is one that constitutes the very nature 
of the will."22 In other words, moral obligation is constitutive, not antithetical, to our freedom; it 
reflects rather than constrains the very nature of the autonomy of persons. One, therefore, exercises his 
normative authority (in this sense, his moral self-determination) when he imposes duties upon himself 
according to reason.  
Analogously, the legitimate claim I may have on others must at the same time proceed from their own 
practical reason. For, according to the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative, I ought to ―act 
only according to the maxim through which [...] [I] can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law.‖ As my practical reason must proceed from the standpoint of the universal moral law, so 
must everyone else's.  
The idea that rational persons must justify their treatment of each other to each other is a further 
extension of the injunction to act according to the maxim so that one's will becomes a universal law. 
Such a maxim is substantively equivalent to saying- "we [ought to] accept and comply with moral 
demands we think it sensible (reasonable) to make on everyone from the shared standpoint of a 
community of equal free and rational persons."23 If I demand that others respect my person, I must at 
the same time will that it should become a universal law. This disposition comports with Kant's general 
assertion regarding the principle of respect, in which he states that ―[e]very human being has a 
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legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human being and is in turn bound to respect every other‖ 
[TL 6:462].
24
  
Duties of (mutual) respect require us to constrain our attitudes and behavior in ways that comport with 
the recognition of the dignity of persons, that is, as beings who can set their own ends according to 
reason, who possesses "the quality of being [one's] own master (sui iuris)", whose agency is above all 
price, whose self-esteem must not be sacrificed for the pursuit of the ends of others or even to his own 
ends, and who stand on a foothold of equality with every other human being. The necessary attitude of 
respect entails the recognition of "a human being beyond reproach (iusti), since before he performs any 
act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone."(TL 6:238).  
When elaborated as such, the mandatory respect fitting to dignity is akin to what Stephen Darwall calls 
"recognition respect". Simply put, ―we respect something in the recognition sense when we give it 
standing (authority) in our relation to it.‖ 25 In particular, respect for the dignity of persons must consist 
in recognizing each person's standing or authority to address demands as persons to other persons. The 
"humanity in our person", writes Kant, "is the object of the respect which [we] can demand from every 
other human being, but which [we] must also not forfeit" (TL 6: 435).26 
On the one hand, the value of our humanity entails directional duties that we owe to each other, and for 
which we exact respect from one another, and on the other hand, "[c]onceived in Kantian terms as 
"common laws" for a "kingdom of ends"..., moral requirements structure and give expression to the 
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distinctive value that persons equally have: dignity, a "worth that has no price''."27 Moral requirements 
reflect our dignity or authority "even when the content of those demands extends beyond the treatment 
of persons", but "we respect our dignity as persons more specifically when the demands concern how 
we must treat one another."28 
Kant has repeatedly emphasized that dignity generates duties of ''respect", where respect is  in turn 
defined as a becoming expression for the dignity of persons. What, then, is the normative relation 
between respect and dignity? Respect for the dignity of persons manifests in various ways: we respect 
someone's dignity when we respect the rights that are constitutive to his dignity, specifically rights 
pertaining to the treatment of him as an end, in addition to those rights protecting his normative 
authority. The list would surely include the right not to be subjected to degrading, dehumanizing and 
humiliating treatments, as in the case of slavery and torture. In regard to that, respect resembles what 
Michael Rosen aptly calls "respect-as-respectfulness"- "which has to do with avoiding the imposition 
of specifically dignitary harms like insulting and degrading treatment."29  
Thomas Christiano captures the essence of respect for dignity when he writes, ―there is a mandatory 
quality to the relation of attitude to dignity.‖ The rights stipulated as paradigmatic violations of dignity 
typically concern with expressive or symbolic harms, although the violation of some of those rights 
does involve more than just the violation of dignity. In Kant, there is a distinctive logic that 
characterizes the relation of the attitude of respect to dignity. Drawing from Thomas Christiano, we can 
describe it as: ―[t]he idea is that the relation of the attitude of respect [...] to things with dignity […] is a 
mind to world direction of fit. In contrast, the relation of desire to things is a world to mind direction of 
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fit.‖30 That is to mean, our attitude of respect [to the thing with dignity] must be suited to the value that 
is already represented in the world. Whereas, our desire for the good need not necessarily correspond to 
the world as it is, for we may be justified in calling for a change in the world so that the world we live 
in shall reflect our aspirations, i.e., the desires and wishes in the mind, according to a broader 
framework of the good life. Christiano likens the correspondence between respect and the way the 
world is to the manners in which belief must comport with reality (in order to be justified). Respect for 
the dignity of persons should not presuppose a world other than the one we live in any more than a 
belief in unicorns can be justified by the contemplation of a conceivable world in which unicorns might 
be real. The point is simply that man has to be respected in society at least in equal measure as the 
treatment he would be entitled in the state of nature; but this is not an argument against striving to 
change oneself and the world to the better.   
Respect is to dignity in the same way admiration is a fitting response to praiseworthiness; both involve 
the notion that something is due to the person possessing the corresponding traits. The only difference 
is that praiseworthiness or esteem is principally governed by principles of propriety and decency than 
by some norm a moral agent is required to behold. It is indeed a character defect if a person refuses to 
grant esteem /appraisal respect to a person of merit. The person who‘s unmoved by merit may 
deservedly be branded as boorish and uncharitable but that, nonetheless, is not a moral defect. But 
failure to respect a person's dignity, regardless of whether he‘s meritorious or otherwise, indicates a 
moral defect on the part of the person who disinclines to accord respect. Christiano sums it up thus: 
―Goodness gives us adequate reason to desire but not sufficient reason. Dignity gives us mandatory 
reasons to respect and merit gives us sufficient reason to admire [esteem or accord appraisal 
respect].‖31  
To respect is to defer, honor or venerate,32 and according respect to others is ―to be understood as the 
maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person, and so as to respect in 
the practical sense‖, a duty ―strictly speaking only a negative one‖ (TL 6:449). Kant stipulates three 
                                                          
30
 Thomas Christiano “Two Conceptions of The Dignity of Persons’’, 103 
31
 Thomas Christiano, “Two Conceptions of The Dignity of Persons’’, 103 
32
 Kant contrasts Reverentia, a subjective feeling of respect, with Observantia or respect in the practical sense, a form of 
respect that follows from the agent‘s maxim. The duty of respect primarily concerns Observantia, although acting from the 
duty of respect invariably involves the phenomenal sense of respect, i.e. Reverentia. So far as I can see, what Kant meant is 
that, although not constitutive to it, Reverentia is not antithetical to Observantia.  
159 
 
specific vices that typically violate the duty of respect: arrogance, defamation and ridicule. Committing 
one of these three vices involves arrogating to oneself, and the likes of oneself, greater ‗self-esteem‘ 
simply by demanding others ―think little of themselves in comparison with [one]‖ (TL 6:465). Holding 
others in contempt (arrogance or self-conceit), or disseminating information about others that induces 
public disrepute (defamation) for the purpose of pure gloating at their disgrace while rendering them 
objects of mockery and derision (ridicule), for Kant, constitute paradigmatic disrespects to their 
dignity. Many instances of degrading and humiliating treatments, for example, epitomize familiar ways 
of committing these three vices.  
Self-conceit, declares Darwall, is ―a fantasy about second-personal status‖.  He adds, it is a pretence as 
if one has dignity independently of the universal moral law; a self-conceited person violates the 
formula of humanity by making an exception for himself  ―as if one‘s own will is a source of normative 
reasons (and is so uniquely)‖ while treating others as if they lack the same standing.33  
Darwall on Dignity as Moral Authority. Before bringing this section to a close, I should like to say few 
things about ''dignity as moral authority'' as particularly conceived by Darwall. Although admittedly his 
authority-based conception of morality is deeply rooted in Kantian constructivism, his view differs 
from Kant in a number of ways. In the first place, Darwall considers moral authority as an adequacy 
condition for testing whether a subjective moral demand carries genuine obligation. When an addresser 
advances a claim over the things she has discretionary authority, Darwall argues, she must at the same 
time impose a subjective test for legitimacy, that is, "[s]he must think that her addressee has the same 
basic authority to blame himself that she has to blame him."34 Consequently, Darwall infers that moral 
obligations are grounded in that authority.  
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I think, being possessed of dignity includes, what one might declare with Feinberg as, the capacity ―to 
look others in the eye and to feel in some fundamental sense the equal of everyone‖.35 In addition, I 
believe that Feinberg‘s forthright identification of dignity with the capacity and standing to claim 
something as one‘s due is very close to the theory of human dignity that I defend as plausible, but it 
needs further elaboration. Darwall's seems to hold a similar view when he later advances a more 
expansive interpretation of the dignity of persons. He writes, 
―The dignity of persons…is the complex whole that comprises all three of the following: the 
substantive mandatory norms regarding conduct toward persons, the standing to demand 
compliance with these as one among mutually accountable equals, and valid demands that are 
grounded in this authority.‖ (Darwall 2006: 244) 
The conviction that dignity grounds moral obligations obtains from the above expansive reading of 
dignity, but only on the assumption that substantive mandatory norms presuppose second-personal 
authority. Arguing as such, Darwall demonstrates that the grounding of moral obligations and the 
stipulation of substantive norms protecting dignity or moral standing are part of the same package. My 
concern with Darwall's view is not that it leaves out some legitimate claims of respect for dignity; 
instead, I should like to challenge his theory on the grounds that it shows too much. What I am 
concerned is a particular problem I'd like to call 'trivialization of the concept of dignity'. On the premise 
that violation of a right also affronts the ground on which it stands, Darwall's theory leads to an absurd 
conclusion that every violation of rights is at the same time a violation of dignity.   
Suppose, for example, a rowdy person steps unbidden on my foot. Although I do have a legitimate 
reason to think my personal space invaded and my authority over what others could do with my foot 
undermined, I think it be trivializing dignity if I were to cry foul over this incident as a violation of my 
dignity especially if I could simply protest into having him remove his foot. Violating my dignity 
involves more than a simple act of stepping on my foot, it has to do with the manners in which he does 
that and the correlating intentions and attitudes involved within such a blatant invasion to my bodily 
integrity. This is not to say that his simple act of stepping on my foot is not morally blameworthy, it 
certainly is if intentional. Respect for persons certainly includes that others not step unbidden on my 
foot, but my concern is that if combined with "the conceptual point that dignity requires respect for 
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persons—these [considerations] might lead one to conclude that dignity is the foundation of all rights 
and of almost all important duties that we owe to other people."36  
There is a rather distinct thin-line that separates the generic notion of 'respect for persons' from 
respecting their dignity. Dignity requires respect for persons; but respect for persons inscribes a wide 
variety of duties, some of which are certainly fundamental as respect for the dignity of persons. One 
may, with Jeremy Waldron, state that "[d]ignity is not the whole story of what we most fundamentally 
owe to others; it is not the whole story of the wrongness of killing, for example, nor...is it the whole 
story of the wrongness of torture."37And I am inclined to agree with that.  
Finally, I must say that both Kant and Darwall have defended theories that sufficiently meet the two 
conditions for an adequate status conception of human dignity: that is, both reflect the idea that dignity 
implies duties owed to persons and those duties are egalitarian in distribution (though some scholars 
argue that Kant restricts the attribution of dignity only to a subset of the human species, i.e., to ―rational 
persons‖).38 Despite their enormous potential in becoming sound theories, both conceptions of dignity 
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 Waldron, Dignity, Rank and Rights, 143 But Waldron went too far when he strikes accord with Michael Rosen's acute 
declaration that "[t]he worst of what the Nazi state did to the Jews was not the humiliation...; it was to murder them." I think 
the worst thing was not the murder but the cruel and inhuman treatment that accompanied it. What weighs heavily on our 
moral sensibilities is that, in life, they were herded like animals or worse as mere things (obstacles) to be discarded, and in 
death, as human embodiments of a plague so to be casted into the oven.  
Moreover, dignity resonates with the idea of respect-as-respectfulness. A profound erosion of the sense of respect-as-
respectfulness usually opens the door for violent behaviour towards others such as murdering them. This connection is 
present at the level of moral psychology, but not, par force, in the normative sense.  
38
 In the Tugendlehre passage, there is a smooth transition from Groundwork abstraction of ‗humanity in the person‘ to 
every human being. I believe this transition dispels long held suspicions that Kant might have excluded a significant number 
of human beings, who may not qualify as fully rational persons, from moral protection of the highest order. For an argument 
critical of Kant‘s supposedly restricted view of the dignity of person, see Doris Schroeder ―Human Rights and Human 
Dignity: An Appeal to Separate the Conjoined Twins‖ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15: 3 (June 2012): 323-335 
For every ―human being regarded as a person, that is the subject of a morally practical reason...possesses a dignity…by 
which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world… Humanity in his own person is the object 
of the respect which he can demand from every other human being, but which he must also not forfeit.‖ (TL 6: 434-435) As 
rational beings, everyone has humanity; but it is a mistake to assume that, within Kant's moral theory, the humanity in the 
person is a metaphysical property garnered from another plain of existence colouring our ordinary humanness (akin to 
Plato‘s vision of the ―intelligible world‖). Instead, the noumenal self is simply the dimension of man ―as an ideal, as he 
ought to be and can be, merely according to reason‖ (Vigil 27:593). Furthermore, respect is a prerogative of the status of 
humanity accorded ―to even a vicious man as a human being; I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in 
his equality as a human being, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it.‖ (TL 6:462-463) 
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fall a little short, as they appear to reinforce the proliferation of the talk of dignity in recent moral 
discourses. In particular, Darwall conceives of respect for dignity neither with the gravitas nor with the 
sense of urgency distinctively attributed to it, despite his expressed intent to the contrary.  
 
5.2 Dignity as Universalized Rank   
At the outset of this chapter I stated that there are two major ways of conceiving dignity as moral 
status. One begins with the idea that dignity is some sort of value, qualified as inherent, incomparable 
or absolute. On this view, the dignity of something has come to mean its moral worth due to properties 
inherent to it. It has its origins in Kantian moral philosophy, which also has inspired the predominant 
paradigm in contemporary human rights theorizing; worth engenders a framework of conceptualizing 
about human dignity I described as "the contemporary paradigm". However, as our discussion in the 
previous section has indicated, Kant's own view betrays the basic tenets of the contemporary paradigm 
and is instead found to be more compatible with the idea of dignity as rank or honor.  
On the second view, dignity is essentially attached to rank or elevation, a position conveniently termed 
"dignity as honor".  Dignity as honor sourced two conceptual frameworks, the archaic and traditional 
paradigms. The archaic paradigm preserves the hierarchical nature of rank and honor within which 
dignity emerges as an evaluative concept signifying inward and outward expression of comportment 
and noble bearing. Obviously, in this sense, dignity retains the status accorded to royalty or nobility: 
one of the entries to dignity in the Oxford English Dictionary has it that dignity connotes "befitting 
elevation of aspect, manner or style;...stateliness, gravity."39 We still routinely use dignity to describe 
how well some people comport themselves, and also to judge some people's unseemly public display of 
character.  
Jeremy Waldron observes that ―[s]uch an attachment of dignity with old concepts of noble rank and 
hierarchy may appear to beget [...] objections. One objection would be the difficulty of instilling 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
On the other hand, critics of Kant often speak of Hitler as an epitome of persons who may have lost or forfeited their dignity 
on account of their despicable deeds, effectively undermining the thesis that dignity is inalienable. Although this shows that 
dignity has an inward dimension that the individual ought to uphold and expressively live up to, it shouldn't be blurred into 
the modern normative aspect of the idea. Evidently, the pre-modern attitudes of honor and self-bearing are built into the idea 
of dignity which has benignly survived in present day idea of coolness. But, Kant's idea is that, whether the person carries 
herself with some modicum of self-control, she is entitled to a respect that belongs to her in her equality as a human being. 
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  Quoted  in Waldron, 2012. p. 21 
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outdated indicator of social inequality into our modern egalitarian framework."
 40 
For we consider it 
constitutive to our modern notion of human dignity that conditional differences of status have no place 
for defining our basic equality as human beings. Almost no one thinks that one has differential claim to 
dignity relative to his fortunes of birth, social standing or comportment abilities. That does not mean, 
retorts Waldron, that "appeals to rank always come in the way of egalitarian aspirations unless we eject 
elements of rank and elevation out of the concept of dignity."41 Against these currents of contemporary 
theorizing wherein human dignity is considered to be divorced from any connotations of rank and 
elevation, but regarded as an attribute of a human being as he is found in nature bereft of any 
hierarchical order of human convention, Waldron insists that dignity "has roots in the thick reality of 
historically existing schemes of rank and nobility.‖42  
But, two sceptical responses may be posed against Waldron's declaration that rank is an adequate 
interpretive framework for human dignity. On the one hand, one might ask: isn't appeal to rank 
precisely what the archaic conception defends? Waldron would say, not necessarily. This is because 
appeals to rank do not necessarily suggest inegalitarian conception of dignity; rank is not conceptually 
opposed to the idea of basic equality. In other words, conceived as a rank dignity can still maintain its 
egalitarian underpinnings, Waldron argues: "the notion of human dignity involves an upwards 
equalization of rank, so that we now try to accord to every human being something of the dignity, rank 
and expectation of respect that was formerly accorded to nobility."43  
Secondly, it may be argued that Waldron simply kept rank in name only while in substance the upward 
equalization means nothing more than an affirmation that Dignity's ancient connection with noble rank 
has been superseded. If we consider, for example, legal provisions on dignity in the human rights 
discourse, we get the notion that dignity is tied to a blanket denial that humans have inherent ranks. 
Dignity is equated rather with the abolition than with the institution or restitution of rank. Not only in 
morality but also, and more distinctively, in law, basic status differences have long been abandoned. So 
one may rhetorically ask- "why then retain the notion of rank?" In response to that Waldron contends, 
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 Jeremy Waldron ―Dignity and Rank‖ European Journal of Sociology,  48: 2 (August 2007): 201-237 
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 Waldron Dignity, Rank and Rights, 2 
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 Jeremy Waldron “Dignity and Rank”, 230 
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 Dignity, Rank and Rights, 33 Undoubtedly, there are some aristocratic privileges that cannot be universalized either 
because they signify unjust practices, as for example the Roman notion of Dominium in ownership which includes serfs and 
slaves, or because when extended some will change their fundamental character.  
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"this ranking sense of "dignity" offers something more to an egalitarian theory of rights than meets the 
eye."44 Evidently, with respect to the significant number of norms that regulate our practical life, both 
in law as well as in morality, ranking status has indeed become obsolete; but "as far as dignity is 
concerned the connotation of ranking status remained, and that what happens was that it was 
transvalued rather than superseded."45 
In order to flesh out Waldron's reasoning for the idea of dignity as rank, a few remarks need making in 
regard to what is distinctive about the notion of ranking status that Waldron has in mind. The first is 
that, for Waldron status is principally a legal idea, albeit a dynamic one. He writes, ―status is a legal 
condition characterized by distinctive rights, duties, liabilities, powers, and disabilities.‖46 And 
secondly, status does not merely envelop rights and privileges, for it adds a further fact: it is not just an 
expository device packaging Hohfeldian incidents, status also embodies underlying legal reasons and 
public concerns for the determination of legal incidents, further vindicating why they do appear in a 
specific package.
47
 The status of citizenship, bankruptcy, felony, lunacy, or minority confer ―not just 
reasons or [public] concerns for legal provisions one at a time (which might then be expounded 
seriatim or together, according to expository convenience), but they are reasons and concerns for 
generating the whole package of rights, duties, capacities, and liabilities of the person 
concerned.‖48Status is not redundant since it signifies more than the sum of legal incidents that it 
encapsulates.  
Dignity as Rank: from Law to Morality.  
Analogous to its employment in law, ―[t]he idea of single [or equal] moral status conveys‖ the familiar 
idea that ―we all have the same basic moral rights and we labor under the same array of basic moral 
duties.‖49 For the deployment of rank in morality, Waldron is adamant that it may be more adequate to 
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begin our exploration of dignity as a legal idea "and then look to see how that works in a normative 
environment (like morality) that is structured quite differently from the way in which a legal system is 
structured."50  
Certainly in the realm of law (I suspect, less significantly in morality) we may identify two contrasting 
categories of status: condition and sortal statuses. Condition statuses define a person's relative standing 
measured against established norms, and several bases of distinction in status maybe identified ranging 
from recognizable powers and authorities as in the status of a creditor or legal majority, to disabilities 
as in bankruptcy, felony and lunacy. These legal statuses apply to individuals in virtue of the conditions 
they are in, either by choice or brute luck. Sortal status, on the other hand, designates what sort of 
person that one is. It is a baseline representing a person's permanent position in the eyes of the law. In a 
dignitarian society there is but one sortal status.51  
The baseline sortal-status, Waldron maintains, ―is high enough to be termed a 'dignity'‖; it is the status 
of ―the bearer of an array of rights—rather than the status of someone who mostly labors under duties; 
it is the status of someone who can demand to be heard and taken into account.‖52  
What is interesting to see is how dignity conceived as a ranking status serves egalitarian goals. If 
dignity is primarily a legal idea, how does then law protect, recognize, or promote human dignity? 
Waldron remarks that there is a duality between general rules establishing the status and particular 
rules that protect it. Protecting individuals against degrading and humiliating treatment is one 
fundamental way in which law protects dignity. Some rights constitute human dignity, while, at the 
same time, dignity serves as their underlying content packaging particular rules protecting persons from 
degrading and humiliating treatments.  
Although human dignity is protected and at the same time constituted by rights, that is not all there is to 
tell about it; a good account of human dignity should also explain it as noble bearing- which refers to 
those intuitions Waldron calls 'moral orthopedics— ―having a certain sort of presence; uprightness 
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52
 Waldron Dignity, Rank and Rights, 59-60 
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[…]; self-possession and self-control; self-presentation as someone to be reckoned with; not being 
abject, pitiable, distressed or overly submissive in circumstances of adversity.‖53 What is expressed 
here is a responsibility to maintain, treasure and protect one's own dignity. It may appear that dignity as 
noble bearing emerges as an icing on the cake, adding flavour but little substance to dignity's normative 
core. However, without having to inflate its significance, dignity as noble bearing can be said to play a 
meaningful normative function. Waldron states that ―this element of noble bearing is normatively 
important... for the way one is treated by others; one must not be treated by others in ways that make a 
degraded bearing or a degraded self-presentation unavoidable.‖54 Perhaps that is partly the reason why 
slavery, torture, and related forms of degrading and humiliating treatments are considered as 
paradigmatic violations of human dignity. There is one feature that the above sort of wrongful actions 
share in common, namely that they are inherently designed to break down the victims' own sense of 
self-respect, by depriving him of self-possession and self-control. Similarly, but on the flip side of the 
above argument, there is a passage from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals that appears to champion the 
notion that dignity as noble bearing defines "duties to oneself". In the famous passage On Servility 
Kant claims that honouring the humanity in one's own person implies a duty not to diminish, forfeit or 
fail to vigorously defend it, including a positive requirement that one ought to display a dignified 
bearing and self-presentation. 
That being said, what distinguishes Waldron's theory from that of Kant and Darwall is that it privileges 
law over morality as the primary habitat of dignity.55 He claims that law is a normative system in its 
own right, and there is such a thing as legal philosophy, a body of thought within which legal concepts 
including dignity maybe analyzed and vindicated. It is not plausible to try to ground dignity as a legal 
concept on principles available only to critical morality, so he claims. This view, nonetheless, does not 
amount to a blanket denial of the possibility of a moral critique of the concept of human dignity. It 
merely asserts that, unlike law, morality is not an institutionalized order as "it may be harder to think of 
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(critical) morality as proceduralized in the way that legal systems obviously are",56even though moral 
philosophers sometimes employ institutional metaphors to convey their thoughts and reasons.  
Nevertheless, it seems to me that an argument for separating the legal analysis of dignity from dignity-
theorizing in critical morality does not, at the same time, serve as a reason for privileging law over 
morality. Despite my reservations about its overall plausibility, I still believe that Waldron's conceptual 
framework brings forth more illumination to our understanding of human dignity in morality than 
meets the eye.   
In my view, as far as human dignity is concerned, moral reasoning has precedence over legal analysis. 
According to Waldron, however, morality may enter the discourse in two peculiar ways. One way that 
moral analysis may figure in the discourse on human dignity is to ―evaluate law morally using 
(something like) law's very own dignitarian resources.‖57 This function is linked to a less compelling 
use that moral analysis maybe put to task, that is, moral theorists "can certainly talk of [sea] changes in 
our understanding of moral requirements", and using Waldron's framework make better sense of the 
declaration that human dignity involves an upward universalization of rank. One can grant Waldron the 
thesis that how we come to understand moral requirements that the idea of dignity brings to bear may 
mimic the evolution of status in the legal context.58 The point he is making is not only that ―our moral 
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 In the past, even some respected moral theorists used to defend the notion that there were different kinds of human 
beings, each with a moral status befitting its racial or cultural pedigree; but now we think that such an idea is morally 
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Enlightenment thought", that the supposed universal appeal of the dictum- "all men are born free and equal"- only operated 
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but far more sinister view was recently duplicated in a two-volume treatise in moral philosophy by Hastings Rashdall: A 
Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy, 2
nd 
Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924) Cf. 
Waldron Dignity, Rank and Rights pp. 68-69  
The reason why I have chosen to go with Hume and Kant is not to undermine their philosophical excellence, especially the 
latter's brilliant treatises in moral philosophy, but to underscore that those astonishing claims about inherent moral 
distinctions between human beings were not as remotely uncommon among philosophers as one may have initially thought. 
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views have moved upward in this respect‖ but also, and more importantly, that we pretty much left the 
higher status as it is, as a moral threshold. People of high status keep their privileges relating to their 
autonomy, as attacks on their personal dignity is still regarded as a sacrilege but now such protections 
are extended to everyone. Nonetheless, it is my contention that the metaphor of upward 
universalization is pertinent only for exegetic purposes- illustrative but not definitional, and therefore 
has little to do with the moral justification of dignity as rank.  
Even though Waldron's account were accepted as historically plausible, it lacks a (moral) normative 
basis. It is precisely on this score that I take issue with Waldron. Critical morality is ahistorical; there 
can be no upward progression of morality understood as a set of values, reasons and requirements; 
normative grounding of moral concepts is enduring, therefore immune from modification due to or in 
line with ―the spirit of the time‖. Waldron himself concedes that there is little connection between the 
historical progression of moral ideas and the grounding of their corresponding normative principles. 
Such acknowledgement of a gap is central to my critique of Waldron, and the fact that he overlooked 
its importance adds further fuel to my disagreement with him. 
The evolution of legal principles may, on the other hand, be an adequate source of normativity in law; I 
have no quarrel with him on that score. I acknowledge that to a certain extent legal reasoning is 
autonomous and every legal conception need not necessarily be justified by, and thereby rendered 
subservient to, an overarching moral theory. Waldron is correct in highlighting that "we should not 
assume that a legal analysis of dignity is just a list of texts and precedents, in national and international 
law, in which the word 'dignity' appears."59 In general, I believe he is right in insisting that "there is 
such a thing as legal philosophy, there is such a thing as legal principles, and it is a jurisprudence of 
dignity" that he is pursuing; but, I think, none of that gainsays the presumption "to treat dignity as a 
moral conception in the first instance or assume that a philosophical explication of dignity must begin 
as moral philosophy." 60  
It is not particularly problematic to say that, in the order of our understanding, the analysis of dignity 
may begin with law and then proceed to morality. But it will still be wrong to assume that our moral 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Instead, it had been a mainstream thought until as recently as mid 20th century when the notion of  moral equality took the 
centre stage in philosophical theorizing, wherein relics of the past still pop up at times camouflaged by the liberal self-
righteous and self-congratulatory notion of tolerance extended to 'the other' "out of charity" than as a matter of justice.  
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understanding of dignity is in any way dependent on the legal understanding. I think it is more 
reasonable to say, using Kant's metaphor (with respect to knowledge and experience), that 'our 
understanding of dignity as a moral idea may begin with its legal analysis but it by no means follow 
that the moral idea arises out of the legal analysis of dignity'.  
As a legal conception, the idea of dignity presupposes institutions that are tasked with juridical 
interpretation and enforcement of the principle of dignity. Absent these presumptions, it would lose 
what makes it distinctively a legal idea. This fact that law is institutional influences the normative 
vindication of principles that a legal conception advances. On the contrary, the moral idea makes no 
such presumption; if anything, it utilizes institutional metaphors such as the notion of the moral 
community or procedural metaphors like Rawls' "original position". Therefore, to start the analysis of 
dignity as a legal idea and then try to normatively vindicate the concept of dignity in morality using its 
juridical structure would be a flawed approach. In all fairness, that is not probably what Waldron was 
suggesting; but also in failing to suggest that, Waldron's advice for moral philosophers to mimic the 
legal structure in their moral analysis of dignity rings hollow. For the evolution of our moral thinking 
has no bearing whatsoever on the validity of moral principles, it is, therefore, beside the point in which 
order of understanding dignity figures in practical reason.  
That being said, I am profoundly skeptical about the veracity of Waldron's major premise, which states 
that a sound legal analysis of human dignity can be defended independently of any moral foundation. 
He did not provide a convincing argument for a purely legal analysis of human dignity; his lengthy 
historical analysis that purportedly shows an upward evolution of dignity as rank and companion 
declarations about the normative independence of law, merely scratch the surface without conferring 
much needed substance to his claim. 
 In addition, I think, one can vindicate a positive argument for an underlying moral foundation to a 
legal conception of dignity: as far as human dignity is concerned, I think there are valid reasons to 
suppose that its legal analysis ultimately requires a moral foundation. Take for instance, Waldron's 
conception of upward equalization of noble privileges, which must include a substantive criterion by 
which we can identify privileges that ought and those that ought not be universalized. He argues that 
positional privileges are not valid candidates for universalization; some, such as the privilege that 
accords the nobility a prerogative to speak first in public discourse, are logically impossible to 
universalize, whereas others ought to be modified to fit into the new egalitarian setting, for instance the 
right to have equal vote in every important decision on public policy is transformed into the notion of 
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representative democracy. But, since we may not cherry pick some privileges and christen them to 
everyone as valid entitlements, when it comes to injecting a principled scheme of delineating 
universalizable from non-universalizable noble privileges, we ought to rely on an underlying 
substantive conception of equality. Contrary to what Waldron would have us believe, I think ideas of 
legal equality (or simply legal personhood) do not suffice to accomplish that, not at least without the 
patronage of some conception of moral equality.  
I do, however, think that Waldron's legal analysis of dignity shades some light on the dual structure of 
human dignity: dignity engenders norms that establish it as a general normative status, and, at the same 
time, establishes specific norms that protect us from degrading and humiliating treatments that are aptly 
regarded as paradigmatic violations of human dignity. I commend Waldron for bringing into light the 
dual structure of dignity as a general status for possessing rights and some specific rights, in turn, 
designed to protect our dignity from direct moral violence. Nevertheless, I do not think his is the 
correct view. In particular, I think he is mistaken in claiming that the historical evolution of rank 
underlies deep equality. Human dignity, on the other hand, reflects deep equality that accords human 
beings basic equal respect and difference even in the state of nature.  Historical analysis of rank, to say 
the least, is not the most fitting framework for capturing ideas of equal respect and difference owed to 
human beings long before the emergence of the basic structures of society—to say nothing of modern 
society.  
 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
At the outset of this chapter I devised a contrast between the status view and the conception of dignity 
as value, and conjectured that dignity construed as value does not inform what is distinctively 
important about the concept of human dignity. I must reiterate that the value concept I alluded to, in 
contrast with status, is very distinct from the Kantian notion of 'value beyond price'. Value in the 
ordinary sense connotes a good or telos to be pursued or a metaphysical property to be treasured. 
Conceived as such, value theory is indeed the polar opposite of the status conceptions of human 
dignity. There are cogent reasons for resisting conceptualizing dignity as value in the sense described. 
The upshot is that, dignity is not a sort of value that underlies/justifies the possession of basic moral 
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rights. My point is that the logic by which normativity is accrued from the idea of dignity is quite 
unlike the ways in which normative constraints may flow from statements of value.61  
Furthermore, I argued that it is more plausible to read Kant's conception of dignity as an instance of the 
status view.62 In making sense of Kant's equation of "dignity" with incomparable worth, we should take 
seriously Elizabeth Anderson's distinction between appealing and commanding values "which if it 
works", and I think it does, "may bridge the gap between dignity as value-beyond-price and dignity as 
rank or authority."63 For Kant, the dignity of persons connotes a normative standing that commands 
respect, and also designates a complementary notion of noble bearing and moral presence. Despite his 
initial ambivalence about whether it would be adequate to consider Kant's view as a status conception, 
with the aid of Anderson's clarification, Waldron appears convinced that "[i]n this sense, dignity ceases 
to be a purely value-concept and takes on the character much more of a concept of normative status or 
considerability."64 
In defense of the status conception, I maintained that the status theory best illustrates how the 
dignitarian content added to certain violations of rights can render the action more objectionable than it 
would otherwise be without the dignitarian element, i.e., the latter adds stringency to rights. What I 
mean by the dignitarian content is something akin to what may be conveyed by the idea of respect-as-
respectfulness. Take murder, for example, which is an unjustified violation of the basic right to life. 
There can be a morally relevant distinction between murder simpliciter and murder by way of cruel, 
barbaric and inhumane methods and it is easy to see that the latter contains more dignitarian content. 
Whereas the barbaric and inhumane element constitutes violation of dignity as a right, the murder, i.e., 
the unjustified act of taking someone's life, violates the victim's dignity via the violation of the right to 
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life, which essentially constitutes a dignitarian content.65 Murder obliterates the very moral status for 
having any rights whatsoever; by eliminating the victim's future existence, it permanently forecloses 
the possibility of leading a dignified life. In addition, murder epitomizes treating a person as if she 
counts for nothing, and therefore violates the dignity of persons.  
Both senses of dignity violation are packaged into one specific act of heinous murder; and it is 
reasonable to say that the additional dimension that dignity brings forth in terms of respectfulness adds 
moral stringency to certain ways of treating people. Offenses to human dignity need not necessarily be 
attached to violations of basic moral rights. It does also figure in right violations that are not severe 
moral violations as murder, and still produces a comparable effect on the overall moral stringency of 
the moral prohibition against it. For the dignitarian content has little to do with the content of the right 
that is being violated, but the manners in which it is violated, i.e., the fact that the right violation occurs 
in a degrading and humiliating mode, thus there is no justified reason for relating human dignity 
distinctively to basic human rights.66 To be clear, the conception of dignity as moral status does not 
subscribe to the notion that human dignity is necessarily and peculiarly tied to a subset of human rights 
we call basic human rights. That does not, however, falsify the claim that some basic rights are 
specifically designed to protect us from direct assaults to our dignity. In particular, rights against 
degrading and humiliating treatments are pertinent to the protection of our basic status as human 
beings. Also the disclaimer that there is no principled relation between the most basic human rights and 
human dignity does not gainsay the observation that most incidents of dignity violation occur in 
conjunction with a violation of basic human right. Furthermore, some basic right violations partly 
involve degrading and humiliating treatments; torture, for example, fits this bill. And yet, the violation 
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 I acknowledge that it is contentious whether simple murder constitutes a violation of dignity. My view is that, it 
obliterates the moral status of an individual whose life ought matter. To the very least, murder involves treating a person as 
a mere means, to be discarded as if the person lacks a normative authority over matters essential to life including his 
continued existence.  
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  Recall that in the first chapter of this dissertation I said that  the most potent challenge to dignity theorizing declares that 
human dignity is an umbrella term encompassing basic moral rights. According to Birnbacher, the primary proponent of this 
view, human dignity has no content of itself and its most adequate function is to abbreviate the most basic human rights. 
Since human dignity does not occasion the delineation of some rights as basic, it is therefore substantively reducible to the 
most basic rights that it abbreviates—for expository purposes. However, by adopting what I consider to be the most 
plausible conception of dignity (as moral status), we can effectively counter the charge of substantive redundancy. Human 
dignity has no special relationship with basic human rights, hence its content does not intersect with the content of basic 
human rights. Nevertheless, it might be related to the most basic human rights in a different sense.  
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of dignity that torture engenders is not the only principal reason why torture constitutes a basic right 
violation.  
Finally, the idea of standing or normative authority distinctively resonates with the two salient features 
of the conception of dignity as moral status. Such resonance illustrates why the status theory vindicates 
a valid relationship between dignity and moral rights: we think of dignity as a general status and some 
rights as instances to that status whose content is, in turn, defined by dignity. The fact that dignity is, 
quite plausibly, conceived as the content of a right encompassing prohibitions against degrading and 
humiliating treatments maybe one of the reasons why we must not think of dignity as the justificatory 
ground for rights. For it would still beg the question what grounds the right the content of which is 
dignity itself.  After all, status is not reducible to a simple array of legal/moral incidents. For that 
reason, it may have multiple roles to play in the morality of rights than the too simplistic vision of 
dignity as a foundation.  
174 
 
Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
In this dissertation I defended the view that human dignity is the moral status or standing for having 
rights. The most important features of the status conception are the following: Firstly, the status 
conception of dignity envisages a dualistic relationship between human dignity and moral rights: as a 
general normative status dignity is presupposed by the possession of rights, and as a normative 
principle it is constituted by certain specific rights—rights that have to do with the protection of people 
from degrading and humiliating treatments. Secondly, the conception of dignity as moral status best 
accounts for paradigmatic violations of human dignity that are most familiarly described under the 
banner of 'cruel and inhuman treatments' including torture, humiliation and other similar ways of 
treating people as if they morally count for nothing. And thirdly, the conception of dignity as moral 
status adequately explains why our rights against 'cruel and inhuman treatments' have categorical moral 
force.   
I argued that dignity as moral status not only debunks the most telling skepticism against a positive 
appraisal of the concept in the discourse on moral rights, but also reflects the most profound and 
compelling thoughts about human dignity as a moral concept. The following concluding remarks will 
endeavor to show how the status conception responds or relates to other competing conceptions of 
human dignity. In regard to that, I will briefly discuss how the status theory responds to general and 
anticipated objections and further highlight what is so distinctive about the status conception that 
appears to clarify the concept of dignity with characteristic rigor in ways other conceptions do not.   
 
The Status Theory and Dignity Skepticism 
In Chapter 1, I recognized 'substantive redundancy' as one of the most forceful objections to any 
positive account of human dignity, not just specifically to the status conception. In a nutshell, the 
redundancy argument maintains that the core substantive meaning of human dignity can aptly be 
conveyed by, and is hence reducible to, a set of fundamental human rights. The principle of 
Menschenwürde (or human dignity) "has no specific content of its own" and "all the goods and rights 
protected by [it]...are also protected by other moral principles. In this...sense, then, the principle has no 
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specific content of its own."1 We can therefore dispense with dignity when thinking about the basic 
structure and normative foundations of moral rights, according to some proponents of the redundancy-
objection; that is because, they claim, human dignity is not "a principle postulating a good of its own."2 
Despite being substantively reducible to minimal individual rights "which themselves are postulated by 
other principles", what is distinctive to human dignity "is the priority it gives to certain minimal 
individual rights and claims" which it shields from potential trade-offs with other rights and claims, and 
consequently declare as inviolable.3 
As I stated elsewhere in this dissertation, by adopting what I consider to be the most plausible 
conception of human dignity (as moral status), we can effectively counter the charge of substantive 
redundancy. Note that the redundancy thesis does not exactly claim that dignity is without content, but 
only that  the concept of dignity designates a set of basic individual rights the content of which are 
defined by other moral principles. Therefore, to answer the redundancy objection, we must establish 
two points: (i) that the idea of human dignity has a content of its own, and (ii) that dignity is not a 
principle that prioritizes minimal individual rights, but a normative principle constituted by some basic 
rights the content of which is defined by none other than respect for the dignity of persons.  
There are two components to this second point: on the one hand, the conception of dignity as moral 
status disputes  a general relation between human dignity and basic moral rights, and on the other hand, 
it insists that human dignity is germane to the understanding of some basic right-claims than to others, 
even then, dignity's relationship with specific rights is not as a prioritizing principle.  
First and foremost, the status conception contends that a substantive theory of human dignity can be 
formulated and defended by delineating the types of treatment of people that directly display respect 
for the general moral status of the human person: any treatment of persons that distinctively reflect 
one's regard, honor, respect and veneration to the fact of their being human fits this bill. Or one can 
state it negatively by establishing paradigmatic violations of dignity, and then contrariwise extract and 
structure the essence of dignity's specific content as a distinct and indispensable content of human 
                                                          
1
  Dieter Birnbacher "Ambiguities in the Concept of Menschenwürde" in K. Bayertz (ed.), Sanctity of Life and  Human 
Dignity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 107-121, at. 112 
2
  Birnbacher "Ambiguities in the Concept of Menschenwürde", 112 
3
   Birnbacher "Ambiguities in the Concept of Menschenwürde", 112-3 
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dignity. The requirement to treat persons with regard and difference resonates with conferring equal but 
high moral status to persons; but on the flip side, certain actions essentially involve a direct violation of 
the dignity of persons. Treatments such as degradation and humiliation constitute the denial of the 
equal moral standing that each person is granted by the principle of human dignity, for they manifest a 
mode of relation which in its essence is based on an attitude of disrespect for the other. To humiliate or 
degrade the humanity in a person is to deny him the moral standing that he is in some fundamental 
sense the moral equal of anyone (and everyone). In this regard, I wish to point to the closing section of 
Chapter 1, in which I mentioned some examples ranging from the treatment of POWs to discriminatory 
institutional policies and social norms that, in my view, illustrate the essence of humiliation and 
degradation. I shall not restate them here, but only say that the examples showcased instances of direct 
outrages to human dignity. The apt of the story is that to disgrace, debase, ignoble, degrade or dishonor 
a person is to think of him as having a lesser claim for respect than should normally be accorded to 
persons by virtue of their humanity. And defined positively, dignity signifies gravity and the standing 
to address others as someone to be reckoned with, as someone who has basic claims, and as someone to 
be recognized and treated in ways that underscore that he is in some fundamental sense the equal of 
everyone.   
The moral standing that I consider high enough to be called dignity calls for the treatment of persons 
through the authority of the highest normative tools available to morality, i.e., through the possession 
of individual rights: To be endowed with human dignity then is to have the moral standing for the 
possession of rights. As a following step, the relationship between the most basic individual right-
claims and human dignity as a status concept must be laid down with clarity.  
As a moral standing for having rights, human dignity envisions no special relationship with basic moral 
rights since its content does not necessarily intersect with the content of the latter.  Considering dignity 
as a principle of ranking is not in consonance with the status theory either. What then is the precise 
relation between the principle of human dignity and basic rights? Indeed, basic right-claims against 
degrading and humiliating treatments can most concretely encapsulate the substantive core of human 
dignity. These rights are basic to the human person for the reason that they protect us from severe 
moral offenses to our person, but they are also paradigmatic instances of the principle of human dignity 
because they are meant to directly protect the moral standing of individuals. Other basic rights such as 
the right not to be tortured consist in the protection of our dignity; this is because torturing a person 
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designates one's manifest lack of regard for the moral standing of a fellow human being. Obviously 
torture violates dignity in some measure. But it is also morally objectionable for compelling reasons 
other than due to the fact that it signifies a manifest denial of the moral standing of victims or for the 
fact that victims of torture are treated as if they count for nothing. 
 But it is not always the case that a basic right violation conveys a dignitarian content. Take for instance 
an occasional violation of a basic right to liberty perpetrated on a fully competent grown-up man by his 
own obsessively paternalistic father. This simple breach to one's liberty is indeed a right violation, 
regardless of the that the father presumably wants nothing but a flourishing life for his son; it is not a 
violation of dignity nonetheless.   
I do not deny, however, that a violation of the basic right to liberty can simultaneously manifest a 
violation of human dignity. We may expand on the above example by introducing additional facts to it: 
say the father couldn't help himself from invading and dictating every aspect of his son's life, reducing 
the latter to a mere vehicle for his own vision of the good life. In these circumstances, the father has 
usurped his son's standing to decide what purpose is to be made of his body and mind. The son can't 
freely decide or do anything without securing his father's prior approval, in which case the hapless son 
is clearly not the author of his own life and hence treated by his father as if he lacks a normative 
authority or standing over essential aspects of his life, that is to live his life in his own terms. Therefore, 
in accordance with the status conception that I champion, this severe case of violation to a person's 
basic liberty rights entails the violation of his dignity. Clearly his dignity is at stake in this, though not 
in the former, case. Peter Schaber puts the point with characteristic rigor: he writes, "[t]he dignity of a 
person relates to the claim to be acknowledged as a being that is allowed to live his or her life 
according to his or her own ideas - in other words, to live a life with self-respect."4 
This is therefore to say that, according to the status conception, a  violation of human dignity does not 
eventuate simply because a violation of basic rights has taken place (unless those putative rights are 
composed entirely of specific rights against degrading and humiliating treatments). Nor will it be 
plausible to say that there can be a violation of dignity in the absence of a right violation.  
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   Peter Schaber, "Human Dignity, Self-Respect, and Dependency" in Paulus Kaufmann et. al. (eds.) Humiliation, 
Degradation and Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011): 151-158, at 153  
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That being said, I wish to put more emphasis on the idea that there is a duality in dignity's relationship 
with rights: dignity is the moral status for having rights, having any moral rights whatsoever, and 
dignity is also constituted by some rights. Does that then mean rights are derived from the inherent 
dignity of the human person? Does the status theory warrant the idea that dignity is foundational to 
moral rights?  
 
Status Conception of Dignity and the Foundation of Moral rights 
The above questions were considered in Chapter 2, where, by drawing on Jeremy Waldron‘s work, I 
identified four senses in which the notion of foundation could be understood: foundation as a matter of 
genealogy and history, as a source of legitimacy, as a valid source of reason (justification), and 
foundation understood in the sense of shedding light on another concept. I mentioned that foundation in 
the first sense has little or no bearing on the normativity of moral concepts. Whether the concept of 
dignity is prior to the idea of moral rights in the historical order, or for that matter in the genealogical 
sequence, of ideas is an issue that has no relevance to the question what underscores the normative grip 
right-claims have on us.  
One may, however, understand dignity as a foundation for rights in the third sense, i.e. as a genuine 
source of validity for right-claims—one that Waldron considers as "the most robust form of right 
foundationalism."  This sense of foundation is what most philosophers and legal scholars have in mind 
when declaring that rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. It has been argued that 
basic moral right-claims are derived analytically from propositions that reflect the dignity of the human 
person: propositions about the inherent dignity of the human person logically imply propositions about 
moral rights; so that one cannot assert dignity as a normative concept but deny the latter, at the pain of 
contradiction. Two famous philosophers make that claim—James Griffin and Alan Gewirth.5 Both 
basically "adopt normative agency as the [Gewirth would say, dialectically necessary] interpretation of 
                                                          
5
  James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Alan Gewirth, "Dignity as the Basis of Rights" 
in Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent (eds.) The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1992): 10-28 
179 
 
the 'dignity of the human person' when that phrase is used of [sic] the ground of human rights",6 but 
each went on slightly different argumentative routes to warrant that claim.  
The conception of dignity as moral status rejects that view, for a number of reasons. The first has to do 
with status conception's resistance towards linear derivation of moral (human) rights from one 
foundational principle. The pursuit of linear derivation of rights has two objectionable consequences: 
on the one hand, it overlooks the complex dualistic relation between dignity and rights—dignity as a 
general moral status for the possession of rights, and dignity as a normative principle constituted by 
certain rights; and on the other hand, linear derivation lends itself to the belief that all right violations 
are simultaneously violations of dignity, a normative consequence that status conception declare as 
untenable. Not to mention that dignity would lose its unique persuasion in morality if every right 
violation was to be considered as a violation of dignity at the same time, logical derivation cannot 
explain the normative locus of rights and why we need to take seriously the moral grip that right-claims 
have on us. The point is, in order to provide a compelling account of the foundations of rights more is 
needed than simply demonstrating the logical necessity of accepting a universal ascription of human 
dignity, which in turn serves to justify generic human rights. That is because a requirement not to 
contradict oneself, which lies at the heart of analytic foundationalism, does not substitute a normative 
moral reason for action.  
Throughout this dissertation I highlighted that one of the most defining features of the status 
conception is that it espouses two ways of relating human dignity with moral rights: it conceives of 
dignity as a general status for having rights as well as the content of certain rights that are related to it 
in some specific ways—that is to say dignity is constituted by some rights, rights that have to do with 
the prohibition of degrading and humiliating treatments. A foundation of the kind discussed in the 
above suggests that we take dignity as a basis for generating specific (human) rights claims, and 
admittedly may confer "an account of human rights on a more rigorous basis than the list of rights 
given in a legal charter."7 But, this foundationalism does not comport with the fundamental feature of 
dignity's relation to rights that I have discussed earlier, as it would specifically fail to account for 
dignity's deeper relation to some basic rights than to others.  
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  Griffin, On Human Rights, 152 
7
  Waldron, "Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?," in Rowan Cruft et. al (eds.) Philosophical Foundations of 
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 117- 137, 128.  
180 
 
Dignity has also been considered as a foundation in the looser sense "as a way of understanding the 
point of rights that will help us interpret particular right provisions as well as help us determine the 
spirit in which we should proceed in advancing rights-based claims."8The sort of understanding of a 
foundation considered here does not suggest a rigid linear approach for deriving and vindicating rights 
claims from the statement of a foundation. But the insight and understanding such a foundation might 
confer us ''depends on how robust the conception of dignity was taken to be".9On a more robust 
approach dignity might designate an underlying moral status in virtue of which we exact respect and 
difference from all others. If by shedding light Waldron meant that dignity is a normative 
presupposition for the possession of rights, then I will have to concede that human dignity may in that 
sense be understood as foundational to moral rights. 
A Response to Conceptualizing Human Dignity outside the Realm of  Rights 
Some philosophers deny that the sheer fact that most dignity violations occur simultaneously with a 
rights violation can provide a reason to suppose that human dignity is an indispensable element of the 
morality of rights, or vice versa. Respect for rights or the most basic claims of the human person will 
certainly foster human dignity: a society that routinely respects the rights of persons, for example, seem 
to correlatively accord basic respect and dignity to its members. Certainly, there is some dignity in 
being the right holder and in having one's basic rights and claims respected. But not, as Avishai 
Margalit puts the charge, because violation of some rights can be a paradigmatic instance of dignity 
violation. There  may be a correlation between the two, but that does not suggest causation or 
derivation of one from the other. Respect for rights engages the self-respect of persons in quite 
distinctive ways to how respecting the dignity of persons engages self-respect. So in the same way, "the 
violation of rights involves a diminution of self-respect", while the violation of dignity involves 
"humiliating gestures that are not naturally related to rights."10  
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The distinction that I described in Chapter 3 between the violation of rights and the manners in which 
rights are violated is pertinent here. There I also have recognized that humiliating gestures might 
sometimes be embedded in, though not constitutive to, rights violations, in which case I agree with the 
basic premise that the violation of dignity is analytically separable from right violations per se. It is 
important, however, to distinguish two normative consequences of the above distinction. The first – 
and I believe valid – implication is that some right violations are not occasioned by dignity violations. 
But the second consequence, that Margalit wants to prove, has it that dignity violations can occur 
independently of a parallel or antecedent violation of a right. I challenge this second ramification of the 
separation thesis.  
It is one thing to say that humiliating gestures signify the manner in which a right is violated but not the 
bare fact of the violation of the right, and quite another to say that humiliating gestures are naturally 
unrelated to rights. But there is no argument for precluding gestures from being included in the content 
of a right; on the contrary, right-claims against degrading and humiliating treatments encapsulate 
prescriptions against certain attitudes and gestures. It is this mandatory relation between attitude and 
respect that provides us the principal reason why certain ways of treating people are considered 
degrading or humiliating. For that reason, the status conception rejects as unwarranted the assertion that 
humiliating gestures are unrelated to rights.  
I do not, however, mean to suggest that gestures and mannerisms are the only mediums for violating 
the dignity of persons. Of course, there are right violations that inherently violate dignity without 
necessarily including gestures and outward expressions of contempt. Human dignity is 
paradigmatically violated, for example, in the case of torture – not due to the pain inflicted on the 
victims, or the particular details of how the act  was carried out, but "because it is used to make it clear 
to the victims that they do not count, that they are fully dominated."11 
In chapter 4 and 5, I laid down the basic argumentative framework of the status conception of human 
dignity, by first clarifying the concept of moral status, then in Chapter 5 by submitting my case in 
defense of a particular strand of the status theory in contrast to other versions of it. In clarifying the 
concept of moral status, I identified four senses of what having a moral status might mean: to say that 
X has moral status means (i) how moral agents treat X is morally important, (ii) X is a direct object of 
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moral obligation or that it counts morally in itself, (iii) in its own right and for its own sake X gives us 
a reason to constrain our actions and behaviour towards it, i.e. X has interests, and (iv) X is owed 
duties. I argued that the sense of moral status that is consistent with basic intuitions about human 
dignity is (iv). We think that to be endowed with human dignity means to have a normative presence 
that morally compels others to grant respect and difference to those who are possessed of it—human 
beings. It, therefore, implies that human dignity is also a normative principle that imposes categorical 
duties. The other three senses of moral status do not, however, imply categorical duties.  
In chapter 5 I also sought to explicate human dignity within the framework of degrees of moral status 
wherein having dignity implies occupying a higher moral status without, at the same time, denying 
other things from having some sort of morally recognizable status. It is, therefore, consistent with the 
conception of human dignity as moral status to maintain that other sentient beings have moral status, in 
one of the other three senses, and that we are morally prohibited to do certain things to them. 
Nevertheless, the claims emanating from the other senses to moral status have weaker moral force 
when pitted against dignity claims. The dignity of persons, on the other hand, implies the status of 
someone who is inviolable.  
Consistent with the general notion that human dignity is a moral status in the fourth sense, we can find 
two competing substantive conceptions in the discourse about human dignity. There are conceptions 
that regard status as a sort of value or worth, and there are those that conceive of the moral status 
dignity confers to us in terms of high rank and honor. Many philosophers gravitate towards the 
conception of dignity as an inherently valuable status. I have one problem with this interpretation 
because worth or value, unless conceived in a strictly technical Kantian sense, does not seem to 
comport with the logic of rights. For rights appear to function normatively as constraints on the pursuit 
and promotion of values. I also recognized in Chapter 5 a proper clarification is needed to demonstrate 
that, for Kant, dignity is not purely a value-concept but instead takes the form and substance of high-
ranking normative standing. I will not here discuss in detail the arguments for this particular 
interpretation of Kantian dignity. Kant writes that "[a] human being regarded as a person...possesses a 
dignity...by which he exacts respect from all other rational beings in the world." (TL 434-5) He asserts 
that respect must be accorded ―to even a vicious man as a human being; I cannot withdraw at least the 
respect that belongs to him in his equality as a human being, even though by his deeds he makes 
himself unworthy of it.‖ (TL 6:462-463) Kant insists that respect for the dignity of persons requires 
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moral protection from three cardinal vices that are paradigmatic forms of disrespect to the humanity in 
the person: arrogance, defamation and ridicule. Thought of in this way, respect for the dignity of 
persons "includes the respect we must show people just out of recognition of their status as people."12 
Stephen Darwall echoes this sentiment when he states that the respect that dignity commands is 
'recognition respect': according "equal status in the moral community, understood as a community of 
mutually accountable free and rational agents."13 For both Kant and Darwall, the normative authority to 
demand respect not only implies that one is owed duties but it also requires that one must be a free and 
rational person who can be held to morally account. In that sense, the dignity or authority of persons is 
second-personal. Although the notion of standing or normative authority distinctively resonates with 
the conception of dignity as moral status, it seems to me that this particular conception does not capture 
the essence of being endowed with human dignity. To be clear, for Kant and Darwall, to have the 
normative authority and to be a moral agent are mutually interdependent. However, the most salient 
feature of human dignity is that all human beings are endowed with it regardless of their moral 
capacity, of which moral agency clearly requires. I do, however, think that dignity confers us an equal 
normative standing to possess rights, but it does not particularly require that one is a moral agent.  
On the argumentative structure of the status conception of dignity, I draw from Jeremy Waldron's 
insightful analysis of dignity in his book—Dignity, Rank, and Rights, in particular the dualistic 
relationship he envisaged between a general normative status and rights as particular instances to that 
status is very pertinent to my reconstruction of the status conception of dignity in morality. I believe his 
legal analysis of dignity shades light on the dual structure of human dignity: dignity engenders norms 
that establish it as a general normative status, and, at the same time, includes specific norms that protect 
us from degrading and humiliating treatments that are aptly regarded as paradigmatic violations of 
human dignity. Waldron argues that dignity "has roots in the thick reality of historically existing 
schemes of rank and nobility.‖14 He underscores that the account of dignity that he offers is not 
inconsistent with human dignity's egalitarian base, arguing that "the notion of human dignity involves 
an upwards equalization of rank, so that we now try to accord to every human being something of the 
                                                          
12
  Ronald Dworkin, Justice For Hedgehogs, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 205 
13
  Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 244 
14
  Jeremy Waldron ―Dignity and Rank‖ European Journal of Sociology  Vol. 48, Issue 2 (August 2007): 201-237, 230 
184 
 
dignity, rank and expectation of respect that was formerly accorded to nobility."15  However, I do not 
think his is the correct view. I disagree with him with respect to his conviction that the historical 
evolution of dignity as rank confers the normative foundation for its current use. To the contrary, I 
believe human dignity accords all human beings basic respect and difference even in the state of nature. 
I, therefore, think he is mistaken in privileging law over morality as to the issue of dignity's natural 
habitat, and I took issue with him on that score.   
In this dissertation, I have only proposed an approach of conceptualizing human dignity in a moral 
theory that positions the concept of rights at its normative core. But pretty little has been said about the 
politics of identifying the principles of justice consistent with our conception of human dignity. I agree 
with Drowrkin that "[w]e must develop our conception of what dignity requires further than we yet 
have, so that we can identify a politics that is consistent with it."16 A politics based on status 
differences, or that mainstreams tribal obligations, or one which asserts that racial, ethnic, religious or 
linguistic connections confer the basis for rights and obligations do not past the litmus test of equal 
respect and difference that the conception of dignity as moral status has set in place. To the very least, 
nothing in my defense of human dignity as moral status lends them any moral support.  
Without respect for dignity humanity will go awry, and a politics that does not recognize and 
mainstream the dignity of persons is bound to cause any society loose one of its saving graces.   
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